A market-based mechanism to improve capital expenditures

Most governments in Sub-Saharan Africa have a capital spending problem. They don’t spend enough money to build or improve infrastructure that is in obviously short supply. What has emerged as a ‘second-best’ solution to this problem is infrastructure-directed lending by the development agencies. This is an unfortunate solution, not just for the weakness in state capacity that it perpetuates, and the fiscal space it frees up for countries to undertake expensive commercial borrowing, but also because it links unnecessary debt to necessary infrastructure. I propose a private sector-based solution that links infrastructure spending to contemporaneous revenues, in which the useful functions of the development agency are opened up to competition and the debt financing is replaced by markets for political risk. This solution could not only reduce the cost and debt burden of building infrastructure, but also create high-powered incentives that would solve the weaknesses in state capacity that made debt-linked infrastructure necessary in the first place

The Political Economy of Bilateral Foreign Aid

Despite its developmental justification, aid is deeply political. This paper examines the political economy of aid allocation first from the perspective of the donor country, and then the political economy of aid receipt and implementation from the perspective of the recipient country. When helpful, it draws from studies of multilateral aid. Following those discussions, the paper explores solutions, employed by the development community, to the distortions brought about by the political economy of bilateral aid—distortions that steer aid away from achieving economic development in the recipient country. As it turns out, none of these solutions can shield foreign aid from the heavy hand of politics. Developing countries heavily influenced by foreign aid end up with a different, and novel, governing apparatus

The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically-driven Aid less Effective?

As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated – such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank – are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place.World Bank, aid effectiveness, political influence, United Nations Security Council

Who Runs the International System? Power and the Staffing of the United Nations Secretariat

National governments frequently pull strings to get their citizens appointed to senior positions in international institutions. We examine, over a 60 year period, the nationalities of the most senior positions in the United Nations Secretariat, ostensibly the world's most representative international institution. The results indicate which nations are successful in this zero-sum game, and what national characteristics correlate with power in international institutions. The most overrepresented countries are small, rich democracies like the Nordic countries. Statistically, democracy, investment in diplomacy, and economic/military power are predictors of senior positions―even after controlling for the U.N. staffing mandate of competence and integrity. National control over the United Nations is remarkably sticky; however the influence of the United States has diminished as U.S. ideology has shifted away from its early allies. In spite of the decline in U.S. influence, the Secretariat remains pro-American relative to the world at large

The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?

As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated – such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank – are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place.World Bank, aid effectiveness, political influence, United Nations Security Council

Do Voters Demand Responsive Governments? Evidence from Indian Disaster Relief

Using rainfall, public relief, and election data from India, we examine how governments respond to adverse shocks and how voters react to these responses. The data show that voters punish the incumbent party for weather events beyond its control. However, fewer voters punish the ruling party when its government responds vigorously to the crisis, indicating that voters reward the government for responding to disasters. We also find evidence suggesting that voters only respond to rainfall and government relief efforts during the year immediately preceding the election. In accordance with these electoral incentives, governments appear to be more generous with disaster relief in election years. These results describe how failures in electoral accountability can lead to suboptimal policy outcomes

South Sudan: The Birth of an Economy

We discuss the birth of a new economy in a society that has only recently emerged from a 22-year-long civil war. The pace of growth so far has been fast but uneven. We find that aid and oil money are flowing rapidly into certain sectors, while other employment-generating areas of the economy, particularly agriculture, have barely changed their centuries-old ways. As a result, the recent windfall of wealth has yet to translate into tangible development benefits for the majority of the population. In order to achieve growth in these other sectors, there is a need for more innovation in both government policy and business strategy

Nhyehyɛeɛ A Ɛbɛma Ahafo Mfaso - Deɛ Apam No Aba Mu: Yɛrehwehwɛ Mpɔtamu Ahofama Wɔ Newmont Sika Kɔkɔɔ Agudeɛtuo Mu Wɔ Ghana

