29 research outputs found
SARS-CoV-2 in lions, gorillas and zookeepers in the Rotterdam Zoo, the Netherlands, a One Health investigation, November 2021
In November 2021, seven western lowland gorillas and four Asiatic lions were diagnosed with COVID-19 at Rotterdam Zoo. An outbreak investigation was undertaken to determine the source and extent of the outbreak and to identify possible transmission routes. Interviews were conducted with staff to identify human and animal contacts and cases, compliance with personal protective equipment (PPE) and potential transmission routes. Human and animal contacts and other animal species suspected to be susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 were tested for SARS-CoV-2 RNA. Positive samples were subjected to sequencing. All the gorillas and lions that could be tested (3/7 and 2/4, respectively) were RT-PCR positive between 12 November and 10 December 2021. No other animal species were SARS-CoV-2 RNA positive. Forty direct and indirect human contacts were identified. Two direct contacts tested RT-PCR positive 10 days after the first COVID-19 symptoms in animals. The zookeepers' viral genome sequences clustered with those of gorillas and lions. Personal protective equipment compliance was suboptimal at instances. Findings confirm transmission of SARS-CoV-2 among animals and between humans and animals but source and directionality could not be established. Zookeepers were the most likely source and should have periodic PPE training. Sick animals should promptly be tested and isolated/quarantined.</p
Population-based screening in a municipality after a primary school outbreak of the SARSCoV-2 Alpha variant, the Netherlands, December 2020–February 2021
An outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 Alpha variant (Pango lineage B.1.1.7) was detected at a primary school (School X) in Lansingerland, the Netherlands, in December 2020. The outbreak was studied retrospectively, and population-based screening was used to assess the extent of virus circulation and decelerate transmission. Cases were SARS-CoV-2 laboratory confirmed and were residents of Lansingerland (November 16(th) 2020 until February 22(th) 2021), or had an epidemiological link with School X or neighbouring schools. The SARS-CoV-2 variant was determined using variant PCR or whole genome sequencing. A questionnaire primarily assessed clinical symptoms. A total of 77 Alpha variant cases were found with an epidemiological link to School X, 16 Alpha variant cases linked to the neighbouring schools, and 146 Alpha variant cases among residents of Lansingerland without a link to the schools. The mean number of self-reported symptoms was not significantly different among Alpha variant infected individuals compared to non-Alpha infected individuals. The secondary attack rate (SAR) among Alpha variant exposed individuals in households was 52% higher compared to non-Alpha variant exposed individuals (p = 0.010), with the mean household age, and mean number of children and adults per household as confounders. Sequence analysis of 60 Alpha variant sequences obtained from cases confirmed virus transmission between School X and neighbouring schools, and showed that multiple introductions of the Alpha variant had already taken place in Lansingerland at the time of the study. The alpha variant caused a large outbreak at both locations of School X, and subsequently spread to neighbouring schools, and households. Population-based screening (together with other public health measures) nearly stopped transmission of the outbreak strain, but did not prevent variant replacement in the Lansingerland municipality
Travel-related MERS-CoV cases: An assessment of exposures and risk factors in a group of Dutch travellers returning from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, May 2014
__Background:__ In May 2014, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection, with closely related viral genomes, was diagnosed in two Dutch residents, returning from a pilgrimage to Medina and Mecca, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). These patients travelled with a group of 29 other Dutch travellers. We conducted an epidemiological assessment of the travel group to identify likely source(s) of infection and presence of potential risk factors.
__Methods:__ All travellers, including the two cases, completed a questionnaire focussing on potential human, animal and food exposures to MERS-CoV. The questionnaire was modified from the WHO MERS-CoV questionnaire, taking into account the specific route and activities of the travel group.
__Results:__ Twelve non-cases drank unpasteurized camel milk and had contact with camels. Most travellers, including one of the two patients (Case 1), visited local markets, where six of them consumed fruits. Two travellers, including Case 1, were exposed to coughing patients when visiting a hospital in Medina. Four travellers, including Case 1, visited two hospitals in Mecca. All travellers had been in contact with Case 1 while he was sick, with initially non-respiratory complaints. The cases were found to be older than the other travellers and both had co-morbidities.
