Local market consolidation and bank productive efficiency

The recent banking literature has evaluated the impact of mergers on the efficiency of the merging parties [e.g., Rhoades (1993), Shaffer (1993), Fixler and Zieschang (1993)]. Similarly, there has been analysis of the impact of eliminating bank entry restrictions on the average performance of banks [Jayaratne and Strahan (1998)]. The evidence suggests that acquiring banks are typically more efficient than are acquired banks, resulting in the potential for the new combined organization to be more efficient and, therefore, for the merger to be welfare enhancing. The evidence also suggests, however, that these potential gains are often not realized. This has led some to question the benefits resulting from the recent increase in bank merger activity. We take a somewhat more comprehensive and micro-oriented approach and evaluate the impact of actual and potential competition resulting from market-entry mergers and reductions in entry barriers on bank efficiency. In particular, in addition to the efficiency gains realized by the parties involved in a bank merger, economic theory argues that additional efficiency gains should result from the impact of the merger on the degree of local market competition. We therefore examine the impact of increased competition resulting from mergers and acquisitions on the productive efficiency of incumbent banks. Our findings are consistent with economic theory: as competition increases as a result of entry or the creation of a more viable local competitor, the incumbent banks respond by increasing their level of cost efficiency. We find this efficiency increase to be in addition to any efficiency gains resulting from increases in potential competition occurring with the initial elimination of certain entry barriers. Thus, consistent with economic theory, new entrants and reductions in entry barriers lead incumbent firms to increase their productive efficiency to enable them to be viable in the more competitive environment. Studies evaluating the impact of bank mergers on the efficiency of the combining parties alone may be overlooking the most significant welfare enhancing aspect of merger activity. We do not find evidence of profit efficiency gains. In fact, the mergers are associated with decreases in profit efficiency; perhaps indicating that revenues may also be competed away from incumbents as a result of mergers.Bank mergers

(Interstate) Banking and (Interstate) Trade: Does Real Integration Follow Financial Integration? *

We conjecture that banks present in two regions charge the appropriate risk premiums for trade-related projects between these markets, whereas higher rates are charged for projects involving shipments to markets where they are absent. These differences affect regional trade flows. US interstate banking deregulation serves as a natural experiment to test our model’s implication with the Commodity Flow Survey data. Difference-in-differences estimates suggest that the trade share of state-pairs that allowed pairwise interstate entry increased by 14 % over ten years relative to non-integrated state-pairs. Instrumental variables estimates suggest that an actual increase in bank integration from zero to 2.28% (the mean) increases trade 17 % to 25%

U.S. Banking Integration and State-Level Exports

We use US interstate banking deregulations to identify the bank finance-trade channel while controlling for state-country bank links. A 1% increase in banking integration between states caused a 0.23% increase in the state-country level foreign exports/domestic shipments ratio between 1992-1996. The observed effect is due to banks with foreign assets, while the US expansion of banks with only domestic assets has no impact on exports/domestic shipments ratio. Our findings support the bank finance channel of international trade

The Competitive Dynamics of Geographic Deregulation in Banking: Implications for Productive Efficiency

Deregulation of geographic restrictions in banking over the past 20 years has intensified both potential and actual competition in the industry. The accumulating empirical evidence suggests that potential efficiency gains associated with consolidating banks are often not realized. We evaluate the impact of this increased competition on the productive efficiency of non-merging banks confronted with new entry in their local markets and find that the incumbent banks respond by improving cost efficiency. Thus, studies evaluating the impact of bank mergers on the efficiency of the combining parties alone may be overlooking the most significant welfare-enhancing aspect of merger activity. Copyright (c) 2008 Federal Reserve Bank of New York with Exclusive License to Print by The Ohio State University.

Financial Integration and Growth: Banks' Previous Industry Exposure Matters

Using U.S. interstate banking deregulations, we identify the effect of banks’ prior to market-entry industry exposures on the state-level manufacturing sector growth. Examining industry value added, gross operating surplus, total compensation, number of employees, output per employee and wages, we find that the larger the discrepancy in specialization in an industry between a state-pair, the higher is the impact of banking integration on the growth of that sector in the less specialized state. Our results indicate that a banking channel shapes the states’ industrial landscape. Banks prior exposure to different sectors appears to have important consequences for regional economic integration

Risk-Based Capital Requirements for Banks and International Trade

We provide the first evidence that changes in risk-based capital requirements for banks affect the real economy through international trade. Using a natural experiment – mandatory Basel II adoption in its Standardized Approach by all banks in Turkey on July 1, 2012 – we investigate the impact of new risk-weights applied to commercial letters of credit (CLC) on that country’s exports to 174 countries. We estimate the resulting payment-term-cost elasticity of CLC-financed trade to be between -0.5 and -1 while the overall trade elasticity to be between -0.032 and -0.179. Calculations suggest that both CLC-related bank pricing and rationing channels are involved