The role of agency beliefs in transition: Commentary to the Special Section

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/102088/1/ijop199037.pd

The informational basis of social judgments: Memory for integrated and nonintegrated trait descriptions

The representation of trait descriptions in memory depends not only on the properties of this information (e.g., whether it is consistent) but also on the operations performed on it (e.g., whether it has been integrated). If a set of traits merely has to be comprehended without being integrated (called a discrete judgment), then an inconsistent set is processed just as readily as a consistent one. However, if integration is required, that is, a coherent impression must be formed (called an integrative judgment), consistent trait descriptions are processed more rapidly than inconsistent ones. The effect of such differences in processing on the representation was shown in recognition memory performance: First, following integrative judgment a trait description was more accessible than following a discrete judgment. Second, under integrative judgment, memory for a consistent trait description was no greater than that for an inconsistent description, whereas under discrete judgment, memory for the former was superior to that for the latter. This suggests that when an impression is formed, namely, under integrative judgment, the traits describing a person are associated with each other via prior knowledge, and thus are represented as a unified structure; otherwise each trait is stored as a separate piece of information.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/25352/1/0000799.pd

The informational basis of social judgments: Using past impression rather than the trait description in forming a new impression

In making a new judgment, a person can access relevant past judgments and/or process the stimulus information underlying these judgments. The present study is concerned with (i) the conditions under which past judgments are used instead of stimulus information and (ii) the effects that repeated past judgments have on the representation of the stimulus information in memory. Three experiments were conducted using an impression formation task. Subjects were presented with trait descriptions of hypothetical individuals and were asked to make one, three, or five impression judgments on the basis of each description. It was hypothesized that a new impression will tend to be based on an old one, rather than on trait information, as a function of the ease with which the new impression can be inferred from the old. Ease of inference, in turn, will depend on the similarity of the two impressions and the availability of the past impression. The results of the three studies are consistent with this hypothesis: When past judgments were available, (Expermints 1 and 3), the extent to which they, rather than the trait information, determined the present judgment increased with the similarity between them. However, when another activity interpolated between the old and the new judgments (Experiment 2), thus making the past judgment more difficult to access, the tendency to use the latter diminished considerably. After judging, subjects were given a surprise recognition test for the trait information. Recognition accuracy was superior following a series of related judgments than following unrelated judgments, suggesting that the elaborations and inferences activated by the stimulus information tend to accumulate more under related judgments than under unrelated ones.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/25592/1/0000136.pd

Processing the information contained in another's behavior

This study investigates attributions based on behavior congruent with situational demands (in-role) and those based on behavior incongruent with situational demands (out-of-role). By analyzing these processes in terms of a Bayesian inference model, it was possible to determine (a) the diagnostic values observers intially assign to behaviors, (b) the actual informational impact of these behaviors, and (c) the degree of optimality in processing information contained therein. The main results can be summarized as follows: (1) The diagnostic value and actual informational impact of out-of-role behaviors were much higher than those of inrole behaviors. (2) Information about out-of-role behaviors was less optimally processed than information about in-role behaviors. (3) Observers assigned smaller diagnostic values to behaviors which were described in great detail than to behaviors which were described in summary statements. (4) Observers' attitudes influenced their initial beliefs about the actors but not the processing of new information about the actor. (5) The Bayesian inference model predicted observers' inferences reasonably well.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/21998/1/0000411.pd

The informational basis of social judgments: Memory for informative and uninformative arguments

This study investigates the encoding and retrieval of arguments in an opinion formation task. It is based on a model of opinion formation that partitions the latter process into initial encoding, elaborative encoding, integration, and decision. According to this model elaborative encoding depends on two factors: (i) the informativeness of the arguments and (ii) their thematic relatedness. Since it is reasonably well established that the likelihood of retrieving an argument is an increasing function of the amount of elaboration performed on it, the first hypothesis is straightforward, namely, that the memory for an argument will increase with its informativeness and with its thematic relatedness to other arguments. The second hypothesis assumes that by dint of their closer association with the decision, informative arguments occupy a more central position in the representation of an opinion than uninformative ones. This implies that an informative argument should be accessed and reported prior to an uninformative argument, even when differences in retrievability (i.e., probabilities of recall) are controlled. The findings were consistent with such an analysis.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/25124/1/0000557.pd

What a person thinks upon learning he has chosen differently from others: Nice evidence for the persuasive-arguments explanation of choice shifts

