237 research outputs found

    Using ARIMA Forecasts to Explore the Efficiency of the Forward Reichsmark Market

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    We explore the efficiency of the forward reichsmark market in Vienna between 1876 and 1914. We estimate ARIMA models of the spot exchange rate in order to forecast the one-month-ahead spot rate. In turn we compare these forecasts to the contemporaneous forward rate, i.e., the market's forecast of the future spot rate. We find that shortly after the introduction of a "shadow" gold standard in the mid-1890s the forward rate became a considerably better predictor of the future spot rate than during the prior flexible exchange rate regime. Between 1907 and 1914 forecast errors were between a half and one-fourth of their pre-1896 level. This implies that the Austro-Hungarian Bank's policy of defending the gold value of the currency was successful in improving the efficiency of the foreign exchange market

    Using ARIMA Forecasts to Explore the Efficiency of the Forward Reichsmark Market: Austria-Hungary, 1876-1914

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    We explore the efficiency of the forward Reichsmark market in Vienna between 1876 and 1914. We estimate ARIMA models of the spot exchange rate in order to forecast the one-month-ahead spot rate. In turn we compare these forecasts to the contemporaneous forward rate, i.e., the market's forecast of the future spot rate. We find that shortly after the introduction of a "shadow" gold standard in the mid-1890s the forward rate became a considerably better predictor of the future spot rate than during the prior flexible exchange rate regime. Between 1907 and 1914 forecast errors were between a half and one-fourth of their pre-1896 level. This implies that the Austro-Hungarian Bank's policy of defending the gold value of the currency was successful in improving the efficiency of the foreign exchange market

    Where It All Began: Lending of Last Resort and the Bank of England during the Overend, Gurney Panic of 1866

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    The National Monetary Commission was deeply concerned with importing best practice. One important focus was the connection between the money market and international trade. It was said that Britain’s lead in the market for “acceptances” originating in international trade was the basis of its sterling predominance. In this article, we use a so-far unexplored source to document the portfolio of bills that was brought up to the Bank of England for discount and study the behavior of the Bank of England during the crisis of 1866 (the so-called Overend- Gurney panic) when the Bank began adopting lending of last resort policies (Bignon, Flandreau and Ugolini 2011). We compare 1865 (a “normal” year) to 1866. Important findings include: (a) the statistical predominance of foreign bills in the material brought to the Bank of England; (b) the correlation between the geography of bills and British trade patterns; (c) a marked contrast between normal times lending and crisis lending in that main financial intermediaries and the “shadow banking system” only showed up at the Bank’s window during crises; (d) the importance of money market investors (bills brokers) as chief conduit of liquidity provision in crisis; (e) the importance of Bank of England’s supervisory policies in ensuring lending-of-lastresort operations without enhancing moral hazard. An implication of our findings is that Bank of England’s ability to control moral hazard for financial intermediaries involved in acceptances was another reason for the rise of sterling as an international currency.

    Hamlet Without The Prince of Denmark: Relationship Banking and Conditionality Lending In The London Market For Foreign Government Debt, 1815 - 1913

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    This paper offers a theory of conditionality lending in 19th century international capital markets. We argue that ownership of reputation signals by prestigious banks rendered them able and willing to monitor government borrowing. Monitoring was a source of rent, and it led bankers to support countries facing liquidity crises in a manner similar to modern descriptions of “relationship” lending to corporate clients by “parent” banks. Prestigious bankers’ ability to implement conditionality loans and monitor countries’ financial policies also enabled them to deal with solvency. We find that, compared with prestigious bankers, bondholders’ committees had neither the tools nor the prestige required for effectively dealing with defaulters. Hence such committees were far less important than previous research has claimed.

