Military coups d'état and the distribution of domestic institutional political power within democracies: the case of post-1789 France

Peter Feaver’s agency theory of civil–military relations posits that within democratic countries the relationship between civilian and military leaderships is fluid. This chapter seeks to see how civil–military relations within democracies are influenced by the distribution of domestic political power, shown particularly in whether the country has a presidential or parliamentary form of government, or their approximate. France since 1789 is a case (however imperfect) of a democratic country where the distribution of domestic political power has fluctuated between autocratic and collective forms of decision-making. This chapter presents a longitudinal case study of how since 1789 French civilian leaders have attempted to control the French military, with a focus on how the distribution of domestic political power influenced civil–military relations. This chapter hypothesizes that when there is a concentration of domestic political power, the military is more likely to be compliant with the civilian leadership, but when that power is more diffused, the military is less likely to be compliant. This is because when political power is more concentrated, the military has more confidence in the government, limiting the scope through which the military can inject itself into politics. However, when political power is more diffused, the military is more likely to feel that it has the duty and the opening through which to inject itself into politics

The Reluctant Counter-insurgents: Britain's Absent Surge in Southern Iraq

Britain’s participation in the Iraq war was beset by controversy before the invasion even began. Many observers expected disaster, and seemed vindicated as the country fell into a sprawling insurgency.1 Mistakes made early in the occupation appeared to have sparked an unstoppable descent into vast destruction. Then a radical decision by President Bush, in January 2007, altered this trajectory.2 By August 2006, civilian fatalities in Iraq averaged over 1,500 per month, alongside almost 100 American military dead. Yet by June 2008, civilian fatalities per month were down to around 200, and American military killed under a dozen.3 The surge of 30,000 soldiers, matched by changed tactics, doctrine, and Sunni politics, showed defeat was not inevitable. One of Britain’s main objectives in entering the war had been to cement Anglo-American relations. Poor military performance in Iraq is widely perceived to have damaged these relations.4 This chapter asks why the British army failed to emulate its American allies in conducting a successful counter-insurgency (COIN) in Iraq