2 research outputs found
La teorĂa de principal-agente en los estudios sobre ciencia y tecnologĂa
Este trabajo presenta la TeorĂa de Principal-Agente y la forma en que se ha establecido en los Ăşltimos años en los estudios de ciencia y tecnologĂa. Para ello describe, primero, la propia teorĂa y la forma en que la han desarrollado la economĂa y la ciencia polĂtica. El trabajo revisa el modo en que estas disciplinas la han utilizado para explicar problemas relacionados con ciencia y tecnologĂa o que los tocan lateralmente. DespuĂ©s se ocupa de las aplicaciones concretas en los llamados estudios de ciencia y tecnologĂa. El artĂculo propone que la teorĂa se relaciona con las teorĂas clásicas de la disciplina, de las que a veces es sĂłlo una formalizaciĂłn. Como propone, por fin, que las debilidades de la teorĂa se deben antes a su mal uso y a su escaso desarrollo que a sus posibilidades reales, a juzgar por su Ă©xito en otras ciencias sociale
Political Regimes, Bureaucracy and Scientific Productivity
Can a scientist trust that the government is going to pay him or her fairly? In the science–government relationship, an incumbent may be better off if he or she does not provide—or does not provide a fair pay to public scientists. We propose a simple game-theoretic model for understanding the trust problem in the relationship between governments and scientists. The model shows how with reliable governments (democracies), bureaucratic contracts (e.g., secure tenure) are not optimal since they have low-powered incentives (in contrast to the high-powered private-sector type of contracts) and run against scientists' responsiveness to government demands. However, with nonreliable governments (dictatorships), bureaucratic contracts are second-best solutions because they protect scientists against the possibility of governments' misbehavior (i.e., ex post opportunistic defections, such as canceling research programs overnight). An empirical analysis confirms the predictions: bureaucratic contracts enhance scientific productivity with nonreliable governments (dictatorships) but hamper scientific productivity with reliable governments (democracies)