Breaking gridlock: how path dependent layering enhances resilience in global trade governance

What are the implications of the proliferating preferential trade agreements (PTAs) for the liberal trade order? Many scholars and practitioners see large increases in PTAs as a destabilizing factor that undermines core features of the post-war international trade system. By contrast, this paper argues that the accelerated growth of PTAs since the mid-1990s enhances the resilience of the liberal trade order. PTAs increase the ability of the order to accommodate heterogeneous preferences and distributive conflicts. They represent a continuation of a longer path of liberalization set in motion by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This path-dependent development created conditions for a gradual expansion of the membership and the regulatory scope of the GATT/WTO system, but also heightened levels of preference heterogeneity and distributive conflicts. By enabling groups of states with homogenous preferences to layer new rules on top of the multilateral GATT/WTO system, PTAs enable the continuation of the liberalization path. Consequently, PTAs have served as complements rather than to undermine the WTO

Internationalization of the rule of law? Legalization meets institutional interaction

"This paper studies institutional interaction through dispute settlement in international trade governance. Precisely, the paper addresses the question, how and with which consequences the dispute settlement mechanisms of the European Union (EU) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) as well as the dispute settlement mechanisms of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) influence the normative development or effectiveness of the respectively other institution. Thereby, the paper proceeds in the following steps: First, legalization and institutional interaction will be highlighted as important topics of study. Afterwards, a theoretical framework to analyze institutional interaction through dispute settlement by causal mechanisms will be developed. Eventually, the empirical part of the paper analyzes two important trade-disputes regarding their inter-institutional influence: The Banana Dispute, which was arbitrated by the European Court of Justice as well as the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and the Softwood Lumber Dispute, which was arbitrated in front of the NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism and the WTO DSB. The paper concludes by drawing the implications of institutional interaction through dispute settlement for the legalization of international trade governance and especially for the already claimed 'internationalization of the rule of law' in international trade governance." (author's abstract

Coordination or conflict? The causes and consequences of institutional overlap in a disaggregated world order

Institutional overlap emerges not only as an unintended by-product of purposive state action but also as its deliberate result. In two ways, this article expands existing research on the causes and consequences of institutional overlap. First, we establish that three different types of dissatisfaction may lead states to deliberately create institutional overlap: dissatisfaction with substantive norms and rules, dissatisfaction with decision-making rules and dissatisfaction with the institutional fit of an existing governance arrangement for a given cooperation problem. Each type of dissatisfaction triggers a distinct motivation for the creation of institutional overlap: to induce policy change, to increase influence on collective decision-making or to enhance governance effectiveness. Second, we demonstrate that whereas the motivation to induce policy change leads to interface conflicts, the motivations to increase influence on collective decision-making and to enhance governance effectiveness give rise to inter-institutional coordination. Three empirical case studies on global energy governance, the governance of global development banking and global environmental governance probe these analytical claims

Contested multilateralism as credible signaling: how strategic inconsistency can induce cooperation among states

This paper analyzes how patterns of international cooperation are affected if a group of states, led by a major power, pursues a strategy of “contested multilateralism” (CM). We conceptualize CM as a reaction to deadlock in institutional adjustment bargaining where CM lowers the gains actors can reap from cooperation in the short run. We demonstrate that, in the long run, CM nevertheless can have positive effects on international cooperation and specify when this is the case. Because of the costs associated with it, CM conveys a credible signal of the resolve of a dissatisfied group of states to contest the institutional status quo. Due to this capacity, CM alters the institutional and strategic environment within which institutional adjustment bargaining takes place. As a result, CM opens up the possibility for inter-institutional accommodation that increases realized cooperation gains. We probe the plausibility of our theoretical reasoning with empirical case studies on competitive regime creation in multilateral development finance and on regime-shifting in the governance of international trade in genetically modified organisms

Im Spannungsfeld von Regionalisierung und Globalisierung: wie, warum und mit welchen Folgen beeinflussen sich NAFTA und WTO gegenseitig?

"Dieser Beitrag analysiert institutionelle Wechselwirkung zwischen regionaler und globaler Integration in der internationalen Handelspolitik, indem er den kausalen Einfluss untersucht, den Nordamerikanisches Freihandelsabkommen (NAFTA) und Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) aufeinander ausüben. Konkret wird der Frage nachgegangen, wie und warum die beiden Institutionen interagieren und welche Folgen sich daraus für deren normative Entwicklung und Steuerungswirksamkeit ergeben. Zunächst wird auf Basis von Colemans 'Makro-Mikro-Makro-Modell' ein theoretischer Ansatz zur Analyse institutioneller Wechselwirkung mit Hilfe von Kausalmechanismen entwickelt Der empirische Teil analysiert vier empirische Fälle institutioneller Wechselwirkung zwischen NAFTA und WTO. Hierbei wird zweierlei ersichtlich: Erstens beruht der inter-institutionelle Einfluss zwischen NAFTA und WTO auf den Einflusslogiken Wechselwirkung durch institutionelle Bindung und Wechselwirkung durch Verhalten. Zweitens treten in Abhängigkeit von der Richtung des kausalen Einflusses zwei unterschiedliche Effekte auf: Die WTO als globale Institution erhöht die Steuerungsfähigkeit der NAFTA als regionale Institution, während die NAFTA die Steuerungsfähigkeit der WTO unterminiert." (Autorenreferat

