Director Overconfidence

We examine overconfident CEO directors and find they attend more board meetings, are more likely to serve on the nominating or the compensation committee, have more independent directorships, and foster higher attendance rates on boards. Boards with overconfident directors are more likely to appoint a better prepared and more reputable CEO following a turnover. These newly appointed CEOs are also more likely to be overconfident. This evidence indicates overconfident CEO directors exhibit significant influence on the board and over the firm’s CEO selection

The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Firm Productivity: evidence from Taiwan's manufacturing firms

This study analyses the relationship between ownership structure and board of director composition and their influences on the total factor productivity (TFP) of Taiwan's firms. The empirical results show that the curvilinear specification is better to capture the relationship between inside ownership and firm productivity. Meanwhile, the ownership structure in a firm indeed affects differences in TFP between conglomerate firms and non-conglomerate firms, high-tech firms and non-high-tech firms, and family-owned firms and non-family-owned firms. Additionally, a smaller board may be less encumbered by bureaucratic problems and more functional and CEO duality may be able to improve productivity. Furthermore, productivity deteriorates with increasing proportion of collateralised shares. More institutional holdings, however, are an effective way to alleviate the negative impact of collateralised shares on TFP. Copyright (c) 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.