Music, sounds, the Stradivarius and the computer: A dialogue between the music-maker and the music-listener

In what might be described as an 'ecological' spirit, here I recycle an ancient form, the dialogue. I find the dialogue form particularly appealing for its potential to encapsulate ideas both as content and form. This dialogue, between the music-maker and music-listener, is intended as an allegory that uses accessible language in a contemporary, conversational style. From an epistemological perspective, the split maker-listener may be viewed as a fabrication that subsumes numerous conflicts at personal, group and societal levels. The text is about creativity, freedom and ownership, about concept, percept and practice within multidisciplinary and multicultural contexts. It can be reconstructed in different ways when the music-maker and the music-listener are personified under a multitude of guises within multiple contexts. I have added a bibliographic list following the dialogue that includes some examples of the background reading that has helped to shape the thinking underlying the text. In particular, I have been deeply influenced by Gregory Bateson's writings, especially his 'metalogues', a collection of humorous, deceptively light dialogues that do not specify theatrical elements. I feel this lack of obvious affective content in the text allows readers to construe their own views of how the negotiation of discourses may take place, regardless of what I may have imagined or thought to have implied – or not – using a few italicised words

On the finite space blow up of the solutions of the Swift-Hohenberg equation

The aim of this paper is to study the finite space blow up of the solutions for a class of fourth order differential equations. Our results answer a conjecture in [F. Gazzola and R. Pavani. Wide oscillation finite time blow up for solutions to nonlinear fourth order differential equations. Arch. Ration. Mech. Anal., 207(2):717--752, 2013] and they have implications on the nonexistence of beam oscillation given by traveling wave profile at low speed propagation.Comment: 24 pages, 2 figure

Oligopolistic Competition as a Common Agency Game

In applying the common agency framework to the context of an oligopolistic industry, we want to go beyond the classical dichotomy between Cournot and Bertrand competition. We define two games, the oligopolistic game and the corresponding concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, and an associated auxiliary game that can be interpreted as a common agency game and that has the same set of equilibria. The parameterization of the set of (potential) equilibria in terms of competitive thoughness is derived from the first order conditions of the auxiliary game. The enforceability of monopolistic competition, of price and quantity competition, and of collusion is examined in this framework. We then describe the (reduced) set of equilibria one would obtain, first in the non-intrinsic case and then in the case where a global approach would be adopted instead of partial equilibrium approach. Finally, we illustrate the use of the concept of oligopolistic equilibrium and of the corresponding parameterization by referring to the standard case of symmetric quadratic utility.

Household behavior and individual autonomy.

The paper proposes a model of household behavior with both private and public consumption where the spouses independently maximize their utilities, but taking into account, together with their own individual budget constraints, the collective household budget constraint with public goods evaluated at Lindahl prices. The Lagrange multipliers associated with these constraints are used to parameterize the set of equilibria, in addition to the usual parameterization by income shares. The proposed game generalizes both the ‘collective’ model of household behavior and the non-cooperative game with voluntary contributions to public goods.Intra-household allocation, household financial management, degree of autonomy, Lindahl prices, local income pooling, separate spheres.

Household behavior and individual autonomy: A Lindahl approach.

A comprehensive model of economic household decision is presented which incorporates both fully cooperative and fully non-cooperative variants, parameterized by the income distribution, as well as a semi-cooperative variant, parameterized in addition by a vector B, representing the degrees of individual autonomy. In this comprehensive model, the concept of "household B-equilibrium" is introduced through the reformulation of the Lindahl equilibrium in strategic terms. Existence is proved and some generic properties of the household B-equilibrium derived. An example is given to illustrate. Finally a particular decomposition of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix is derived and the testability of the various models discussed.Intra-household allocation, household financial management, degree of autonomy, Lindahl prices, local income pooling, separate spheres.

Household behavior and individual autonomy

intra-household allocation, household financial management, degree of autonomy, Lindahl prices, local income pooling, separate spheres