448 research outputs found

    Ambiguity and public good provision in large societies

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    ArticleIn this paper, we consider the effect of ambiguity on the private provision of public goods. Equilibrium is shown to exist and be unique. We examine how provision of the public good changes as the size of the population increases. We show that when there is uncertainty, there may be less free-riding in large societies

    Bargaining Power and Value Sharing in Distribution Networks: A Cooperative Game Theory Approach

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    This paper illustrates a methodology for analyzing bargaining games on network markets, by means of numerical models that can be calibrated with real data. Economic incentives to join or to expand a network depend on how the network surplus is being distributed, which in turn depends on a variety of factors: position of each agent (e.g., a country) in a specific network, its reliability in the cooperation scheme (e.g., geo-political stability), existence of market distortions and availability of outside options (e.g., alternative energy sources). This study is aimed at presenting a game theory methodology that can be applied to real world cases, having the potential to shed light on several political economy issues. The methodology is presented and illustrated with application to a fictitious network structure. The method is based on a two-stage pro- cess: first, a network optimization model is used to generate payoff values under different coalitions and network structures; a second model is subsequently employed to identify cooperative game solutions. Any change in the network structure entails both a variation in the overall welfare level and in the distribution of surplus among agents, as it affects their relative bargaining power. Therefore, expected costs and benefits, at the aggregate as well as at the individual level, can be compared to assess the economic viability of any investment in network infrastructure. A number of model variants and extensions are also considered: changing demand, exogenous instability factors, market distortions, externalities and outside options

    Strong laws of large numbers for sub-linear expectations

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    We investigate three kinds of strong laws of large numbers for capacities with a new notion of independently and identically distributed (IID) random variables for sub-linear expectations initiated by Peng. It turns out that these theorems are natural and fairly neat extensions of the classical Kolmogorov's strong law of large numbers to the case where probability measures are no longer additive. An important feature of these strong laws of large numbers is to provide a frequentist perspective on capacities.Comment: 10 page

    Investment under ambiguity with the best and worst in mind

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    Recent literature on optimal investment has stressed the difference between the impact of risk and the impact of ambiguity - also called Knightian uncertainty - on investors' decisions. In this paper, we show that a decision maker's attitude towards ambiguity is similarly crucial for investment decisions. We capture the investor's individual ambiguity attitude by applying alpha-MEU preferences to a standard investment problem. We show that the presence of ambiguity often leads to an increase in the subjective project value, and entrepreneurs are more eager to invest. Thereby, our investment model helps to explain differences in investment behavior in situations which are objectively identical

    Elicitation of Preferences under Ambiguity

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    This paper is about behaviour under ambiguity ‒ that is, a situation in which probabilities either do not exist or are not known. Our objective is to find the most empirically valid of the increasingly large number of theories attempting to explain such behaviour. We use experimentally-generated data to compare and contrast the theories. The incentivised experimental task we employed was that of allocation: in a series of problems we gave the subjects an amount of money and asked them to allocate the money over three accounts, the payoffs to them being contingent on a ‘state of the world’ with the occurrence of the states being ambiguous. We reproduced ambiguity in the laboratory using a Bingo Blower. We fitted the most popular and apparently empirically valid preference functionals [Subjective Expected Utility (SEU), MaxMin Expected Utility (MEU) and α­-MEU], as well as Mean-Variance (MV) and a heuristic rule, Safety First (SF). We found that SEU fits better than MV and SF and only slightly worse than MEU and α­-MEU

    Information and ambiguity: herd and contrarian behaviour in financial markets

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    “The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9334-3”The paper studies the impact of informational ambiguity on behalf of informed traders on history-dependent price behaviour in a model of sequential trading in nancial markets. Following Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant (2006), we use neo-additive capacities to model ambiguity. Such ambiguity and attitudes to it can engender herd and contrarian behaviour, and also cause the market to break down. The latter, herd and contrarian behaviour, can be reduced by the existence of a bid-ask spread.Research in part funded by ESRC grant RES-000-22-0650

    Queueing Problems with Two Parallel Servers

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    Under stochastic dominance Choquet-expected utility and anticipated utility are identical

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    The aim of this paper is to convince the reader that Choquet-expected utility, as initiated by Schmeidler (1982, 1989) for decision making under uncertainty, when formulated for decision making under risk naturally leads to anticipated utility, as initiated by Quiggin/Yaari. Thus the two generalizations of expected utility in fact are one
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