POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES OR VOTERS AS FISCAL CONSERVATIVES? EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA

Theoretical models of the political budget cycle suggest that electoral manipulation of government expenditures can take the form of changes in the composition of spending, without impacting the overall budget or the deficit, and that the form and extent of this manipulation depend on the fiscal preferences of voters. In this paper, I use data on government expenditures and election outcomes in Colombia to provide an integrated analysis of voting behavior and the preelectoral dynamics of government spending. I emphasize potential changes in the composition, rather than the size, of the budget. I find that components of the budget that can be identified with targeted spending grow, and that non-targeted spending contracts, in the year preceding an election. Consistently, I find that voters reward the preelection increases in targeted spending, but punish incumbents who run high deficits before the election.Political Budget Cycle

The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy: Survey

This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of fiscal policy, in particular the accumulation of government debt. We examine three possible determinants of fiscal balances: opportunistic behavior by policymakers, heterogeneous fiscal preferences of either voters or politicians, and budget institutions. We focus on the contributions of the last 10 years and emphasize findings related to developing countries. We include a recent body of literature on the fiscal preferences of voters, which, interestingly, seems to suggest that voters do not favor high-spending governments. We also report some original empirical evidence. First, we test different hypotheses from the political economy literature in a simultaneous manner for a large set of both developed and developing countries. We find that less-fragmented governments and a greater ability of voters to monitor fiscal policy are related to lower deficits; the estimated effects are larger than when the two hypotheses are evaluated separately, as the existing literature does. Second, we suggest the role of the courts in the determination of fiscal policy as a promising new avenue of research, and present some suggestive novel evidence on the importance of this channel.

Electoral Manipulation via Expenditure Composition: Theory and Evidence

We present a model of the Political Budget Cycle in which voters and politicians have preferences for different types of government spending. Incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending, rather than overall spending or revenues. Rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation, because it can also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor. Classifying expenditures into those which are targeted to voters and those that are not, we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all Colombian municipalities. Our findings indicate both a pre-electoral increase in targeted expenditures, combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure, and a voter response to targeting.

Political Fragmentation and Government Spending: Bringing Ideological Polarization into the Picture

The literature has come to no agreement about the empirical validity of the so-called weak government hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, political fragmentation should lead to higher government expenditure. With the aim of reconciling the empirical evidence with theory, in this paper we discuss and test a new hypothesis about this relationship: that fragmentation should matter for public spending only to the extent that the degree of polarization is high enough. Our results for a sample of presidential democracies show that a marginal change in the level of fragmentation in the governing coalition affects positively the size of the budget, but only if there is some degree of polarization. We also find that what matters for fiscal policy in presidential democracies is the degree of fragmentation and polarization within the governing coalition, rather than in the legislature at large. For parliamentary democracies we find erratic patterns for the relationship between fragmentation and public spending. Our results suggest interesting differences between presidential and parliamentary systems.Common-pool resource problem, government spending, politicalfragmentation, ideological polarization

Pork Barrel Cycles

We present a model of political budget cycles in which incumbents influence voters by targeting government spending to specific groups of voters at the expense of other voters or other expenditures. Each voter faces a signal extraction problem: being targeted with expenditure before the election may reflect opportunistic manipulation, but may also reflect a sincere preference of the incumbent for the types of spending that voter prefers. We show the existence of a political equilibrium in which rational voters support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though they know it may be electorally motivated. In equilibrium voters in the more "swing" regions are targeted at the expense of types of spending not favored by these voters. This will be true even if they know they live in swing regions. However, the responsiveness of these voters to electoral manipulation depends on whether they face some degree of uncertainty about the electoral importance of the group they are in. Use of targeted spending also implies voters can be influenced without election-year deficits, consistent with recent findings for established democracies.

Pork Barrel Cycles ∗

We present a model of political budget cycles in which incumbents influence voters by targeting government spending to specific groups of voters at the expense of other voters or other expenditures. Each voter faces a signal extraction problem: being targeted with expenditure before the election may reflect opportunistic manipulation, but may also reflect a sincere preference of the incumbent for the types of spending that voter prefers. We show the existence of a political equilibrium in which rational voters support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though they know it may be electorally motivated. In equilibrium voters in the more “swing ” regions are targeted at the expense of types of spending not favored by these voters. This will be true even if they know they live in swing regions. However, the responsiveness of these voters to electoral manipulation depends on whether they face some degree of uncertainty about the electoral importance of the group they are in. Use of targeted spending also implies voters can be influenced without election-year deficits, consistent with recent findings for established democracies. JEL classification: D72, E62, D7

Export Dynamics in Colombia: Transactions Level Evidence

We examine Colombian export transaction data from customs records in several dimensions. We begin with some basic statistics on the number and frequency of export transactions by a firm, overall and across individual markets. We then decompose the variation in overall exports into the number of transactions and the size of the average transaction, both at the aggregate level and for individual firms to explore gravity equations, where the patterns of exports and numbers of transactions are related to the distance with respect to the destination. The analysis is carried out both at the aggregate and the firm level. Then we explore the relationship between patterns of transactions numbers and shipment modes. Our results show great heterogeneity in the patterns of frequency and number of transactions across firms; the average firm sent about 75 shipments abroad in 2005, while the firm with largest number of transactions that same year dispatched more than 26,000 shipments. Moreover, while close to 35% of firms in the sample report a single export transaction over the period, for most firms with multiple transactions the average span between two transactions is less than a month. Part of this heterogeneity is shown to be related to the distance with respect to the destination market: firms exporting to more distant destinations make less frequent shipments than firms exporting to markets that are closer. This suggests that there are fixed costs per shipment inducing declining marginal cost of higher shipment volume. These patterns imply that, at the aggregate level, transactions numbers are the primary source of variation in exports. The variability in the numbers of transactions also explains an important part of the well-known negative relationship between aggregate exports and distance to a specific destination.Export transaction frequency; fixed shipment costs and scale economies in transportation; destination distance, average shipment volume and number of shipments. Classification JEL: F10; F12; F14.

Scarring Recessions and Credit Constraints: Evidence from Colombian Firm Dynamics

Using a rich dataset of Colombian manufacturing establishments between 1995 and 2004, we illustrate potential scarring effects of recessions operating through credit constraints. In contrast with the view that recessions are times of cleansing, we find that financially constrained businesses might be forced to exit the market during recessions even if they are highly productive. For instance, during recessions, an establishment with TFP at the lowest 10th percentile but not facing credit constraints has the same exit probability as a constrained plant with TFP at least as high as the 39th percentile. The gap is much smaller during expansions. The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, it evaluates the role played by credit constraints in explaining firm dynamics throughout the business cycle, a phenomenon the literature has dealt with mostly from a theoretical standpoint. Second, it sheds light on the implied long-run consequences of exits induced by lack of credit on efficiency. Finally, it is the only study we know of providing direct evidence to judge the empirical merits of proposed micro foundations behind the long-run consequences of crises.Plant exit, credit constraints, business cycles, recessions

The Effect of Structural Reforms on Productivity and Profitability Enhancing Reallocation: Evidence from Colombia

In the U.S., some sectoral evidence suggests that growth is driven mainly by productivity enhancing reallocation. In countries with greater barriers to entry and imperfect competition, the reallocation process may be inefficient. Therefore, for developing countries, an open question is whether reallocation is productivity enhancing. Using a unique plant-level longitudinal dataset for Colombia for the period 1982-1998 we examine the interaction between market allocation, productivity and profitability. Given the important trade, labor and financial market oriented reforms in Colombia in 1990, we explore whether and how the contribution of reallocation changed. Our data include plant-level quantities and prices. Using plant prices, we propose a sequential methodology to estimate productivity and demand shocks. First, with plant-level physical output data, we estimate total factor productivity (TFP) using downstream demand to instrument for inputs. Then, with plant-level price data, we estimate demand shocks and mark-ups in the inverse-demand equation, using TFP to instrument for output. We characterize the evolution of TFP and demand shock distributions. Market reforms are associated with rising overall productivity that is driven by reallocation away from low- and towards high-productivity businesses; and, the allocation of activity across businesses is less driven by demand factors.

The effects of structural reforms on productivity and profitability enhancing reallocation: Evidence from Colombia

Estimates for the U.S. suggest that at least in some sectors productivity enhancing reallocation is the dominant factor in accounting for producitivity growth. An open question, particularly relevant for developing countries, is whether reallocation is always productivity enhancing. It may be that imperfect competition or other barriers to competitive environments imply that the reallocation process is not fully e?cient in these countries. Using a unique plant-level longitudinal dataset for Colombia for the period 1982-1998, we explore these issues by examining the interaction between market allocation, and productivity and profitability. Moreover, given the important trade, labor and financial market reforms in Colombia during the early 1990's, we explore whether and how the contribution of reallocation changed over the period of study. Our data permit measurement of plant-level quantities and prices. Taking advantage of the rich structure of our price data, we propose a sequential mehodology to estimate productivity and demand shocks at the plant level. First, we estimate total factor productivity (TFP) with plant-level physical output data, where we use downstream demand to instrument inputs. We then turn to estimating demand shocks and mark-ups with plant-level price data, using TFP to instrument for output in the inversedemand equation. We examine the evolution of the distributions of TFP and demand shocks in response to the market reforms in the 1990's. We find that market reforms are associated with rising overall productivity that is largely driven by reallocation away from low- and towards highproductivity businesses. In addition, we find that the allocation of activity across businesses is less driven by demand factors after reforms. We find that the increase in aggregate productivity post-reform is entirely accounted for by the improved allocation of activity.TFP measurement, productivity and demand decompositions, structural reforms