Spoofing detection for underwater acoustic GNSS-like positioning systems

The need for accuracy, precision, and data registration in underwater positioning and navigation should be viewed as no less stringent than that which exists on the sea surface. In the same way in which GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) receivers rely on the signals from multiple satellites to calculate a precise position, undersea vehicles discern their location by ranging to the acoustic signals originating from several fixed underwater acoustic sources using the Time-of-Arrival algorithm (ToA) through the Ordinary Least Squares method (OLS). In this article, the scope has been limited to only considering underwater positioning systems in which the navigation receiver is acoustically passive. The receiver “listens” to the buoys, receives their messages and solves the problem of finding its own position based on the geographical coordinates of the buoys. Often, such systems are called GNSS-like Underwater Positioning Systems (GNSS-like UPS). It is important to note the distinction between general purpose GNSS-like UPS (mainly civil systems) and special purpose GNSS-like UPS (mainly military systems). In this article, only general purpose GNSS-like UPS systems have been considered. Depending on the scale of system’s service areas, GNSS-like UPS are divided into global, regional, zonal and local systems. Only local GNSS-like UPS systems have been considered in this article. The spoofing of acoustic GNSS-like UPS works as follows: the acoustic GNSS signal generator transmits a simulated signal of several satellites. If the level of the simulated signal exceeds the signal strength of the real satellites, the acoustic receiver of an underwater object will “capture” the fake signal and calculate a false position based on it. All receivers that fall into the spoofing zone will calculate the same coordinates, while the receivers located in different places will have a mismatch in the XYZ coordinates

Cloud-based GNSS navigation spoofing detection

Satellite navigation systems are commonly used to precisely determine the trajectory of transportation equipment. The widespread deployment of GNSS is pushing the current receiver technology to its limits due to the stringent demands for seamless, ubiquitous and secure/reliable positioning information. This fact is further aggravated by the advent of new applications where the miniaturized size, low power consumption and limited computational capabilities of user terminals pose serious risks to the implementation of even the most basic GNSS signal processing tasks. This paper has presented the advantage of Cloud-based GNSS Navigation, which facilitates the possibility of developing innovative applications where their particularities (e.g. massive processing of data, cooperation among users, security-related applications, etc.) make them suitable for implementation using Cloud-based infrastructure

Атаки на глобальные навигационные спутниковые системы и обнаружение спуфинга беспилотных кораблей, базирующееся на облачных технологиях

Спутниковые навигационные системы широко используются для точного определения траектории транспортных средств. В этой статье разработаны математические модели и алгоритмы для решения проблем безопасности спутниковой навигации. Одной из проблем является спуфинг (подстановка) — ситуация, когда система (аппаратное обеспечение, программное обеспечение и т. п.) успешно маскируется как другая, фальсифицируя систему данных, и выполняет незаконные действия. В статье рассматривается алгоритм обнаружения спуфинга на основе анализа гражданского спутникового сигнала, принимаемого мобильными одноантенными или двухантенными приемниками ГНСС. Эта работа также служит для уточнения оценки угроз среди гражданского населения путем демонстрации проблем, связанных с обнаружением спуфинга. Широкое распространение ГНСС подталкивает текущую технологию приемника к ее пределам из-за строгих требований к обеспечению бесшовного, повсеместного, безопасного и надежного позиционирования. Этот факт еще более усугубляется появлением новых приложений: миниатюрный размер, низкое энергопотребление и ограниченные вычислительные возможности пользовательских терминалов создают серьезную проблему для реализации даже самых основных задач обработки сигналов ГНСС. Эта работа иллюстрирует преимущество спутниковой навигации с использованием облачных технологий, которая облегчает возможность разработки инновационных приложений, таких как, например, массированная обработка данных, сотрудничество между пользователями, приложения, защищенные безопасностью и т. п

GNSS and LNSS Positioning of Unmanned Transport Systems: The Brief Classification of Terrorist Attacks on USVs and UUVs

As the demand for precision positioning grows around the world and spreads across various industries, initiatives are being taken to increasingly protect Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers from intruders of all kinds, from unintentional industrial interference to advanced GNSS spoofing systems. The timing and cost of these forthcoming satellite navigation safety efforts are difficult to decipher due to the large number of new signals and constellations being deployed. However, it is safe to say that the newly designed anti-jamming and anti-spoofing GNSS systems open up new opportunities for innovative technologies. The false acoustic signal delay is equal to the sum of the spoofer receiving antenna delay, processing delay, and propagation delay from the spoofer to the victim. The victim finds the same location as the spoofer’s receiving antenna, and receivers located in different locations will have the same XYZ. The article presents classifications of terrorist attacks of this type

The Spoofing Detection of Dynamic Underwater Positioning Systems (DUPS) Based on Vehicles Retrofitted with Acoustic Speakers

The need of precision for underwater positioning and navigation should be considered as strict as those present at the sea surface. GNSS provides 4D positioning (XYZT). Each satellite contains two rubidium and two cesium atomic clocks. They are monitored by an atomic clock on the ground, and the entire system is constantly calibrated to a universal time standard, Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). GNSS receivers determine the time T to within 100 billionths of a second without the cost of owning, operating and maintaining an atomic clock. Of particular importance is the measurement of XYZT underwater. We assume that some surface vehicles are additionally equipped with an Acoustic Speaker, which transmits the XY coordinates of the vessel with an indication of accuracy and the time T of the vessel. Submarine vehicles determine their position by help of acoustic signals from several surface acoustic sources using the Time of Arrival (ToA) algorithm. Detection of Spoofing for the Dynamic Underwater Positioning Systems (DUPS) based on vehicles retrofitted with acoustic speakers is very actual problem. Underwater spoofing works as follows: N acoustic speaker on N ships transmit the coordinates {xi,yi,ti}, i=1,N¯. GNSS signals are susceptible to interference due to their very low power (−130 dBm) and can be easily jammed by other sources, which may be accidental or intentional. The spoofer, like an underwater vehicle, receives these signals from N vessels, distorts them and transmits with increased acoustic power. All receivers into the spoofed area will calculate the same coordinates, so the indication of the coincidence of coordinates from a pair of diversity receivers is an indication of spoofing detection

GNSS and LNSS Positioning of Unmanned Transport Systems: The Brief Classification of Terrorist Attacks on USVs and UUVs

As the demand for precision positioning grows around the world and spreads across various industries, initiatives are being taken to increasingly protect Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers from intruders of all kinds, from unintentional industrial interference to advanced GNSS spoofing systems. The timing and cost of these forthcoming satellite navigation safety efforts are difficult to decipher due to the large number of new signals and constellations being deployed. However, it is safe to say that the newly designed anti-jamming and anti-spoofing GNSS systems open up new opportunities for innovative technologies. The false acoustic signal delay is equal to the sum of the spoofer receiving antenna delay, processing delay, and propagation delay from the spoofer to the victim. The victim finds the same location as the spoofer’s receiving antenna, and receivers located in different locations will have the same XYZ. The article presents classifications of terrorist attacks of this type