Can Smart Contracts Enhance Firm Efficiency in Emerging Markets?

Blockchain technology has the potential to eliminate one of the most significant barriers to economic growth through private business transactions in developing countries—lack of trust. In a typical developed country, individuals and firms conduct transactions within an institutional environment that offers security through the enforcement of agreements. Transparent and effective courts, while imperfect to be sure, enable parties to feel secure in their transactions even if their level of trust in the other party is low. This security, in turn, facilitates transactions far afield from high-trust relationships (e.g., immediate relatives), generating transactions based upon economic value rather than party trust alone. Developing countries often lack effective or transparent institutions and are frequently plagued with corruption that weakens substantially their level of security in economic transactions. Accordingly, individuals and firms in developing countries seek contracting parties whom they trust, knowing that it is trust that will ensure enforcement more than courts or law enforcement. Transactions in this type of environment are thus limited to known entities, such as relatives or colleagues who have a trust-relationship with the individual. As a result, potentially valuable transactions are avoided due to lack of trust, which, on a macro-level, limits the economic growth potential of the entire economy. Blockchain technology and smart contracts offer a solution to the trust problem prevalent in developing country contractual transactions. First, because blockchain uses an open architecture, all transactions are publicly accessible, immutable, and verifiable by anyone. This helps to eliminate corruption and fraud from the transaction. Second, because all smart contract transactions are recorded along a blockchain and cannot be modified ex post, a permanent and publicly accessible ledger is available to shed any doubt about payments or other transactions throughout the process. And third, because blockchain systems are automated, security in the enforcement mechanism is all but guaranteed. For instance, failure to deliver goods by a set time will automatically trigger a default clause that transmits payment of liquidated damages to the injured party without the intervention of a judge or arbitrator. Numerous problems with this approach exist. For instance, access to information about technology such as blockchain, especially among firms that would most directly benefit from it (e.g., informal firms), is highly limited for the moment. Second, smart contracts are in their infancy and work primarily with clearly stipulated terms that allow for no interpretation, which are not always common in contracts between firms. In this case, eliminating a neutral arbiter from the transaction also eliminates the possibility of reviewing the circumstances of a breach or other contract mishap. And third, though lack of trust in parties may be reduced through this technology, lack of trust in online financial transactions may be exacerbated. The use of electronic finance options in developing countries is far less common than in developed countries, making implementation of a completely online transmission system particularly challenging. Despite the evident weaknesses in applying smart contracts and blockchain technology to developing country firm transactions, there is great potential for at least small-scale application in certain markets where party trust levels are particularly low. In this paper, I will review literature on the development of smart contract technology and its application in relevant contexts. I will consider the potential impact that this technology could have if properly implemented in emerging markets. And I will offer a set of suggestions for policymakers to consider in educating firms and incentivizing their use of this technology. What follows is an introduction to the area of smart contracts as a substitute or at least a complement to legal institutions. I fully expect a robust literature to develop around this topic in the near future

