Book review: Singapore and Switzerland: secrets to small states success edited by Yvonne Guo and Jun Jie Woo

What makes a small state succeed? In Singapore and Switzerland: Secrets to Small State Success, editors Yvonne Guo and Jun Jie Woo explore this question through two cases that have shown similar economic performance by balancing international forces and domestic demands. This is a far-reaching overview of the mechanisms that have shaped the successes – and some failures – of Singapore and Switzerland that will be of use to students and researchers of business studies, public policy and comparative politics, finds Michele Fenzl

Book review: Uninformed: why people know so little about politics and what we can do about it by Arthur Lupia

Are citizens fundamentally uninformed – or even misinformed – when it comes to questions of politics and government? In Uninformed: Why People Knows So Little About Politics and What We Can Do About It, Arthur Lupia tackles the issue of political ignorance by arguing that rather than simply seeking to provide greater information to the public on political issues, the more pressing concern for those positioning themselves in the role of ‘civic educators’ is how to communicate effectively. Michele Fenzl finds this one of the best scholarly engagements with the question of political ignorance, offering practical strategies that will not only be of use to political ‘instructors’, but to anyone interested in education and effective communication

Book review: social advantage and disadvantage edited by Hartley Dean and Lucinda Platt

Social Advantage and Disadvantage, edited by Hartley Dean and Lucinda Platt, explores these two concepts as necessarily relational terms, whereby any attempt to conceptualise disadvantage must be interwoven with an understanding of how relative advantage is constructed. Examining advantage and disadvantage across the life course as it relates to family, education, work, old age and income with particular focus on the UK, this book guides the reader through complex structures of inequality, making it a key read for students, scholars and policymakers, writes Michele Fenzl

From polarization of the public to polarization of the electorate: European Parliament elections as the preferred race for ideologues

This study examines the effect of voters’ ideological extremism on turnout in European national and European Parliament elections. Using data from recent European Election Studies, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, and other national election studies, we find that, relative to centrists, ideological extremists (measured by self-placement on the left–right scales) are more likely to vote in European Parliament elections (2014 and 2019) but not national elections. We argue that these differences stem from the fact that European Parliament elections are second-order races. The results help to explain why the European Parliament has become more polarized, even in the absence of significant changes in overall attitudes among the European public, and why extreme parties have been more successful in recent European Parliament than national elections

Responsiveness, If You Can Afford It: Policy Responsiveness in Good and Bad Economic Times

Traditional theories of representation posit that political parties have incentives to respond to public opinion which, in turn, is reflected in public policy as parties come together to form governments. Absent from this chain of representation, however, is the notion of costs. We advance the study of policy responsiveness by arguing that the government’s cost of responding to the electorate is marginal under conditions of strong economic growth but considerable during hard economic times. Cross-national analyses of voters and government welfare policies produces results that are consistent with this expectation. The findings imply that democratic performance, expressed as responsiveness, is conditional on economic growth

Democracy in Unequal Times: How Economic Inequality Influences Voter Turnout, Party Polarization, and Union Density

This thesis proposes three studies to explore the impact of income inequality on established democracies. The aim of this thesis is twofold: (1) to investigate the political sustainability of large income gaps; and (2) to understand why inequality increased in democracies. The first paper analyzes the behavior of political elites. Scholars of US politics report a strong connection between inequality and party polarization. Evaluating this relationship comparatively, I instead find that inequality depolarizes parties’ economic positions. This happens because inequality depresses low-income voters’ participation. This changes the composition of the core constituencies on the left, leaving redistributive positions with less support. The left moderates, while the right stays put. This leads to convergence on economic issues. The second paper then evaluates why the US is different. Since participation links inequality to party convergence comparatively, I investigate the effect of income gaps on turnout in American states. Previous research on this relationship shows contrasting evidence for the American case: some scholars report a negative impact; others a null effect; and some even a positive one. Differently, I suggest that the relationship is curvilinear: moderate inequality increases turnout; while very low or very high gaps reduce it. An analysis of turnout in American states from 1980 to 2010 finds supporting evidence for this prediction. The third paper then focuses on the effect of inequality on behaviors beyond voting. The study is the first to systematically analyze the implications of inequality for unionization levels in democracies. Contrary to intuition, I argue that inequality reduces union density: in unequal times, workers lose confidence in unions. This increases the risk of de-unionization over time. Studying both individual survey data and panels for the aggregate level, I find that inequality reduces union density in advanced democracies

Bicameralism and Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion

Does the organization of the assembly affect whether governments deliver policy that reflects the changing preferences of the public? Cross-national analyses of public opinion and policy outputs, for welfare policies and immigration policies, show that governments respond to shifts in public opinion in systems with a dominant chamber but not where bicameralism is strong. Our theory’s emphasis on the distribution of power between chambers further explains differences within bicameral systems: constraints on policy change mean that responsiveness is weaker where power is equally distributed between chambers but more robust where power is concentrated in the lower house. Evidence from institutional change in Belgium, where the fourth State Reform shifted power away from the senate and disproportionately toward the lower house, provides corroborating evidence that policy becomes more responsive when constitutions concentrate legislative power. Study findings have implications for our understanding of how bicameralism matters for government responsiveness to public opinion

Replication Data for: Responsiveness If You Can Afford It: Policy Responsiveness in Good and Bad Economic Times

Replication files for "Responsiveness If You Can Afford It: Policy Responsiveness in Good and Bad Economic Times.