33 research outputs found
The Use of Sets (and Other Extensional Entities) in the Analysis of Hylomorphically Complex Objects
Hylomorphically complex objects are things that change their parts or matter or that might have, or have had, different parts or matter. Often ontologists analyze such objects in terms of sets (or functions, understood set-theoretically) or other extensional entities such as mereological fusions or quantities of matter. I urge two reasons for being wary of any such analyses. First, being extensional, such things as sets are ill-suited to capture the characteristic modal and temporal flexibility of hylomorphically complex objects. Secondly, sets are often appealed to because they seem to contain their members. But the idea that sets do contain their members, in the ordinary sense of containment, is a substantive metaphysical position that makes analyses that rely on that idea for their plausibility much more metaphysically committing than is generally thought
An Epistemic Component to Personal Identity: the Case of Religious Conversion
Under what conditions is a person a at time t the
same person as a person b at a later time t"? This is the
problem of personal identity over time. In this paper, I wish
to argue that there is a necessary (though not sufficient)
epistemic condition for identity. I will explain this condition
and offer some support for it. I will then discuss a case -
religious conversion - where it is arguable both that the
necessary condition fails to obtain and that there is a
failure of identity. If the case displays a fruitful co-incidence
between these two failures, that will be some evidence in
favor of my necessary condition
Essentially Contested Concepts and Semantic Externalism
In 1956, W.B. Gallie introduced his idea of essentially contested concepts. In my paper, I offer a novel interpretation of his theory and argue that his theory, thus interpreted, is correct. The key to my interpretation lies in a condition Gallie places on essentially contested concepts that other interpreters downplay or dismiss: that the use of an essentially contested concept must be derived “from an original exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the contestant users of the concept.” This reveals a similarity between Gallie’s views and the semantic externalist views of Hilary Putnam, and others, about natural kind terms like “water” and “tiger.” I argue that natural kind terms and terms for essentially contested concepts are two species of a single semantic genus. In the case of natural kind terms, a term refers to a natural kind, the exemplars are instances of that kind, and the relation between the exemplars and anything to which the term applies is co-membership of the kind. In the case of terms for essentially contested concepts, a term refers to an historical tradition, the exemplar is a stage or temporal part of that tradition, and the relation between the exemplar and anything to which the term refers is being the heir of. This allows me to understand the contests that alerted Gallie to the phenomenon of essentially contested concepts as contests over the ownership of historical tradition
Meme-making: Poaching, Reappropriation, or _Bricolage_?
Memes are a prominent example of a kind of digital artifact. It is widely agreed that an integral
component of meme-making is the way in which it makes use of other existing material. In this paper, I examine
three different ways of understanding this making use of. First, it has been seen in economic terms, as a kind
of poaching. Secondly, the cultural concept of (re)appropriation has been deployed. Finally, Lévi-Strauss’s
notion of bricolage is often mentioned. I argue that despite some interesting insights deriving from the first two
approaches, it is the third that gives the most comprehensive and interesting take on meme-making