Partisanship, Ideology, and Representation in Latin America

This paper uses joint scaling methods and similar items from three large-scale surveys to place voters, parties and politicians from different Latin American countries on a common ideological space. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the findings reveal that the "median" voter in Latin America is located to the left of the ideological spectrum, and that voter's ideological locations are highly correlated with their partisan attachments. The location of parties and leaders suggests that three distinctive clusters exist: one located at the left of the political spectrum, another at the center, and a third to the right. The results also indicate that legislators in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru tend to be more "leftist" than their voters. The ideological drift, however, is not large enough to substantiate the claim that a representation gap exists in those countries

Fiscal Policy, Inequality and the Poor in the Developing World

Using comparable fiscal incidence analysis, this paper examines the impact of fiscal policy on inequality and poverty in 25 countries for around 2010. Success in fiscal redistribution is driven primarily by redistributive effort (share of social spending to GDP in each country) and the extent to which transfers/subsidies are targeted at the poor and direct taxes targeted at the rich. While fiscal policy always reduces inequality, this is not the case with poverty. Fiscal policy increases poverty in 4 countries using a US$1.25/day PPP poverty line, in 8 countries using a US$2.50/day line, and in 15 countries using a US$4/day line (over and above market income poverty). Net direct taxes are always equalizing and net indirect taxes are equalizing in 17 of the 25 countries. While spending on pre-school and primary school is pro-poor (i.e. the per capita transfer declines with income) in almost all countries, pro-poor secondary school spending is less prevalent, and tertiary education spending tends to be progressive only in relative terms (i.e. equalizing but not pro-poor). Health spending is always equalizing

U.S. Tax Policy and Health Insurance Demand: Can a Regressive Policy Improve Welfare?

The U.S. tax policy on health insurance is regressive because it favors only those offered group insurance through their employers, who tend to have a relatively high income. Moreover, the subsidy takes the form of deductions from the progressive income tax system, giving high-income earners a larger subsidy. To understand the effects of the policy, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents and an endogenous demand for health insurance. We use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to calibrate the process for income, health expenditures, and health insurance offer status through employers and succeed in matching the pattern of insurance demand as observed in the data. We find that despite the regressiveness of the current policy, a complete removal of the subsidy would result in a partial collapse of the group insurance market, a significant reduction in the insurance coverage, and a reduction in welfare coverage. There is, however, room for raising the coverage and significantly improving welfare by extending a refundable credit to the individual insurance market

Relaci?n di?metro de copa-di?metro altura de pecho para Pinus oocarpa Schiede, en Siguatepeque, Honduras

2 ilus. 3 tab. 6 ref