Elections, Ideology, and Turnover in the U.S. Federal Government

A defining feature of public sector employment is the regular change in elected leadership. Yet, we know little about how elections influence public sector careers. We describe how elections alter policy outputs and disrupt the influence of civil servants over agency decisions. These changes shape the career choices of employees motivated by policy, influence, and wages. Using new Office of Personnel Management data on the careers of millions of federal employees between 1988 and 2011, we evaluate how elections influence employee turnover decisions. We find that presidential elections increase departure rates of career senior employees, particularly in agencies with divergent views relative to the new president and at the start of presidential terms. We also find suggestive evidence that vacancies in high-level positions after elections may induce lower-level executives to stay longer in hopes of advancing. We conclude with implications of our findings for public policy, presidential politics, and public management

Public Sector Personnel Economics: Wages, Promotions, and the Competence-Control Trade-off

We model personnel policies in public agencies, examining how wages and promotion standards can partially offset a fundamental contracting problem: the inability of public sector workers to contract on performance, and the inability of political masters to contract on forbearance from meddling. Despite the dual contracting problem, properly constructed personnel policies can encourage intrinsically motivated public sector employees to invest in expertise, seek promotion, remain in the public sector, and develop policy projects. However, doing so requires internal personnel policies that sort slackers from zealots. Personnel policies that accomplish this task are quite different in agencies where acquired expertise has little value in the private sector, and agencies where acquired expertise commands a premium in the private sector. Finally, even with well-designed personnel policies, there remains an inescapable trade-off between political control and expertise acquisition

Quitting in Protest: A Theory of Presidential Policy Making and Agency Response

This paper examines the effects of centralized presidential policy-making, implemented through unilateral executive action, on the willingness of bureaucrats to exert effort and stay in the government. Extending models in organizational economics, we show that policy initiative by the president is a substitute for initiative by civil servants. Yet, total effort is enhanced when both work. Presidential centralization of policy often impels policy-oriented bureaucrats ( zealots ) to quit rather than implement presidential policies they dislike. Those most likely to quit are a range of moderate bureaucrats. More extreme bureaucrats may be willing to wait out an opposition president in the hope of tempering future policy when an allied president is elected. As control of the White House alternates between ideologically opposed extreme presidents, policy-minded moderates are stripped from bureaucratic agencies leaving only policy extremists or poorly performing slackers. These departures degrade policy initiative in moderate agencies

Difficulties for the entrepreneurial small-scale comercial poultry production in developing countries.

Projeto/Plano de Ação: 02.09.70700-01

the ambiguities within concept, culture and evaluation

The ESG universe has expanded dramatically in recent years and it looks like it is here to stay. The sustainability motto proliferated very quickly and the various market participants eagerly embraced ESG integration, but its definition and consolidation lagged behind. The initial voluntarism brought out the subjectivities and nuances of each law, culture and national institutions resulting in enhanced heterogeneity and sometimes incompatibility between jurisdictions. In this context, it is especially noticeable that fiduciary law may represent an obstacle to the receipt of ESG factors according to the legal system in question. Alongside the diversity of approaches to sustainability issues, typical phenomena arise from the ESG framework's ambiguity and lack of planning, namely the contradictory corporate performance scores presented by distinct rating agencies and the greenwashing practices. In this sense, as more and more supporters of sustainable policies emerge, proportionally the skepticism among the dogmatic ones grows due to confusion and uncertainty which weaken the credibility of ESG practices. On top of that, only recently a concern to regulate the ESG market has arisen, so its real potential is yet to be explored

Field lab on internationalization - the case of missangas & co. in Denmark

This document provides a detailed analysis of the internationalization process of Missangas&Co., a Portuguese bead-based jewelry SME, and aims to guide it towards sustainable growth in the global jewelry market. It begins with an assessment of the company's current operations, financials, and organization, along with an international market selection analysis from where a shortlist of 5 countries was derived, with Ireland being identified as the ideal target for expansion. The report further outlines a comprehensive plan for entering this market, encompassing marketing strategies and financial projections. Additionally, it features a literature review on International Entry Mode Selection to support the proposed strategies