Uncertainty in a mixed duopoly with quadratic costs

In this paper, we consider a mixed market with uncertain demand, involving one private firm and one public firm with quadratic costs. The model is a two-stage game in which players choose to make their output decisions either in stage 1 or stage 2. We assume that the demand is unknown until the end of the first stage. We compute the output levels at equilibrium in each possible role. We also determine ex-ante and ex-post firms’ payoff functions

Dinâmica simbólica e ferradura de Smale

Descrevemos a “ferradura de Smale”, um sistema dinâmico bem conhecido que apresenta um conjunto de propriedades muito importantes em Sistemas Dinâmicos. O estudo da dinâmica da “ferradura de Smale” permitenos entender a importância do conceito de dinâmica simbólica.We describe the Smale horseshoe, a well-known dynamical system that presents a set of properties which are very important in Dynamical Systems. The study of the dynamics of the Smale horseshoe allows us to understand the importance of the notion of symbolic dynamics

Privatização num mercado misto com decisões sequenciais

Consideramos um mercado no qual competem uma empresa pública e uma empresa privada, decidindo, de forma sequencial, as quantidades a produzir. O governo impõe um imposto sobre as quantidades comercializadas, de acordo com uma função que consiste numa soma ponderada entre o bem-estar público e a receita total obtida pela aplicação desse imposto. O objetivo deste trabalho é estudar o efeito da privatização da empresa pública, (i) quando a empresa líder é a empresa pública; e (ii) quando a empresa líder é a empresa privada. Além disso, fazemos uma comparação entre os resultados obtidos nos dois modelos estudados.We consider a market in which a public firm and a private firm compete by deciding, sequentially, the quantities to be produced. The government imposes a tax on the quantities, according to a function that is a weighted sum of the welfare and the total revenue obtained by applying this tax. The aim of this paper is to study the effect of privatization, (i) when the leader is the public firm; and (ii) when the leader is a private firm. Furthermore, we do a comparison between the results from the two models

Privatization and productive efficiency in an international Stackelberg mixed duopoly

We consider a Stackelberg mixed market in which a state-owned welfare-maximizing (domestic) public firm competes against a profit-maximizing (foreign) private firm. We suppose that the domestic firm is less efficient than the foreign private firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of privatization on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare. We show that privatization lowers productive efficiency of the domestic firm, regardless of whether the domestic firm is leader or follower. Furthermore, we also show that privatization of the domestic public firm deteriorates the domestic social welfare, regardless of whether the domestic firm is leader or follower.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Price-quantity-setting mixed duopoly models: market opening

Usually, market models analyse competition between firms with either quantity or price as decision’s variables. This paper considers mixed duopoly competitions in which a state-owned public firm and a private firm produce complementary goods. We analyse, separately, the model in which the state-owned public firm sets the price and the private firm chooses the output production; and the model in which the state-owned public firm sets the output production and the private firm chooses the price. By considering domestic and international models, we analyse the effects of opening the market to a foreign firm. We also compare the results obtained with different types of decision variables. This paper contributes to the understanding of the implications of firms’ decisions on social welfare. As a result, the paper shows that, in the domestic competition, social welfare is higher when the state-owned public firm sets price and the domestic private firm sets production outputs than in other competitions. Furthermore, when the market is opened to foreign firms, social welfare is higher when both firms set prices than in other competitions.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Online hotel ratings e a sua influência nos preços dos hotéis: o caso de Lisboa, Portugal

