Competition Between Auctions

Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we review the state of the art of competition between auctions. We consider three different types of competition: competition between auctions, competition between formats, and competition between auctioneers vying for auction traffic. We highlight the newest experimental, statistical and analytical methods in the analysis of competition between auctions.auctions, bidding, competition, auction formats, auction houses

Economics, Psychology, and Social Dynamics of Consumer Bidding in Auctions

With increasing numbers of consumers in auction marketplaces, we highlight some recent approaches that bring additional economic, social, and psychological factors to bear on existing economic theory to better understand and explain consumers' behavior in auctions. We also highlight specific research streams that could contribute towards enriching existing economic models of bidding behavior in emerging market mechanisms.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/47034/1/11002_2005_Article_5901.pd

Combining Buy-In Penalties with Commissions at Auction Houses

Most auction sellers consign property to auction houses rather than holding the auction themselves. In addition to charging sellers a commission on property that sells in the auction, many auction houses also specify buy-in penalties in auction contracts. This is an amount the seller must pay the auction house if the property fails to sell at auction. An important managerial question for auction houses is whether and when buy-in penalties can increase revenues of the auction house, seller, or both, and what combinations of commission and buy-in penalty to use. We show that auctions which combine buy-in penalties with lower commissions Pareto-dominate auctions that use only commissions. This strategy motivates the seller to set a lower reserve, which creates a surplus in auction revenues that can go to one or both parties. This strategy is Pareto-dominant even if the auction house and the seller are uncertain about the number of bidders at the auction, or the auction house is uncertain about the seller's own valuation for the property, at the time the buy-in penalty, commission, and reserve are contractually set. We also discuss the incentive issues raised by this strategy.auctions, bidding, commissions, pricing, penalty