Making a dead woman pregnant? A critique of the thought experiment of Anna Smajdor

In a thought-provoking article – or how she herself named it, ‘a thought experiment’ – the philosopher-medical ethicist Anna Smajdor analyzed in this journal the idea of whole-body gestational donation (WBGD) in brain-dead female patients, as an alternative means of gestation for prospective women who cannot or prefer not to become pregnant themselves. We have serious legal, economical, medical and ethical concerns about this proposal. First, consent for eight months of ICU treatment can never be assumed to be derived from consent for post-mortem organ donation; these two are of an incomparable and entirely different medical and ethical order. Moreover, the brain-dead woman is very likely to be medically unfit for high-tech surrogacy and the brain-dead state poses a high risk for deficient embryo/fetal development. Second, from a scarcity perspective, occupying an ICU bed for eight months appears to be unjust. The costs for eight months of ICU treatment are far too high compared to the costs of surrogacy for a living, selected, and healthy woman. Neither insurance companies nor prospective parents will want to pay these exceptionally high costs for a dead woman if a living surrogate mother can be hired for a considerably lower amount. Third, there is an increased risk for harm of the child to be in WBGD. And finally, WBGD risks violating the brain-dead woman’s dignity and harming the interests of her loved ones. In short, there is simply no need for brain-dead women as surrogates.</p

Inability to obtain deferred consent due to early death in emergency research: effect on validity of clinical trial results

PURPOSE: To illustrate the impact on the validity of trial results due to excluding patients from a randomized controlled trial for whom no deferred consent could be obtained after randomization because study procedures had already been finished. METHODS: The unadjusted and adjusted primary outcome measures of a recent randomized controlled multicentre study in the field of intensive care medicine were compared, including (n = 348) or excluding (n = 289) patients with missing deferred consent. RESULTS: Thirty-nine patients (11%) died early, before the patient or his/her proxy could be approached and consent be obtained. In another 20 patients (6%), it was not possible to inform proxies and ask consent within the period of study procedures. A significant treatment effect (p = 0.006) in the adjusted analysis became non-significant (p = 0.35) when the patients with missing deferred consent were excluded. CONCLUSIONS: Exclusion of patients without obtained deferred consent can reduce statistical power, introduce selection bias, make randomization asymmetrical, decrease external validity and thereby jeopardize study results. This may have implications for emergency research in various disciplines

Anticipation of distress after discontinuation of mechanical ventilation in the ICU at the end of life

Background: A considerable number of patients admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU) die following withdrawal of mechanical ventilation. After discontinuation of ventilation without proper preparation, excessive respiratory secretion is common, resulting in a 'death rattle'. Post-extubation stridor can give rise to the relatives' perception that the patient is choking and suffering. Existing protocols lack adequate anticipatory preparation to respond to all distressing symptoms. Methods: We analyzed existing treatment strategies in distressing symptoms after discontinuation of mechanical ventilation. Conclusion: The actual period of discontinuation of mechanical ventilation can be very short, but thoughtful anticipation of distressing symptoms takes time. There is an ethical responsibility to anticipate and treat (iatrogenic) symptoms such as pain, dyspnea-associated respiratory distress, anxiety, delirium, post-extubation stridor, and excessive broncho-pulmonary secretions. This makes withdrawal of mechanical ventilation in ICU patients a thoughtful process, taking palliative actions instead of fast terminal actions. We developed a flowchart covering all possible distressi