Lisbon is one of the European Union cities that has one of the highest growth in the number of hotels. With the digital revolution, travelers can easily not only compare prices but also get information about the experience of other guests which can influence prices. The aim of this paper is to analyze how prices for a hotel stay can be influenced by some quality signaling factors, as star rating and online consumer’s ratings (location, cleanliness, comfort, facilities, staff and value for money, available on Booking.com), the volume of consumer’s comments and the availability of rooms in Lisbon. For 151 hotels in Lisbon, from 3 to 5 stars, through a multiple regression model, the results suggest that hotel category, location and facilities ratings have a positive influence on hotel room rates, but higher trade-off between what clients pay and the guest hotel stay experience has a negative impact on the consumer’s willingness to pay, as well as the number of comments. Among different hotel categories, the influent factors are different. Our main findings provide signs to hoteliers to take corrective actions towards the attributes most valuable for consumers and that can provide a higher room rate premium.Lisboa é uma das cidades da União Europeia onde o número de hotéis tem tido uma das maiores taxas de crescimento. Com a revolução digital os turistas podem facilmente comparar preços bem como obter informações acerca da experiência dos hóspedes, o que pode influenciar os preços. O objetivo deste artigo é o de analisar de que forma os preços podem ser influenciados por fatores sinalizadores de qualidade, como a categoria (número de estrelas), avaliações online (localização, limpeza, conforto, comodidades, funcionários e relação qualidade/preço, disponíveis no booking.com), o número de comentários dos hóspedes e a disponibilidade de quartos em Lisboa. Para 151 hotéis, de 3 a 5 estrelas, através de um modelo de regressão múltipla, os resultados sugerem que a categoria do hotel, os ratings de localização e comodidades têm uma influência positiva no preço, mas um maior trade-off entre o que os clientes pagam e a experiência que usufruem tem um impacto negativo na vontade de pagar, assim como o número de comentários. Verifica-se, ainda, que os fatores influentes diferem entre hotéis com diferentes categorias. Os resultados fornecem pistas para os hoteleiros promoverem ações corretivas relativamente aos atributos mais valorizados e que podem proporcionar um maior prémio no preço dos quartos.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Licensing under Cournot vs Bertrand competition

In this paper we consider, on one hand, a differentiated Cournot model, and, on the other hand, a differentiated Bertrand model, when one of the firms engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim of the present paper is two-fold. The first is to study the licensing of the costreduction by a per-unit royalty and a fixed-fee in these Cournot and Bertrand models. The second is to do a direct comparison between Cournot model and Bertrand model. We analyse the implications of these types of licensing contracts over the R&D effort, the profits of the firms, the consumer surplus and the social welfare. We show that some previous results for two-part tariff licensing are not robust, in the sense that they can be not true for just either a per-unit royalty contract or a fixed-fee contract. Furthermore, by using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods assumes a great importance in the results. We also discuss the optimal licensing, meaning that which licensing method is preferred, in each of the duopoly models considered.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Price-setting hotel competition with corporate social responsibility

Pricing plays an important role in any market competition, but particularly in those businesses that hold a seat in hyper competitive economic activities such as hotels. This paper analyses a market competition between one corporate social responsibility (CSR) hotel and one for profit (FP) hotel, in which both hotels set room prices. We study three different market behaviors: (i) both hotels take their decisions simultaneously; (ii) the CSR hotel takes the leader position; (iii) the FP hotel takes the leader position. For each situation, by using game theory techniques, we compute the different outcomes of the model at equilibrium. We also describe the effects of CSR on the outcomes.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Mapping industry 4.0 in the Portuguese industry

With Industry 4.0 and digital transformation, organisations have undergone enormous changes in business models, engineering, manufacturing, processes, and technologies. Hence, the need to investigate the status of its current knowledge and maturity. This research, supported by a survey for data collection (fifty valid responses), aims to analyse the knowledge and maturity (on a five-scale level) of Industry 4.0 in Portugal from the perspective of industrial companies. The conclusions highlight that the Portuguese organisations will have to adapt to the impact of Industry 4.0 on how their business is being developed and encompass the digitisation with new technologies. Unfortunately, adopting the concepts and methodologies inherent to Industry 4.0 is still incipient in Portugal, suggesting a possible lack of knowledge and poor leadership. Companies need to strategically change towards business models that are more flexible to the potential of technology and have a closer relationship with customers, ensuring increased operational autonomy and repositioning products and services. Having a team dedicated to digitisation increases the Industry 4.0 maturity level. Companies with a maturity Medium/High level of Products and Innovations have a higher level of perception based on their capacity for innovation, supported by new digital models and tools. Concerning Human Resources, the digitisation of knowledge management means and the promotion of new ideas for digital transformation increases its I4.0 maturity level. This study contributes to the start of the art of Industry 4.0 in Portuguese companies, mapping its present status, and providing insights for its future enhanced adoption.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio