Transportation and land-use preferences and residents’ neighborhood choices: the sufficiency of compact development in the Atlanta region

This paper analyzes the transportation and land-use preference and actual neighborhood choices of a sample of 1,455 residents of metro Atlanta. We develop a stated-preference scale on which desires for neighborhood type are gauged, from preferences for low-density, auto-oriented environments to desires for compact, walkable, and transit-oriented neighborhoods. This scale is then related to desires for change in one’s own neighborhood characteristics after a hypothetical move. If all neighborhood preferences were equally likely to be satisfied, then neighborhood preferences would not be correlated with a desire for change. By contrast, in the current study, stronger preferences for a more walkable environment are associated with greater desire for change in one’s neighborhood characteristics. This suggests an undersupply of compact, walkable, and transit-friendly neighborhood types relative to current demand. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007Zoning, Land-use regulation, Stated preference, Residential choice, Smart growth, Compact development,

Public choice principles of redistricting

This paper uses fundamental principles of public choice, mainly the median voter theorem, to develop a simple theory of redistricting. The focus is on how closely policy outcomes correspond to majority rule. The main results are: (1) Potential policy bias in favor of nonmajority groups is structurally linked to the number of legislative seats and the population, and the structure of most states puts them very close to the theoretically maximum bias. (2) Random districting, which might seem like the essence of neutrality, does not eliminate policy bias on average. (3) Traditional principles of compact, contiguous districts that respect existing political boundaries, stressed in the Supreme Court’s Shaw v. Reno decision, minimize the chance of nonmajoritarian outcomes. Our analysis also offers a gerrymandering explanation for the positive relation between seats and spending that is usually taken as support for the “Law of 1/n.” Copyright Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2006Redistricting, Voting rights, Median voter,