Inter-sectoral economic linkages in the mining industries of Botswana and Tanzania:Analysis using partial hypothetical extraction method

Fiscal and local content policies aimed at promoting linkages between mining and other economic sectors have been informed by theories built on historical observations dating back to the 1950s. This paper contends that there is a need to rethink theories about mining-based economic linkages and the prospects for structural change based on an improved understanding of existing and potential inter-sectoral linkages. Using the input–output tables for Tanzania and Botswana, we apply the Partial Hypothetical Extraction Method within the Leontief and Gosh input–output frameworks to examine the linkages between the mining and quarrying sector and other economic sectors within these two economies. We find that, for Botswana, possible linkage pathways lie in scaling-up coal, soda ash and salt mining and investing in glass, polymer, and chemicals manufacturing. For Tanzania, opportunities for linkage pathways lie with the mining and manufacturing of non-metallic and construction materials as well as metallic minerals and natural gas. For both countries, the prospects for transforming their economies away from a heavy reliance on mineral extraction hinges on leveraging extractives for infrastructure, innovative technology, and technical skills, as well as capturing business opportunities, knowledge, and financial returns to invest in more diversified economic activities.</p

Central bank independence in East African countries: the case of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania

This paper presents a critical assessment of the legal and actual independence of central banks in three East African economies. It applies one de facto and four de jure measures of CBI and reveals that the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) and Bank of Tanzania (BOT) had a higher actual independence in their early years of formation than in 1990–2006, while the Bank of Uganda (BOU) had a higher actual independence in 1986–2006 than in 1979–1986. The legal independence of the CBK and BOT has improved with the stipulation of a single policy objective, constrained finance amount and market determined interest rate on loans to government, as well as improved accountability. However, the method of appointment for governors, the term of office and dismissal of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the two central banks as well as the BOU reflect less independence. The amended statute of the BOU is less reformed for it does not specify a single policy objective, allows a higher amount of loan to the government, and is less accountable

Evaluating conflict risks in Africa’s resource governance

The risks of conflict associated with extractive industries in Africa need to be factored in to policymaking in a more rigorous and informed manner. More-accurate, disaggregated data is needed to evaluate the link between extractive activities and incidents of conflict at sub-national, national, and transnational levels. To understand the varied types of resource conflict across Africa, it is necessary to grasp how political settlements shape the extractive industries (and vice versa). Politics plays a role in how resource conflict is perceived, addressed, and ultimately either resolved or made worse by regulation and policy. Case studies of three countries in east Africa demonstrate the broad spectrum of conflict risks related to mineral and energy resources exploration and production that exists in the continent. Multi-stakeholder mechanisms for more-inclusive governance of natural resources can be used throughout the natural resource governance value chain to address the conflict risks at every level