Wɔ afe mpennu ne nnwɔtwe mu no, mpɔtam du a ɛwɔ Bono ne Ahafo mantam mu ne sika kɔkɔɔ adwu-makuo bi a yɛfrɛ no Newmont Ghana Gold Ltd (Newmont Ghana) yɛɛ apam. Ansa na wɔrebɛyɛ apam no, na saa adwumakuo yi afiri aseɛ koraa retu sika kɔkɔɔ wɔ saa mpɔtamu hɔ. Deɛ na ɛwɔ apam no mu bi ne sɛ, adwumakuo no hyɛɛ bɔ sɛ ɔbɛbuebue nnwuma wɔ mmeaeɛ a wɔretu sika kɔkɔɔ no na ɔsane de sika bɛboa mpuntu nnwuma a ɛbɛkɔ so wɔ mpɔtamu hɔ. Wɔ apam no mu no, wɔkɔɔ bɛnkrom wɔ nhyehyɛeɛ pa a ɛbɛboa ama nkitahodie akɔ so wɔ mpɔtamu hɔ ne adwumakuo no ntam na aboa ama wɔasi gyinaeɛ. Mfeɛ du akyi, saa amannebɔ yi rehwɛ suahunu a mpɔtamhɔfoɔ no anya afiri saa apam no mu na asane nso akyerɛ sɛdeɛ yɛbɛtumi ayɛ no yie. Wɔkaa apam no ho asɛm bio wɔ afe mpennu ne du-nnan mu na ɛbɛtumi aba sɛ wɔbɛsane aka ho asɛm bio wɔ afe mpennu ne du-nwɔtwe anaa afe mpennu ne du-nkron mu. Wɔ wiase afanan nyinaa mu no, fagudeɛtuo nwumakuo ne mpɔtamu a wɔdi wɔn dwuma no tɔ kɔ so ara kɔ apam. Wɔ aman bi so no, amammara no hwehwɛ apam a ɛfa mfaso-kyɛ ho ansa na wɔama kwan ama fagudeɛtuo adwumakuo no ahyɛ wɔn dwumadie ase. Wɔ aman foforɔ so no, nwumakuo no ara firi wɔn pɛ mu na ɛkɔ apam no sɛdeɛ ɛbɛyɛ a mpɔtamhɔfoɔ no bɛyɛ adwumakuo no atuu na wakwati ntawatwa biara a ɛbɛma ne ho so afiri mpɔtamu hɔ. Mpɔtamhɔfoɔ bɛtumi de apam no asi wɔn asɛdeɛ so dua, de anya banbɔ bi afiri nsunsuansoɔ bɔne a fagudeɛtuo de ba ho na ama wɔn anya kyɛfa wɔ mfasoɔ a ɛbɛfiri dwumadie no mu aba. Wɔ Ghanaman mu no, mmara biara nni hɔ a ɛhyɛ fagudeɛ nnwumakuo bi sɛ wɔne mpɔtamu a wɔredi wɔn dwuma no nyɛ apam anaa nhyehyɛeɛ bi. Mpɔtamhɔfoɔ no ne yɛn dii nkitaho a wɔsrɛɛ yɛn sɛ, yɛntu wɔn fo wɔ apam no dwumadie ho. Ansa na yɛregye ato mu sɛ yɛbɛdi saa dwuma no, yɛtuu anammɔn kɔɔ mmeaeɛ no a wɔretu fagudeɛ no ne Nkran. Wɔn a wɔka bi a ɛwom a yɛne wɔn kasaeɛ no bi ne Ghana aban fagudeɛ badwakuo a wɔfrɛ wɔn “Ghana’s Minerals Commision”, mpaninfoɔ a wɔwɔ fagudeɛ nsase no so, ahɔhoɔ a wɔte mpɔtamu hɔ no, nnwuma-kuo a ɛnhyɛ aban ase a wɔwɔ mpɔtamu hɔ, nnipa a apam no ayi wɔn sɛ wɔnhwɛ sɛ nhyehyɛeɛ no bɛyɛ adwuma ne ahenfo nyinaa foaa dwumadie yi so. Yɛsane kɔɔ beaeɛ a wɔretu fagudeɛ no ne Nkran wɔ Kɔtɔnimaa bosome mu wɔ afe mpenu ne du-nson mu. Ɛhɔ na yɛtotoo nnipa bɛboro ɔha ano a na wɔn a wɔka ho bi ne nananom ahenfo, wɔn a wɔsi aban anan mu wɔ mpɔtamu hɔ, mpɔtamhɔfoɔ ananmusifoɔ, temanmufoɔ ne nwumakuo a ɛnhyɛ aban ase, akuafoɔ, mmabunu ne nnipa a apam no ayi wɔn sɛ wɔnhwɛ sɛ nhyehyɛeɛ no bɛyɛ adwuma. Afei yɛsane ne Newmont ananmusifoɔ ahodoɔ dii nkitaho. Yɛntumi nka sɛ nhyehyɛeɛ a mpɔtamhɔfoɔ ne adwumakuo yi yɛeɛ no ama mpuntuo aba wɔn abrabɔ mu ɛfiri sɛ yɛannya nsɛm pii a ɛbɛboa yɛn ama yɛatumi de Ahafo nkuro yi atoto nkuro ahodoɔ a wɔtu fagudeɛ yi bi wɔ hɔ nanso wɔannyɛ nhyehyɛeɛ biara ammfa wɔn dwumadie no ho. Nanso, yɛrema yɛn nsusuiɛ ne deɛ yɛahunu a ɛbɛtumi aboa ama apam nhyehyɛeɛ no ayɛ adwuma yie daakye na ɛho aba mfasoɔ ama mpɔtamhɔfoɔ no, aban ne Newmont adwumakuo no