Brave New World: A Post-Coronavirus Perspective on Trade

Trade policy during the Obama Administration largely reflected the pinnacle of the globalist moment in history. The dream of global peace through economic security was on the cusp of being achieved, with a comprehensive set of trade alliances linking countries both economically and politically to one another, a worldwide system of rules which nearly all countries abided in their economic relationships, and a deeply integrated global supply chain that not only enabled companies to satisfy consumer demands at exceedingly low cost and rapid development, but also empowered more and more workers in poor countries to join the global economy. This had been the pursuit of the progressive politicians in the early twentieth century at the start of the modern global era—the liberal world order. All of this began to visibly crumble with the election of Donald Trump in 2016. His promises of cutting ties with trading partners that did not give the United States a fair deal and relinquishing global leadership in exchange for national sovereignty struck a chord with American voters. Voters understood that the institutions we built had failed them in some fashion and saw the America First policies of Mr. Trump as the answer to their economic woes. The economic protectionism that has taken place during the Trump Administration has not been seen since the 1930s, just before the outbreak of World War II. Withdrawal from international institutions, trade wars with friends and foes, immigration bans, and a general disregard for diplomacy, are indicative of America’s withdrawal from the liberal economic order that it built to help the world recover after World War II. The Coronavirus and subsequent global economic collapse hastened the negative economic fallout from these actions; however, the belief that America should go it alone has been rising for decades. In the past, legislators and the executive have exercised restraint, understanding the dramatic effects that a world without U.S. leadership would have on American and global economic growth and peace. With that restraint now gone, we are proceeding at full speed toward the destruction of the liberal world order. In this short paper, I argue that precisely at a moment of crisis like that presented by a global health pandemic, it is the rules-based international order that has the best chance of slowing the slide toward authoritarianism and global recession. My contribution is focused on the economic policies inherent in the liberal world order and how those have guided us toward strong and sustainable economic growth for seventy-five years. Without American leadership at the helm, chances for survival of that order and the economic prosperity that it brought are dim

Can Smart Contracts Enhance Firm Efficiency in Emerging Markets?

Blockchain technology has the potential to eliminate one of the most significant barriers to economic growth through private business transactions in developing countries—lack of trust. In a typical developed country, individuals and firms conduct transactions within an institutional environment that offers security through the enforcement of agreements. Transparent and effective courts, while imperfect to be sure, enable parties to feel secure in their transactions even if their level of trust in the other party is low. This security, in turn, facilitates transactions far afield from high-trust relationships (e.g., immediate relatives), generating transactions based upon economic value rather than party trust alone. Developing countries often lack effective or transparent institutions and are frequently plagued with corruption that weakens substantially their level of security in economic transactions. Accordingly, individuals and firms in developing countries seek contracting parties whom they trust, knowing that it is trust that will ensure enforcement more than courts or law enforcement. Transactions in this type of environment are thus limited to known entities, such as relatives or colleagues who have a trust-relationship with the individual. As a result, potentially valuable transactions are avoided due to lack of trust, which, on a macro-level, limits the economic growth potential of the entire economy. Blockchain technology and smart contracts offer a solution to the trust problem prevalent in developing country contractual transactions. First, because blockchain uses an open architecture, all transactions are publicly accessible, immutable, and verifiable by anyone. This helps to eliminate corruption and fraud from the transaction. Second, because all smart contract transactions are recorded along a blockchain and cannot be modified ex post, a permanent and publicly accessible ledger is available to shed any doubt about payments or other transactions throughout the process. And third, because blockchain systems are automated, security in the enforcement mechanism is all but guaranteed. For instance, failure to deliver goods by a set time will automatically trigger a default clause that transmits payment of liquidated damages to the injured party without the intervention of a judge or arbitrator. Numerous problems with this approach exist. For instance, access to information about technology such as blockchain, especially among firms that would most directly benefit from it (e.g., informal firms), is highly limited for the moment. Second, smart contracts are in their infancy and work primarily with clearly stipulated terms that allow for no interpretation, which are not always common in contracts between firms. In this case, eliminating a neutral arbiter from the transaction also eliminates the possibility of reviewing the circumstances of a breach or other contract mishap. And third, though lack of trust in parties may be reduced through this technology, lack of trust in online financial transactions may be exacerbated. The use of electronic finance options in developing countries is far less common than in developed countries, making implementation of a completely online transmission system particularly challenging. Despite the evident weaknesses in applying smart contracts and blockchain technology to developing country firm transactions, there is great potential for at least small-scale application in certain markets where party trust levels are particularly low. In this paper, I will review literature on the development of smart contract technology and its application in relevant contexts. I will consider the potential impact that this technology could have if properly implemented in emerging markets. And I will offer a set of suggestions for policymakers to consider in educating firms and incentivizing their use of this technology. What follows is an introduction to the area of smart contracts as a substitute or at least a complement to legal institutions. I fully expect a robust literature to develop around this topic in the near future