International Capital Flows

The sharp increase in both gross and net capital flows over the past two decades has led to a renewed interest in their determinants. Most existing theories of international capital flows are in the context of models with only one asset, which only have implications for net capital flows, not gross flows. Moreover, there is no role for capital flows as a result of changing expected returns and risk-characteristics of assets as there is no portfolio choice. In this paper we develop a method for solving dynamic stochastic general equilibrium open-economy models with portfolio choice. We show why standard first and second-order solution methods no longer work in the presence of portfolio choice, and extend them giving special treatment to the optimality conditions for portfolio choice. We apply the solution method to a particular two-country, two-good, two-asset model and show that it leads to a much richer understanding of both gross and net capital flows. The approach highlights time-varying portfolio shares, resulting from time-varying expected returns and risk characteristics of the assets, as a potential key source of international capital flows.

Self-Fulfilling Risk Panics

Recent crises have seen large spikes in asset price risk without dramatic shifts in fundamentals. We propose an explanation for these risk panics, based on selfful filling shifts in beliefs about risk, that are driven by a negative link between the current asset price and risk about the future asset price. This link implies that risk about the future asset price depends on uncertainty about future risk. This dynamic mapping of risk into itself gives rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria and can generate risk panics. In a panic, risk beliefs are coordinated around a macro fundamental that becomes a sudden focal point of the market. The magnitude of the panic is larger the weaker this macro fundamental. The sharp increase in risk leads to a large drop in the asset price, decreased leverage and reduced market liquidity. While the model is not aimed at modeling the specifics of any particular financial crisis, we show that its implications are broadly consistent with what happened during the 2007-2008 crisis.

Self-Fulfilling Risk Panics

Recent crises have seen very large spikes in asset price risk without dramatic shifts in fundamentals. We propose an explanation for these risk panics based on self-fulfilling shifts in risk made possible by a negative link between the current asset price and risk about the future asset price. This link implies that risk about tomorrow’s asset price depends on uncertainty about risk tomorrow. This dynamic mapping of risk into itself gives rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling shifts in risk. We show that this can generate risk panics. The impact of the panic is larger when the shift from a low to a high risk equilibrium takes place in an environment of weak fundamentals. The sharp increase in risk leads to a large drop in the asset price, decreased leverage and reduced market liquidity. We show that the model can account well for the developments during the recent financial crisis.

Regulating Asset Price Risk

There has been a long debate about whether speculators are stabilizing or not. We consider a model where speculators have a stabilizing role in normal times, but may also provoke large risk panics. The very feature that makes arbitrageurs liquidity providers in normal times, namely their tolerance of risk, enables a large increase in asset price risk during a financial panic. We show that a policy that discourages balance sheet risk reduces the magnitude of financial panics, as well as asset price risk in both normal and panic states.Asset Pricing, Risk Management, Leverage.

Regulating Asset Price Risk

There has been a long debate about whether speculators are stabilizing or not. We consider a model where speculators have a stabilizing role in normal times, but may also provoke large risk panics. The very feature that makes arbitrageurs liquidity providers in normal times, namely their tolerance of risk, enables a large increase in asset price risk during a financial panic. We show that a policy that discourages balance sheet risk reduces the magnitude of financial panics, as well as asset price risk in both normal and panic states.asset pricing; risk management; leverage

International Capital Flows under Dispersed Information: Theory and Evidence

We develop a new theory of international capital flows based on dispersed information across individual investors. There is extensive evidence of information heterogeneity within and across countries, which has proven critical to understanding asset price behavior. We introduce information dispersion into an open economy dynamic general equilibrium portfolio choice model, and emphasize two implications for capital flows that are specific to the presence of dispersed information. First, gross and net capital flows become partially disconnected from publicly observed fundamentals. Second, capital flows (particularly gross flows) contain information about future fundamentals, even after controlling for current fundamentals. We find that these implications are quantitatively significant and consistent with data for industrialized countries.