Enter the cyber dragon: understanding Chinese intelligence agencies cyber capabilities

This paper argues that the nature and tempo of Chinese cyber‑activities have policy implications for the Australian government. The paper provides an understanding of the key elements of the Chinese intelligence agencies that exploit the cyberdomain. It also shows that, while cybersecurity is a concern, much media coverage tends to oversimplify the issue and not present the public with the fuller picture. 2013 is the year that cyber issues have taken on a heightened priority and strategic weight. Governments must now work out how to handle cyber matters as an element of their foreign policy to prevent long-term damage to international relationships

The new frontiers of Islamist extremism: understanding the threat that al-Qaeda affiliates pose to African security

This paper examines three violent Islamist groups in Africa - Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab and Boko Haram - and the way they’ve evolved, especially in the linkages between them and al-Qaeda’s ideology and tactics. Overview Over the past decade various groups that had been operating with a predominantly nationalistic agenda have increasingly become aligned with al-Qaeda in name, ideology, methodologies of attack and tactics. A new jihadism is spreading across Africa. This paper examines three groups—Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. All of these groups are separate from the al-Qaeda core. They haven’t taken up the al-Qaeda model because they’ve been told to, but they’re emulating it. They’re all looking to become dispersed, decentralised movements that frame local grievances in the language of the global jihad. For the international community, the danger lies not so much in the immediate threat to Western targets from African Islamists, but in the potential future creation of a failed state that would provide a base for training and radicalising large numbers of Islamists. The proven capacity of AQIM, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab to train and share fighting and bombmaking skills with new recruits, and then deliver those recruits into intensive front-line fighting roles in areas such as Syria and Iraq, will be the groups’ most immediate international impact. There are no clear solutions for African states combating the Islamist groups but any solution will necessarily be complex. Unfortunately, if the situation’s allowed to continue, there is danger that we’ll see a rise in instability in the regions where the groups operate, and in their growth and ambition

The future of jihad: what next for ISIL and al-Qaeda?

This report examines what the rise of ISIL means for al-Qaeda and how will it react. Overview ISIL is a real threat and must be targeted, but al-Qaeda shouldn’t be forgotten. Indeed, al-Qaeda should remain a key focus for international counterterrorism efforts. It’s a resilient and resolute terrorist organisation, but it’s also weaker than it’s been for many years. We should use this brief opportunity to dismantle the organisation completely. The report examines what the rise of ISIL means for al-Qaeda and how will it react. How will al-Qaeda seek to regain the oxygen of publicity that’s central to terrorist organisations if they’re to recruit, grow and, ultimately, challenge their enemies? Does the rise of ISIL signal the end of al-Qaeda or might al-Qaeda merge with ISIL, confront it head on or take some other course of action? The authors explore four alternative futures for al-Qaeda and ISIL and conclude that a worrying scenario of ‘one-upmanship’ is likely to take place between the two organisations in which al-Qaeda pursues a campaign of international attacks in order to regain the limelight

A shared agenda for the Seoul Conference on Cyberspace, South Korea, 2013

This briefing is ASPI’s distillation of the thoughts of a group of prominent members of the Australian cybersecurity community. We held a workshop in Canberra on the key panel sessions that will take place at the Seoul Conference on Cyberspace, South Korea, in October 2013. Workshop participants included the Australian Government departments with a stake in cyber issues and members of the private sector, including the banking and IT sectors, defence and security industries and representatives from the wider business community. The aim of the workshop was to provide creative Australian perspectives to take to the Seoul conference

Underground web: the cybercrime challenge

The two papers in this Special Report examine the central role that cybercrime plays in modern society and how technological developments create new opportunities for criminals to exploit. Overview Calum Jeffray’s paper, Caught in the net: the law enforcement response to international cybercrime, surveys the strategic cybercrime landscape and illustrates that, despite calls for law enforcement to ‘do more’ to prevent and investigate cybercrime, the agencies involved are often hampered in acting due to jurisdictional issues or the complexity of the investigations. Tobias Feakin’s paper, Cryptomarkets—illicit goods in the darknet, examines the emergence of the ‘darknet’, where trading in illicit goods and services in online black markets has become increasingly commonplace and exacerbates the problems that law enforcement already faces—tracing and prosecuting illegal activities online. This Special Report includes a foreword by Australian Federal Police Commissioner Andrew Colvin

Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project (BNLWRP). Research Report 3.

yesThis third report from the Bradford NLW Project aims to give the reader a brief update of developments and debates within the NLWs field over the last few months. We hope that it will be of interest not only to NLW `specialists', but also to those with a general interest in this area. Interest in non-lethal weapons, which have been defined as being `explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate personnel or material while minimising fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment', has increased dramatically over the last five years as a result of non-lethal technology progress and increasing calls from military forces (especially those engaged in peacekeeping) and civil police for more sophisticated non-lethal responses to violent incidents¿whilst there are evident advantages linked with non-lethal weapons, there are also key areas of concern associated with the development and deployment of such weapons. These include threats to existing weapons control treaties and conventions, their use in human rights violations (such as torture), harmful biomedical effects, and what some predict as a dangerous potential for use in social manipulation and social punishment within the context of a technology of political control

Cyber maturity in the Asia-Pacific Region 2014

Summary: To make considered, evidence-based cyber policy judgements in the Asia-Pacific there’s a need for better tools to assess the existing ‘cyber maturity’ of nations in the region. Over the past twelve months the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s International Cyber Policy Centre has developed a Maturity Metric which provides an assessment of the regional cyber landscape. This measurement encompasses an evaluation of whole-of-government policy and legislative structures, military organisation, business and digital economic strength and levels of cyber social awareness. This information is distilled into an accessible format, using metrics to provide a snapshot by which government, business, and the public alike can garner an understanding of the cyber profile of regional actors

Cyber maturity in the Asia-Pacific region 2016

The 2016 Cyber Maturity report is the culmination of 12 months’ research by the ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre. The report assesses the approach of 23 regional countries to the challenges and opportunities that cyberspace presents, in terms of their governance structure, legislation, law enforcement, military, business and social engagement with cyber policy and security issues. The 2016 report includes an assessment of three new countries, Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Solomon Islands. It also features, for the first time, separate data points on fixed line and mobile connectivity to better reflect the growth of mobile-based internet access across the region, its role in facilitating increased connectivity and opening new digital markets. &nbsp

Screening of Microorganisms for Biodegradation of Simazine Pollution (Obsolete Pesticide Azotop 50 WP)

The capability of environmental microorganisms to biodegrade simazine—an active substance of 2-chloro-s-triazine herbicides (pesticide waste since 2007)—was assessed. An enormous metabolic potential of microorganisms impels to explore the possibilities of using them as an alternative way for thermal and chemical methods of utilization. First, the biotope rich in microorganisms resistant to simazine was examined. Only the higher dose of simazine (100 mg/l) had an actual influence on quantity of bacteria and environmental fungi incubated on substrate with simazine. Most simazine-resistant bacteria populated activated sludge and biohumus (vermicompost); the biggest strain of resistant fungi was found in floral soil and risosphere soil of maize. Compost and biohumus were the sources of microorganisms which biodegraded simazine, though either of them was the dominant considering the quantity of simazine-resistant microorganisms. In both cases of periodic culture (microorganisms from biohumus and compost), nearly 100% of simazine (50 mg/l) was degraded (within 8 days). After the repeated enrichment culture with simazine, the rate of its degradation highly accelerated, and just after 24 h, the significant decrease of simazine (20% in compost and 80% in biohumus) was noted. Although a dozen attempts of isolating various strains responsible for biodegradation of simazine from compost and biohumus were performed, only the strain identified as Arthrobacter urefaciens (NC) was obtained, and it biodegraded simazine with almost 100% efficiency (within 4 days)