The Relationship Between Intellectual Capital Performance and Ownership Gender Diversity in Small-Sized Italian Companies

In recent years, research has been directed toward investigating the determinants of IC performance. While several studies have shown that gender affects company performance and some of its dimensions, whether and how gender impacts on IC performance is still an area open to research. Thus, the aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between ownership gender diversity and IC performance with specific reference to small-sized Italian companies. The investigation is carried out through cross-sectional OLS analysis. The IC performance, the dependent variable, is measured through VAIC™ and each of its three components, while the ownership gender diversity, the independent variable, is measured through a gender diversity index, the Shannon’s index. A set of control variables is included to control for the influence of the factors that previous studies have found to affect the magnitude of VAIC™ and its three components. The results of the OLS analysis show that ownership gender diversity has a negative impact on IC performance: i.e., the higher the diversity, the lower the performance. This seems to support the validity of the similarity attraction paradigm within the IC field

The Impact of Institutional Shareholdings on Price Limits

[[abstract]]We explore whether institutional shareholders would affect the price limits in Taiwan due to that the price limit system in Taiwan is lower than those of other countries. In this study, We reveal that various institutional shareholding ratios including domestic institutional shareholding ratio and foreign institutional shareholding ratio significantly affect several stock limit ratios including the stock limit ratio, stock price up-limit ratio, and stock price down-limit ratio rarely concerned comprehensively in the relevant studies. In addition, we argue that our interesting findings are likely interpreted as follows: First, domestic institutions might buy stocks to price up-limit to improve their performance. Second, institutional investors might beat their competitors by selling competitors’ stocks to price down-limits. Third, foreign institutions might sell stocks to price down-limits after taking many short positions in index futures. We deduce that the Taiwan price limit system might provide opportunities for institutional investors, stakeholders, and even insiders to manipulate share prices because the price limit likely occurs in Taiwan Stock Exchange.[[notice]]補正完