Repression, political threats, and survival under autocracy

Along with the mobilization of political support, repression is one of the two basic instruments dictators use to stay in power. Yet, there is no systematic investigation analyzing whether repression actually helps dictators retain power. This article fills this gap by addressing the simultaneous relationship between survival and repression. The results reveal that repression certainly increases the likelihood of dictators’ survival. Furthermore, this article also analyzes different types of authoritarian leader exit and repression. The article distinguishes between, on the one hand, nonviolent and regular exits and, on the other hand, violent and irregular exits as well as between political terror and restrictions on civil liberties. It argues that terror is effective against threats from organized groups, while restrictions on civil liberties essentially serve to prevent collective action. The empirical evidence confirms that political terror only reduces the likelihood of nonviolent and regular exits. Instead, restrictions on civil liberties are effective in deterring both sorts of threats

The political economy of growth and accountability under dictatorship

La tesis fue dirigida por Adam Przeworski y defendida en la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Se pregunta qué explica las diferencias entre dictaduras en cuanto al grado de organización política, de institucionalización política, de representación dentro de sus instituciones. Qué relación existe entre esas diferencias, la duración del régimen y el distinto grado de crecimiento económico. En la tesis juega un papel central un tipo especial de accountability, de responsabilidad política del dictador. No ante los ciudadanos sino consistente en su vulnerabilidad ante actores que les pueden exigir responsabilidades o que pueden derrocarles. Pueden ser militares, otros miembros en el poder, o movimientos ciudadanos. Esa vulnerabilidad es mayor cuanto más institucionalizada esté la dictadura porque mayores espacios de pluralismo existirán. Ello dependerá de la necesidad del régimen de contar con cooperación social para recaudar impuestos en caso de no disponer de recursos naturales o de no disponer de importante ayuda externa. La vulnerabilidad política está también asociada con mayores posibilidades de que el dictador tenga que rendir cuentas judicialmente una vez que sea depuesto. Ante esa doble vulnerabilidad política y judicial, el dictador promoverá el desarrollo económico, reducirá el consumo público y la extracción depredadora de rentas como forma de sobrevivir en el poder. La tesis desarrolla unos modelos formales muy elegantes e intelectualmente penetrantes y lleva a cabo un análisis econométrico sofisticado y riguroso de dictaduras en 139 países durante 550 periodos de gobierno dictatorial entre 1946 y el año 2000.Abel Escribá Folch.Adam Przeworski, director de tesis. ill. ; 23 cm. Tesis doctorales / Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales ; 64 Includes bibliographical references (p. [323]-352

The Multidimensionality of Political Representation: An Empirical Test on Spanish Political Parties and Voters

Political representation is a complex concept due to its multidimensional and contested nature. This lack of unequivocal meaning has triggered a theoretical dispute about what 'acting for others' should actually involve. In this article we argue that the main actors involved in the process of political representation (political parties and the electorate) also hold alternative conceptions. In an attempt to link political theory to empirical analysis, we use survey data to prove our argument. By attaching dissimilar weights to each of the dimensions, parties and voters defend different interpretations of the political representation concept, which stem from their ideological positions. Nonetheless, there is a significant correspondence between parties' interpretations and their electorates'. Furthermore, we demonstrate how the weight attached to each dimension by voters influences their attitudes towards political parties and their satisfaction with democracy

Learning, political regimes and the liberalisation of trade

In this article, the probability of opening to trade is related to a country's propensity to learn from other countries in its region. It is argued that countries have different motivations to learn, depending upon the responsiveness and accountability of their political regimes. Whereas democracies cannot afford to be dogmatic, authoritarian regimes are less motivated to learn from the experience of others, even if they embrace policies that fail. Using data on trade liberalisation for 57 developing countries in the period 1970–1999, it is found that democracies confronting economic crises are more likely to liberalise trade as a result of learning; among democracies, presidential systems seem to learn more, whereas personalist dictatorial regimes are the most resistant to learning from the experience of others