__Conclusions:__ This epidemiological study revealed the complexity of MERS-CoV outbreak investigations with multiple potential exposures to MERS-CoV reported such as healthcare visits, camel exposure, and exposure to untreated food products. Exposure to MERS-CoV during a hospital visit is considered a likely source of infection for Case 1 but not for Case 2. For Case 2, the most likely source could not be determined. Exposure to MERS-CoV via direct contact with animals or dairy products seems unlikely for the two Dutch cases. Furthermore, exposure to a common but still unidentified source cannot be ruled out. More comprehensive research into sources of infection in the Arabian Peninsula is needed to strengthen and specify the prevention of MERS-CoV infections
Travel-related MERS-CoV cases: an assessment of exposures and risk factors in a group of Dutch travellers returning from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, May 2014
BACKGROUND: In May 2014, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection, with closely related viral genomes, was diagnosed in two Dutch residents, returning from a pilgrimage to Medina and Mecca, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). These patients travelled with a group of 29 other Dutch travellers. We conducted an epidemiological assessment of the travel group to identify likely source(s) of infection and presence of potential risk factors. METHODS: All travellers, including the two cases, completed a questionnaire focussing on potential human, animal and food exposures to MERS-CoV. The questionnaire was modified from the WHO MERS-CoV questionnaire, taking into account the specific route and activities of the travel group. RESULTS: Twelve non-cases drank unpasteurized camel milk and had contact with camels. Most travellers, including one of the two patients (Case 1), visited local markets, where six of them consumed fruits. Two travellers, including Case 1, were exposed to coughing patients when visiting a hospital in Medina. Four travellers, including Case 1, visited two hospitals in Mecca. All travellers had been in contact with Case 1 while he was sick, with initially non-respiratory complaints. The cases were found to be older than the other travellers and both had co-morbidities. CONCLUSIONS: This epidemiological study revealed the complexity of MERS-CoV outbreak investigations with multiple potential exposures to MERS-CoV reported such as healthcare visits, camel exposure, and exposure to untreated food products. Exposure to MERS-CoV during a hospital visit is considered a likely source of infection for Case 1 but not for Case 2. For Case 2, the most likely source could not be determined. Exposure to MERS-CoV via direct contact with animals or dairy products seems unlikely for the two Dutch cases. Furthermore, exposure to a common but still unidentified source cannot be ruled out. More comprehensive research into sources of infection in the Arabian Peninsula is needed to strengthen and specify the prevention of MERS-CoV infections
Norovirus outbreak in a natural playground: A One Health approach
Norovirus constitutes the most frequently identified infectious cause of disease outbreaks associated with untreated recreational water. When investigating outbreaks related to surface water, a One Health approach is insightful. Historically, there has been a focus on potential contamination of recreational water by bird droppings and a recent publication demonstrating human noroviruses in bird faeces suggested this should be investigated in future water-related norovirus outbreaks. Here, we describe a One Health approach investigating a norovirus outbreak in a natural playground. On social media, a large amount of waterfowl were reported to defecate near these playground premises leading to speculations about their potential involvement. Surface water, as well as human and bird faecal specimens, was tested for human noroviruses. Norovirus was found to be the most likely cause of the outbreak but there was no evidence for transmission via waterfowl. Cases had become known on social media prior to notification to the public health service underscoring the potential of online media as an early warning system. In view of known risk factors, advice was given for future outbreak investigations and natural playgroun
Norovirus outbreak in a natural playground: A One Health approach.
Norovirus constitutes the most frequently identified infectious cause of disease outbreaks associated with untreated recreational water. When investigating outbreaks related to surface water, a One Health approach is insightful. Historically, there has been a focus on potential contamination of recreational water by bird droppings and a recent publication demonstrating human noroviruses in bird faeces suggested this should be investigated in future water-related norovirus outbreaks. Here, we describe a One Health approach investigating a norovirus outbreak in a natural playground. On social media, a large amount of waterfowl were reported to defecate near these playground premises leading to speculations about their potential involvement. Surface water, as well as human and bird faecal specimens, was tested for human noroviruses. Norovirus was found to be the most likely cause of the outbreak but there was no evidence for transmission via waterfowl. Cases had become known on social media prior to notification to the public health service underscoring the potential of online media as an early warning system. In view of known risk factors, advice was given for future outbreak investigations and natural playground design
Follow-up of contacts of middle east respiratory syndrome coronavirus–infected returning travelers, the Netherlands, 2014
Notification of 2 imported cases of infection with Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus in the Netherlands triggered comprehensive monitoring of contacts. Observed low rates of virus transmission and the psychological effect of contact monitoring indicate that thoughtful assessment of close contacts is prudent and must be guided by clinical and epidemiologic risk factors
De valkuilen van preventief testen op SARS-CoV-2
The Dutch test capacity to detect the SARS-CoV-2 virus has increased enormously since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. As a consequence of ongoing spreading of the virus, tests are also increasingly being carried out among people without COVID-19 related symptoms. Preventive testing for SARS-CoV-2 is especially performed in sectors in which early detection of the virus is essential, for instance in the professional sports sector. The guideline of the RIVM states that people who have tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 but without COVID-19 related symptoms are advised to stay in isolation for five days from time of the test. However, this guideline is not suitable for people who are diagnosed in a very early stage of the infection as a result of preventive testing. They are likely to leave isolation during the most contagious phase of the infection. In this paper, we argue that people who are positive for SARS-CoV-2, but without COVID-19 related symptoms, after a preventive test should be advised to isolate longer than five days