Review: Physics II for Dummies by Steven Holzner

No abstract available

Defining Normativity

This paper investigates whether different philosophers’ claims about “normativity” are about the same subject or (as recently argued by Derek Parfit) theorists who appear to disagree are really using the term with different meanings, in order to cast disambiguating light on the debates over at least the nature, existence, extension, and analyzability of normativity. While I suggest the term may be multiply ambiguous, I also find reasons for optimism about a common subject-matter for metanormative theory. This is supported partly by sketching a special kind of hybrid view of normative judgment, perspectivism, that occupies a position between cognitivism and noncognitivism, naturalism and nonnaturalism, objectivism and subjectivism, making it more plausible that radically different metanormative theories could be about the same thing. I explore three main fissures: between (i) the “normativity” of language/thought versus that of facts and properties, (ii) abstract versus substantive senses, and (iii) formal versus robust senses

Testimony, Faith and Humility

© Cambridge University Press 2020.It is sometimes claimed that faith is a virtue. To what extent faith is a virtue depends on what faith is. One construal of faith, which has been popular in both recent and historical work on faith, is that faith is a matter of taking oneself to have been spoken to by God and of trusting this purported divine testimony. In this article, I argue that when faith is understood in this way, for faith to be virtuous then it must be accompanied by intellectual humility. I defend this view by showing how someone ought to respond to purported divine testimony if her faith is to be intellectually humble, and how, if it fails in this respect, it will instead be accompanied by the vices of either servility or arrogance.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

The diversity and ecological role of protozoa in fresh waters

Protozoa feed on and regulate the abundance of most types of aquatic microorganisms, and they are an integral part of all aquatic microbial food webs. Being so small, aerobic protozoa thrive at low oxygen tensions, where they feed (largely unaffected by metazoan grazing) on the abundance of other microorganisms. In anaerobic environments, they are the only phagotrophic organisms, and they live in unique symbiotic consortia with methanogens, sulphate reducers and non-sulphur purple bacteria. The number of extant species of protozoa may be quite modest (the global number of ciliate species is estimated at 3000), and most of them probably have cosmopolitan distributions. This will undoubtedly make it easier to carry out further tasks, e.g. understanding the role of protozoan species diversity in the natural environment

Adults in further education: A policy overview

Policy on FE is aimed at tackling social exclusion and contributing to economic efficiency. Several measures have contributed to increasing both participation and achievements of adults yet the needs of many of the most disadvantaged adults remain unmet. Since further education colleges are key institutions in the delivery of initiatives such as Skills for Life and Train to Gain, the impact of these initiatives has a major impact on the services they provide for adults. FE colleges are concerned about the impact of the contestability agenda on this provision. Many FE colleges are also concerned about the effects of reductions in funding for provision that is not clearly employment related, and also the restrictions on funding for ESOL. The main challenge faced by FE colleges is getting the balance between individual, State and employer funding for courses. This is a difficult message to get over to those who can afford to pay but who have benefited from free or heavily subsidised provision. The state has a responsibility to ensure that those who can least afford to pay have their education funded. It also has a responsibility to ensure that institutions with wider social remits can compete fairly with those with commercial agenda who can 'cherry pick' low-cost, high return activities

Review: Genome Duplication: Concepts, Mechanisms, Evolution and Disease by Melvin L DePamphilis and Stephen D Bell

No abstract available

Review: Chemistry of the Solar System by Katharina Lodders and Bruce Fegley, Jr

No abstract available

Disagreement Lost and Found

According to content-relativist theories of moral language, different speakers use the same moral sentences to say different things. Content-relativism faces a well-known problem of lost disagreement. Recently, numerous content-relativists (including the author) have proposed to solve this problem by appeal to various kinds of non-content-based, or broadly pragmatic, disagreement. This presents content-relativists with a new problem—of found agreement. Which (if any) of these newly identified kinds of conflict is correctly identified as the lost moral disagreement we were looking for? This paper offers a critical comparison of different content-relativist proposals. It divides them into two broad categories, quasi-expressivist theories (QED) and metalinguistic theories (MLD). Objections to each are considered, and QED is tentatively found to be superior

The Moral and Evidential Requirements of Faith

© 2019 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion.What is the relationship between faith and evidence? It is often claimed that faith requires going beyond evidence. In this paper, I reject this claim by showing how the moral demands to have faith warrant a person in maintaining faith in the face of counter-evidence, and by showing how the moral demands to have faith, and the moral constraints of evidentialism, are in clear tension with going beyond evidence. In arguing for these views, I develop a taxonomy of different ways of irrationally going beyond evidence and contrast this with rational ways of going against evidence. I then defend instances of having a moral demand to have faith, explore how this stands in tension with going beyond and against evidence, and develop an argument for the claim that faith involves a disposition to go against, but not beyond evidence.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio