PERSISTENCE OF THE GENDER WAGE GAP: THE ROLE OF THE INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF PREFERENCES

This paper provides an explanation of the evolution and persistence of the gender wage gap due to differences in training within the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of preferences. "Job-priority" and "family-priority" preferences are considered. Firms' policy and the distribution of women's preferences influence each other and are endogenously and simultaneously determined in the long run. The results show though the gender gap in training will diminish, it will also will persist over time. This is because both types of women's preferences coexist at the steady state due to the socialization effort of parents to preserve their own cultural values.gender wage gap, firm training, women preferences, cultural transmission

Who moves up the career ladder? A model of gender differences in job promotion

This paper presents an adverse selection model that contributes to explain why women are less likely to be promoted. There are two types of workers: family-committed and job-committed workers. The cost of job effort during the first period of the working life is higher for the former. Firms offer two types of contract, one involving high effort during the first period with promotion possibilities and the other requiring low effort but with no opportunity for promotion attached. We show that women are less likely to apply for jobs with promotion possibilities, but when they do, women are just as likely to succeed as men.Gender Discrimination, Promotions, Asymmetric Information, Status Concerns

EDUCATION AND FAMILY INCOME: CAN POOR CHILDREN SIGNAL THEIR TALENT?

The aim of this paper is to explain how financial constraints and family background characteristics affect the signalling educational investments of individuals born in low-income families. We show that talented students who are poor are unable to signal their talent, as the maximum level of education they can attain may also be achieved by less talented students who are rich. Under this approach, a de-crease in inequalities across generations cannot be expected. The paper also shows that an increase in educational standards would help poor individuals with high-ability if it is combined with other non-monetary measures.Market selection hypothesis, General Equilibrium with Incomplete markets, Wealth accumulation