What is European integration really about? A political guide for economists

Europe’s monetary union is part of a broader process of integration that started in the aftermath of World War II. In this “political guide for economists” we look at the creation of the euro within the bigger picture of European integration. How and why were European institutions established? What are the goals and determinants of European Integration? What is European integration really about? We address these questions from a political-economy perspective, building on ideas and results from the economic literature on the formation of states and political unions. Specifically, we look at the motivations, assumptions, and limitations of the European strategy, initiated by Jean Monnet and his collaborators, of partially integrating policy functions in a few areas, with the expectation that more integration will follow in other areas, in a sort of chain reaction towards an “ever-closer union.” The euro with its current problems is a child of that strategy and its limits

National Borders, Conflict and Peace

This paper reviews the economics approach to conflict and national borders. The paper (a) provides a summary of ideas and concepts from the economics literature on the size of nations; (b) illustrates them within a simple analytical framework where populations fight over borders and resources, and may form non-aggression pacts, military alliances, and political unions; and (c) discusses extensions and directions for further research.wars, alliances, conflict technology, defense, economies of scale, heterogeneity costs, secessions, size of nations

Federalism, Regional Redistribution, and Country Stability

In recent decades a large number of new sovereign states has been created through secessions, decolonization and breakup of existing countries. Since 1990 the Soviet Union split into fifteen independent countries, Yugoslavia gave away to six sovereign states (not counting Kosovo), Czechoslavakia broke into two separate states, Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia, Namibia gained indepen- dence from South Africa, and Timor Leste left Indonesia. Today there are 193 internationally recognized sovereign states in the world, up from 74 in 1945 (the latest UN member is Montenegro, which joined in 2006). At the same time numerous countries, while remaining unified, have taken steps towards more regional autonomy and decentralization. Regional redistribution, decentralization and federalism have played a prominent role in political debates across Europe (e.g., in Belgium, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom) and all over the world--from Cananda to Colombia, from Nigeria to South Africa, from Iraq to India.

National Borders, Conflict and Peace

This paper reviews the economics approach to conflict and national borders. The paper (a) provides a summary of ideas and concepts from the economics literature on the size of nations; (b) illustrates them within a simple analytical framework where populations fight over borders and resources, and may form non-aggression pacts, military alliances, and political unions; and (c) discusses extensions and directions for further research.Wars, Alliances, Conflict Technology, Defense, Economies of Scale, Heterogeneity Costs, Secessions, Size of Nations.

Civil Conflict and Secessions

This paper studies secessions as the outcome of conflict between regions. We study under what conditions regions will divert costly resources to fight each other over political borders. We derive the probability of secession and the amount of resources diverted to separatist conflict, and show how those variables depend on factors such as heterogeneity costs, economies of scale, relative size, and external threats. We also model civil conflict over types of government, after borders have been determined, and study how this political conflict affects the incentives to secede.Secessions, Conflict Technology, Heterogeneity Costs, Economies of Scale, External Threats.

Economic Integration, International Conflict and Political Unions

This article studies the interactions among economic integration, international conflict, and the formation and breakup of political unions. Economic integration reduces the importance of political size, while international conflict increases it. When international conflict reduces economic integration between politically separate units, multiple equilibria are possible. In one equilibrium, political units are small and more open and engage less in conflict, therefore making political size less important. In another equilibrium, the world is formed by larger units, with more conflict and less economic integration

International Conflict, Defense Spending and the Size of Countries

This paper provides a formal model of endogenous country formation and of choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict. The model is consistent with three observations. First, secessions and, more generally, break-up of countries should follow a reduction in the likelihood of international conflict. Second, the number of regional conflicts between smaller countries may increase as a result of the break-up of larger countries. Third, the size of the peace divided -- i.e., the reduction in the defense spending in a more peaceful world -- is limited by the process of country break-up.

War and Relatedness

We develop a theory of interstate conflict in which the degree of genealogical relatedness between populations has a positive effect on their conflict propensities because more closely related populations, on average, tend to interact more and develop more disputes over sets of common issues. We examine the empirical relationship between the occurrence of interstate conflicts and the degree of relatedness between countries, showing that populations that are genetically closer are more than prone to go to war with each other, even after controlling for a wide set of measures of geographic distance and other factors that affect conflict, including measure of trade and democracy.

Borders and Growth

This paper presents a framework to understand and measure the effects of political borders on economic growth and per capita income levels. We present a model providing a theoretical foundation to estimate empirically the effects of political borders on growth. In our model, political integration between two countries results in a positive country size effect and a negative effect through reduced openness vis-…-vis the rest of the world. We estimate the growth effects that would have resulted from the hypothetical removal of national borders between pairs of adjacent countries. We also identify country pairs where political integration would have been mutually beneficial.

War and Relatedness

We develop a theory of interstate conflict in which the degree of genealogical relatedness between populations has a positive effect on their conflict propensities because more closely related populations, on average, tend to interact more and develop more disputes over sets of common issues. We examine the empirical relationship between the occurrence of interstate conflicts and the degree of relatedness between countries, showing that populations that are genetically closer are more prone to go to war with each other, even after controlling for a wide set of measures of geographic distance and other factors that affect conflict, including measures of trade and democracy.conflict, genetic distance, common issues, rival issues