    Using ARIMA Forecasts to Explore the Efficiency of the Forward Reichsmark Market: Austria-Hungary, 1876-1914

    Get PDF
    We explore the efficiency of the forward Reichsmark market in Vienna between 1876 and 1914. We estimate ARIMA models of the spot exchange rate in order to forecast the one-month-ahead spot rate. In turn we compare these forecasts to the contemporaneous forward rate, i.e., the market's forecast of the future spot rate. We find that shortly after the introduction of a ñ€Ɠshadowñ€ gold standard in the mid-1890s the forward rate became a considerably better predictor of the future spot rate than during the prior flexible exchange rate regime. Between 1907 and 1914 forecast errors were between a half and one-fourth of their pre-1896 level. This implies that the Austro-Hungarian Bank's policy of defending the gold value of the currency was successful in improving the efficiency of the foreign exchange market.exchange rate; gold standard; ARIMA; efficiency

    Was the Emergence of the International Gold Standard Expected? Melodramatic Evidence from Indian Government Securities

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    The emergence of the gold standard has for a long time been viewed as inevitable. Fluctuations of the gold-silver exchange rate in world markets were accused to lead to brutal and unsustainable switches of bimetallic countries’ money supplies. However, more recent work has shown that the option character of bimetallism provided a stabilizing feedback loop. Using original data, this paper provides support to the new view. Using quotation prices for Indian Government bonds, we analyze agents’ expectations between 1860 and 1890. The intuition is that the spread between gold and silver bonds issued by the same entity (India) and backed by a credible agent (Britain) is a “pure” measure of the silver risk. The analysis shows that up until 1874 markets were expecting bimetallism to last. It is only after this date that markets gradually started requiring a premium to hold silver bonds indicating their belief that gold would eventually become the only metallic standard.Exchange rate regime, gold standard, bimetallism, credibility, silver risk

    Was the Emergence of the International Gold Standard Expected? Melodramatic Evidence from Indian Government Securities.

    Get PDF
    The emergence of the gold standard has for a long time been viewed as inevitable. Fluctuations of the gold-silver exchange rate in world markets were accused to lead to brutal and unsustainable switches of bimetallic countries’ money supplies. However, more recent work has shown that the option character of bimetallism provided a stabilizing feedback loop. Using original data, this paper provides support to the new view. Using quotation prices for Indian Government bonds, we analyze agents’ expectations between 1860 and 1890. The intuition is that the spread between gold and silver bonds issued by the same entity (India) and backed by a credible agent (Britain) is a “pure” measure of the silver risk. The analysis shows that up until 1874 markets were expecting bimetallism to last. It is only after this date that markets gradually started requiring a premium to hold silver bonds indicating their belief that gold would eventually become the only metallic standard.Exchange rate regime, gold standard, bimetallism, credibility, silver risk

    How to Run a Target Zone? Age Old Lessons from an Austro-Hungarian Experiment

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    This paper considers what we argue was the first experiment of an exchangerate band. This experiment took place in Austria-Hungary between 1896 and1914. The rationale for introducing this policy rested on precisely thoseintuitions that modern target zone literature has recently emphasized: theband was designed to secure both exchange rate stability and monetarypolicy autonomy. However, unlike more recent experiences, such as theERM, this policy was not undermined by credibility problems. In other wordsthe episode provides us with an ideal testing ground for some importantideas in modern macroeconomics: specifically, can formal rules, whenfaithfully adhered to, provide policy makers with some advantages such asshort term flexibility? First, we find that a credible band has a“microeconomic” influence on exchange rate stability. By reducinguncertainty, a credible fluctuation band improves the quality of expectations,a channel that has been neglected in the modern literature. Second, weshow that the standard test of the basic target zone model is flawed anddevelop an alternative methodology. This enables us to understand whyAustro-Hungarian policy makers were so upbeat about the merits ofexchange rate target zones. We believe that these findings shed a new lighton the economics of exchange rate bands.

    The Economics of Badmouthing: Libel Law and the Underworld of the Financial Press in France before World War I

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    This article analyzes the economics of “badmouthing” in the context of the pre-1914 French capital market. We argue that badmouthing was a means through which racketeering journals sought to secure property rights over issuers’ reputation. We provide a theoretical study of the market setup that emerged to deal with such problems, and we test our predictions using new evidence from contemporary sources.badmouthing, capital market, reputation.

    Bonds and Brands : intermediaries and reputation in sovereign debt markets 1820-1830

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    How does sovereign debt emerge and become sustainable? This paper provides a new answer to this unsolved puzzle. Focusing on the early 19th century, we argue that intermediaries’ market power served to overcome information asymmetries and sustained the development of sovereign debt. Relying on insights from corporate finance, we argue that capitalists turned to intermediaries’ reputations to guide their investment strategies. The outcome was a two-tier global bond market, which was sustained by hierarchical relations among intermediaries. This novel theoretical perspective is backed by new archival evidence and empirical data that have never been gathered so far
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