Small shifts in choice occur even without discussion, when individuals merely know each other's preference. This appears to support an interpersonal comparison explanation of group induced shifts in choice and to refute explanations based on persuasive argumentation. The present study demonstrates the contrary, that such effects are consistent with the persuasive-arguments formulation and are obtained under particular conditions specified only by the latter theory, to wit: Knowledge of other's choices is assumed to lead a person to think of reasons (arguments) others might have had for their choices-reasons which ordinarily would not come to mind without this knowledge. Such reasoning functions in the same way as persuasive argumentation during group discussion; it causes the person to persuade himself that an alternative course of action now has greater merit than the one he initially preferred. To test this analysis, an experiment was performed in which subjects responded to choice-dilemma items under three different conditions: Following their own choice (I) they learned what several others had chosen and then wrote arguments in support of alternatives given in that same item; (II) they learned what several others had chosen and then wrote arguments in support of alternatives given in a different item; and (III) they received no information about others' choices but merely wrote arguments on that item. As predicted, shifts in choice occurred only if the person knew what others chose and had an opportunity to think about the latter (condition I); they did not occur if an opportunity to think of others' choices was denied (condition II), nor if knowledge of others' choices was withheld (condition III). Content analysis of the arguments subjects produced in conditions I and II completely supported the hypothesis, as did analyses of responses to postexperimental questionnaire which directly asked the subjects about their feelings and thoughts upon learning what others had chosen.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/21997/1/0000410.pd

Testing two classes of theories about group induced shifts in individual choice

One class of theories explains group induced shifts in individual choice in terms of interpersonal comparison process. By comparing himself with others a member finds out that his position is uncomfortably discrepant, e.g., he is overly cautious or overly risky. Knowledge of this discrepancy presumably is necessary and sufficient to induce him to change his initial choice. Another class of theories holds that merely knowing one is different from others is unimportant. Shifts in choice occur because during discussion a member is exposed to persuasive arguments which prior to discussion were not available to him. Two experiments were conducted, the results of which give considerable support to persuasive-argument theories and none to those based on interpersonal comparison: When a member did not know whether others were arguing for their own position or were forced to support a position contrary to the one they had originally chosen, and the former in fact was the case, typical shifts in choice were obtained. However, if a member had to argue for a position contrary to the one he had initially chosen (and thus he would not be able to muster highly persuasive arguments) typical shifts did not occur, even though another's initial choice could be accurately inferred.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/33923/1/0000190.pd

Interpersonal comparison versus persuasive argumentation: A more direct test of alternative explanations for group-induced shifts in individual choice

One class of theories explains group induced shifts in individual choice in terms of interpersonal comparison process. By comparing himself with others a member finds out that his position is uncomfortably discrepant, e.g., he is overly "cautious" or overly "risky". Knowledge of this discrepancy presumably is necessary and sufficient to induce him to change his initial choice. Another class of theories holds that merely knowing one is different from others is unimportant. Shifts in choice occur because during discussion a member is exposed to persuasive arguments which prior to discussion were not available to him. Thus, if in a factorial design one independently varied (a) the number of others' choices available for comparison and (b) the number of arguments others presented in support of these choices, interpersonal comparison theories would predict the magnitude of the shift to be a function of (a) and not of (b), while theories of persuasive argumentation would predict the opposite. When such an experiment was performed the only reliable main effects were based on the number of arguments, (b), as predicted by persuasive arguments. In no instance did effects involving (a) approach significance.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/33886/1/0000151.pd

What do differences between own, admired, and attributed choices have to do with group induced shifts in choice

Two studies examined certain discrepancies which have been considered important evidence in support of interpersonal comparison (value-adherence) explanations of group induced shifts in choice. These are (a) the differences between a person's own choice and the choice he predicts others would make and (b) the difference between the former and the choice he admires. Findings from the first study indicate that own choices are more extreme than those a person predicts others would make because he is more certain and confident about the former than the latter, not because he wishes to appear to outdo others as interpersonal comparison theories of choice-shift effect would have it. The second study strongly suggests that extreme choices are admired not because they display maximal adherence to a social ideal but because they imply that the person's solution to a problem involving choice is well-founded, that he has persuasive reasons for the choice. On the whole the evidence bodes well for explanations of choice-shift effects based on persuasive argumentation and poorly for those relying on interpersonal comparison processes.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/22288/1/0000728.pd

Experiences of assessment in data and security courses using personal response systems

This paper details an experience report of two interventions which explored the use of a audience response system in summative assessment in two different ways within a conversion Masters degree programme. One course explored students understanding of topics and self-assessment of ability through small multiple-choice quizzes. The other course was based around cyber security and used the audience response system to ensure engagement with the pre-class reading material. Both interventions were designed in an attempt to encourage students to engage more effectively with the material. This paper aims to identify and contrast the ways in which the audience response system was used in assessment in higher education computing science with a view to suggesting key considerations for implementing such an intervention