Can Asset Markets Be Manipulated? A Field Experiment With Racetrack Betting

To test whether naturally occurring markets can be strategically manipulated, $500 and$1,000 bets were made, then canceled, at horse racing tracks. The net effects of these costless temporary bets give clues about how market participants react to information large bets might contain. The bets moved odds on horses visibly (compared to matched‐pair control horses with similar prebet odds) and had a slight tendency to draw money toward the horse that was temporarily bet, but the net effect was close to zero and statistically insignificant. The results suggest that some bettors inferred information from bets and others did not, and their reactions roughly canceled out

Behavioral game theory: Plausible formal models that predict accurately

Many weaknesses of game theory are cured by new models that embody simple cognitive principles, while maintaining the formalism and generality that makes game theory useful. Social preference models can generate team reasoning by combining reciprocation and correlated equilibrium. Models of limited iterated thinking explain data better than equilibrium models do; and they self-repair problems of implausibility and multiplicity of equilibria

Neuroeconomics: Using Neuroscience to Make Economic Predictions

Neuroeconomics seeks to ground economic theory in detailed neural mechanisms which are expressed mathematically and make behavioural predictions. One finding is that simple kinds of economising for life-and-death decisions (food, sex and danger) do occur in the brain as rational theories assume. Another set of findings appears to support the neural basis of constructs posited in behavioural economics, such as a preference for immediacy and nonlinear weighting of small and large probabilities. A third direction shows how understanding neural circuitry permits predictions and causal experiments which show state-dependence of revealed preference – except that states are biological and neural variables

Comment on Noll and Krier, "Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation"

We have known about systematic violations of the expected utility (EU) theory of choice for almost forty years, since Maurice Allais got Jimmie Savage to violate his own "sure-thing principle" (or "independence axiom") while making hypothetical choices over lunch in Paris. Savage was victimized by some combination of wine and intuition. The wine's effect is gone, but the intuition is not: devotion to EU sometimes produces unappealing choices

Progress in Behavioral Game Theory

Is game theory meant to describe actual choices by people and institutions or not? It is remarkable how much game theory has been done while largely ignoring this question. The seminal book by von Neumann and Morgenstern, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, was clearly about how rational players would play against others they knew were rational. In more recent work, game theorists are not always explicit about what they aim to describe or advise. At one extreme, highly mathematical analyses have proposed rationality requirements that people and firms are probably not smart enough to satisfy in everyday decisions. At the other extreme, adaptive and evolutionary approaches use very simple models-mostly developed to describe nonhuman animals-in which players may not realize they are playing a game at all. When game theory does aim to describe behavior, it often proceeds with a disturbingly low ratio of careful observation to theorizing

Does the Basketball Market Believe in the 'Hot Hand,'?

Most people who watch basketball believe in the "hot hand": Players who make a shot are more likely to hit the next shot than players who miss a shot (i.e., shots are positively autocorrelated rather than independent). Almost everyone in the sample studied by Thomas Gilovich, Robert Vallone, and Amos Tversky (1985), including several successful professionals, believed in the hot hand

Evaluation - the educational context

Evaluation comes in many shapes and sizes. It can be as simple and as grounded in day to day work as a clinical teacher refl ecting on a lost teaching opportunity and wondering how to do it better next time or as complex, top down and politically charged as a major government led evaluation of use of teaching funds with the subtext of re-allocating them. Despite these multiple spectra of scale, perceived ownership, fi nancial and political implications, the underlying principles of evaluation are remarkably consistent. To evaluate well, it needs to be clear who is evaluating what and why. From this will come notions of how it needs to be done to ensure the evaluation is meaningful and useful. This paper seeks to illustrate what evaluation is, why it matters, where to start if you want to do it and how to deal with evaluation that is external and imposed