Paying Positive to Go Negative: Advertisers' Competition and Media Reports

This paper analyzes a two-sided market for news where advertisers may pay a media outlet to conceal negative information about the quality of their own product (paying positive to avoid negative) and/or to disclose negative information about the quality of their competitors' products (paying positive to go negative). We show that whether advertisers have negative consequences on the accuracy of news reports or not ultimately depends on the extent of correlation among advertisers' products. Specifically, the lower the correlation among the qualities of the advertisers' products, the (weakly) higher the accuracy of the media outlet' reports. Moreover, when advertisers' products are correlated, a higher degree of competition in the market of the advertisers' products may decrease the accuracy of the media outlet's reports.

Cross-Checking the Media

A characteristic of the news market is that consumers often cross-check information, i.e. observe several news outlets. At the same time, data on political media suggest that more partisan consumers are more likely to cross-check. We explore these phenomena by building a model of horizontal competition in newspaper endorsements. Without cross-checking, outlets are unbiased and minimally differentiated. When cross-checking is allowed, we show that cross-checkers are indeed more partisan than those who only acquire one report. Furthermore, cross-checking induces outlets to differentiate, and the degree of differentiation is increasing in the dispersion of consumer beliefs. Differentiation is detrimental to consumer welfare, and a single monopoly outlet may provide higher consumer welfare than a competitive duopoly

A beam of light: Media, tourism and economic development *

Tourism accounts for around one tenth of global GDP. We analyze the impact of entertainment media in drawing tourists to filming municipalities ( media multiplier ) and, in turn, the effect of tourism on local economic development ( tourism multiplier ). To quantify the media multiplier , we employ a triple-difference empirical strategy exploiting the staggered international release across the EU of Inspector Montalbano, a TV series set in four municipalities of Sicily, a region of Italy. We find that the series release led to a fourfold increase in the number of tourists and boosted tourist expenditure by a factor of 2.5. Furthermore, we provide evidence of positive spillovers in nearby municipalities. To estimate the tourism multiplier , we exploit the interaction between the filming locations and the time-varying share of countries in which the series was aired, to instrument total tourist expenditure at the municipality-time level. Our results show that a 10% increase in total tourist expenditure translates into an increase in municipal income of 4.7%. We also document the impact of tourism on urban dynamics. Namely, tourism increases (decreases) rental and selling prices in the more (less) tourist-attractive areas within municipalities. All in all, the paper suggests that both entertainment media and tourism can be effective tools to boost local economic development