Terrapene

Number of Pages: 6Integrative BiologyGeological Science

Terrapene carolina

Number of Pages: 13Integrative BiologyGeological Science

THE HIDDEN COSTS AND RETURNS OF INCENTIVES — TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS AMONG CEOs

We examine experimentally how Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) respond to incentives and how they provide incentives in situations requiring trust and trustworthiness. As a control we compare the behavior of CEOs with the behavior of students. We find that CEOs are considerably more trusting and exhibit more trustworthiness than students—thus reaching substantially higher efficiency levels than students. Moreover, we find that, for CEOs as well as for students, incentives based on explicit threats to penalize shirking backfire by inducing less trustworthy behavior—giving rise to hidden costs of incentives. However, the availability of penalizing incentives also creates hidden returns: if a principal expresses trust by voluntarily refraining from implementing the punishment threat, the agent exhibits significantly more trustworthiness than if the punishment threat is not available. Thus trust seems to reinforce trustworthy behavior. Overall, trustworthiness is highest if the threat to punish is available but not used, while it is lowest if the threat to punish is used. Paradoxically, however, most CEOs and students use the punishment threat, although CEOs use it significantly less.HIDDEN COSTS, RETURNS OF INCENTIVES, TRUST, TRUSTWORTHINESS, CEO

The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives - Trust and Trustworthiness among CEOs

We examine experimentally how Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) respond to incentives and how they provide incentives in situations requiring trust and trustworthiness. As a control we compare the behavior of CEOs with the behavior of students. We find that CEOs are considerably more trusting and exhibit more trustworthiness than students - thus reaching substantially higher efficiency levels than students. Moreover, we find that, for CEOs as well as for students, incentives based on explicit threats to penalize shirking backfire by inducing less trustworthy behavior - giving rise to hidden costs of incentives. However, the availability of penalizing incentives also creates hidden returns: if a principal expresses trust by voluntarily refraining from implementing the punishment threat, the agent exhibits significantly more trustworthiness than if the punishment threat is not available. Thus trust seems to reinforce trustworthy behavior. Overall, trustworthiness is highest if the threat to punish is available but not used, while it is lowest if the threat to punish is used. Paradoxically, however, most CEOs and students use the punishment threat, although CEOs use it significantly less.

INVESTMENT AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS IN THE G7 COUNTRIES AND AUSTRALIA

The vintage model of capital accumulation predicts that technical progress depends on the installation of new capital equipment. In this paper it is found that investment raises labor productivity in the G7 countries and Australia. This finding implies that the decline in investment during the global financial crisis will have a long lasting detrimental effect on labor productivity and hence wages.

Carphophis amoenus

Number of Pages: 7Integrative BiologyGeological Science

Endangered by Sprawl: How Runaway Development Threatens America's Wildlife

Estimates the growth of land consumption in metropolitan areas over the next 25 years, investigates locally implemented strategies to protect natural lands from overdevelopment, and offers "smart growth" as an option for reducing suburban sprawl

John Patrick McGregor Interview

Transcript of an oral history interview with John Patrick McGregor by John Ernst on his experiences during the Vietnam War on July 9, 1997