Choosing low-cost institutions in global governance

Contemporary global governance takes place not only through formal inter-governmental organizations and treaties, but increasingly through diverse institutional forms including informal inter-governmental organizations, trans-governmental networks, and transnational public–private partnerships. Although these forms differ in many ways, they are all what we call ‘low-cost institutions’ (LCIs): the costs of creating, operating, changing, and exiting them, and the sovereignty costs they impose, are substantially lower on average than those of treaty-based institutions. LCIs also provide substantive and political governance benefits based on their low costs, including reduced risk, malleability, and flexibility, as well as many of the general cooperation benefits provided by all types of institutions. LCIs are poorly-suited for creating and enforcing binding commitments, but can perform many other governance functions, alone and as complements to treaty-based institutions. We argue that the availability of LCIs changes the cost–benefit logic of institutional choice in a densely institutionalized international system, making the creation of new institutions, which existing research sees as the ‘last resort’, more likely. In addition, LCIs empower executive, bureaucratic, and societal actors, incentivizing those actors to favor creating LCIs rather than treaty-based institutions. The availability of LCIs affects global governance in multiple ways. It reduces the status quo bias of governance, changes its institutional and actor composition, enables (modest) cooperation in times of polarization and gridlock, creates beneficial institutional divisions of labor, and expands governance options. At the same time, the proliferation of LCIs reduces the focality of incumbent institutions, increasing the complexity of governance

Judicial integration in the Americas? A comparison of dispute settlement in NAFTA and MERCOSUR

"The influence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on regional integration in Europe is a widely discussed topic in the academic literature. However, outside of Europe, the influence of court-like bodies on integration processes in other regions is much less analysed. Dispute settlement bodies in regional integration schemes outside Europe are not as strong as the ECJ, but they may nevertheless influence regional integration. When judging disputes, court-like bodies have to establish case law in order to be legally consistent with their decision-making – even if precedence effects are formally ruled out by the respective treaties. This case law may lead to increasing integration if the treaties are interpreted respectively. In order to explore the influence of court-like bodies on regional integration outside of Europe, this article compares NAFTA's dispute settlement mechanisms on competition and investment with the dispute settlement mechanism of MERCOSUR. The somewhat surprising result is that although MERCOSUR’s dispute settlement mechanism is formally stronger than its counterpart in North America, the latter exercises more influence on the dynamic of regional integration. The reason for this is that due to larger economic interdependence in North America, NAFTA’s dispute settlement mechanism is confronted with far more disputes than its counterpart in the South. This leads to many more possibilities for developing case law and for interpreting the respective treaties. The theoretically important conclusion is that not only the formal rules are important for judicial integration in regional integration schemes, but that only the interaction of legal rules and economic demands leads to dynamic regional integration projects." (author's abstract

Global governance als polycentric governance

In seiner „Theory of Global Governance“ argumentiert Michael Zürn, Staaten seien gegenwärtig in ein globales politisches System eingebettet, das eine Vielzahl internationaler Institutionen umfasst. Dieser Forumsbeitrag unternimmt den Versuch einer Annäherung an die Gestalt des von Zürn identifizierten globalen politischen Systems. Er schlägt vor, global governance als ein polyzentrisch strukturiertes System zu konzeptualisieren, das aus vielen Entscheidungszentren besteht, die formal voneinander unabhängig sind, sich aber faktisch wechselseitig beeinflussen. Der Beitrag verdeutlicht zunächst, worin die zentralen Merkmale der polyzentrischen Struktur des von Zürn identifizierten globalen politischen Systems bestehen. Anschließend skizziert er, wie die polyzentrische Struktur staatliches Verhalten beeinflusst und das Problem politischer Ordnungsbildung jenseits des Nationalstaates akzentuiert. Abschließend wird vor dem Hintergrund gegenwärtiger Herausforderungen für zwischenstaatliche Kooperation angedeutet, worin die institutionellen Stärken einer polyzentrischen Regelungsstruktur liegen

Paradoxe Verrechtlichung : wie Streitschlichtungsmechanismen interagieren

In diesem Beitrag wird argumentiert, dass es zur Erfassung der Verrechtlichung internationaler Politik notwendig ist, auch die inter-institutionellen Implikationen institutionenspezifischer Verrechtlichungsprozesse systematisch zu untersuchen. Daher wird zunächst die Interdependenz von Verrechtlichung und institutioneller Wechselwirkung verdeutlicht. Anschlieβend wird ein theoretischer Ansatz zur systematischen Analyse institutioneller Wechselwirkung durch Streitschlichtung entwickelt. Mithilfe dieses Ansatzes wird anhand von zwei Fallstudien exemplarisch analysiert, wie und mit welchen Folgen sich Streitschlichtungsmechanismen wechselseitig beeinflussen. Es handelt sich dabei um die Streitschlichtungsmechanismen des Nordamerikanischen Freihandelsabkommens (NAFTA) und der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO). Durch das Aufdecken inkonsistenter bzw. partieller Entscheidungen der beiden Streitschlichtungsmechanismen wird deutlich, dass institutionenspezifische Verrechtlichungsprozesse grundsätzlich die Gefahr in sich bergen, in anderen Institutionen stattfindende Verrechtlichungsprozesse zu unterminieren. Im Hinblick auf die Lösung von internationalen Konflikten ist eine Konsequenz der separaten Verrechtlichung in einzelnen internationalen Institutionen paradoxerweise die Gefahr des Rückfalls aus dem regelbasierten Interaktionsmodus im Rahmen der Streitschlichtungsmechanismen in den machtbasierten Interaktionsmodus auβerhalb derselben

Von Konkurrenz zu Arbeitsteilung : Komplexität und Dynamik im Zusammenspiel internationaler Institutionen

No abstract available