Five Indefinitely Repeated Games in the Laboratory

I experimentally test play in five indefinitely repeated games: a hawk-dove game, a game of chicken, a trust game, a coordination game, and a constant-sum game. I compare the different game histories that affect decision making in each of the games. Une étude expérimentale a été menée afin de tester les décisions prises lors de cinq jeux répétés où le nombre de répétitions est inconnu : un jeu de type hawk-dove, un jeu de type chicken, un jeu de confiance, un jeu de coordination et un jeu à somme constante. Les historiques des différents jeux sont comparés afin d’analyser les prises de décisions des participants dans chaque jeu.experimental economics, repeated games, économie expérimentale, jeux répétés

Learning-by-Doing in an Ambiguous Environment

We experimentally test whether risk aversion or ambiguity aversion can explain decisions in a learning-by-doing game. We first measure subjects' preferences toward risk and ambiguity, and then use these measures to predict behavior in the game. We find that ambiguity averse subjects pay more often to resolve ambiguity, and we find that less risk averse subjects earn more in the game. Our results, in light of a previous field study of farmers in a developing economy, provide further evidence of a link between ambiguity aversion and technology choice, as well as a link between risk aversion and farm profitability. Une étude expérimentale a été menée afin de tester si l’aversion au risque ou l’aversion à l’ambiguïté peuvent expliquer les décisions prises par les sujets lors d’un jeu d’apprentissage par essais. Nous avons d’abord mesuré la préférence des sujets face au risque et à l’ambiguïté, et avons ensuite utilisé ces mesures pour prédire le comportement des sujets au cours du jeu. Nous avons pu constater que les sujets qui éprouvent de l’aversion à l’ambiguïté décident de payer plus souvent afin de clarifier cette ambiguïté. D’autre part, nous avons constaté que moins les sujets éprouvent de l’aversion au risque, plus leurs gains lors du jeu sont élevés. À la lumière d’une étude sur le terrain ayant eu lieu avec des fermiers travaillant dans une économie en développement, nos résultats confirment l'évidence d'un lien entre l'aversion à l'ambiguïté et les choix technologiques, ainsi que d'un lien entre l'aversion au risque et la rentabilité d'une ferme.learning-by-doing, technology choice, risk preferences, risk measurement instruments, ambiguity aversion, experimental economics, apprentissage par essais, choix technologiques, préférences vis-à-vis du risque, instruments de mesure du risque, aversion à l’ambiguïté, économie expérimentale

A Simple Test of Learning Theory?

We report experiments designed to test the theoretical possibility, first discovered by Shapley (1964), that in some games learning fails to converge to any equilibrium, either in terms of marginal frequencies or of average play. Subjects played repeatedly in fixed pairings one of two 3 × 3 games, each having a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. The equilibrium of one game is predicted to be stable under learning, the other unstable, provided payoffs are sufficiently high. We ran each game in high and low payoff treatments. We find that, in all treatments, average play is close to equilibrium even though there are strong cycles present in the data.: Games, Learning, Experiments, Stochastic Fictitious Play, Mixed Strategy Equilibria.

Harnessing the Power of Focal Points To Measure Social Agreement

This paper reports results from an application of Thomas Schelling’s (1960) concept of a focal point to the measure of social agreement on the received tone of media content. In our experiments, subjects rate the tone, positive, negative, or neutral, of newspaper articles and news broadcasts, with an incentive to coordinate responses. We compare the content analysis of a traditional subject pool with those of a representative cross-section of the general public. Our application of the coordination game with strategy labels illustrates that the concept of a focal point can be put to use as a measure of social agreement. Le document présente les résultats obtenus en appliquant le concept de point focal, avancé par Thomas Schelling (1960), à la mesure de l’accord social concernant la perception du ton qui se dégage du contenu médiatique. Dans le cadre des expériences mises sur pied, les sujets évaluent le ton, positif, négatif ou neutre, adopté dans des articles de journaux et des bulletins de nouvelles et sont encouragés, par des mesures incitatives, à coordonner leurs réponses. Nous comparons l’analyse du contenu réalisée par un bassin traditionnel de sujets à celle menée par un échantillon représentatif du grand public. Notre application du jeu de coordination faisant appel à des étiquettes de stratégies démontre que la notion de point focal peut être utilisée pour mesurer l’accord social.Coordination, focal point, experiment, content analysis, media, Coordination, point focal, expérience, analyse du contenu, médias

AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF TAYLOR-TYPE RULES WITH INEXPERIENCED CENTRAL BANKERS

We experimentally test whether a class of monetary policy decision rules describes decision making in a population of inexperienced central bankers. In our experiments, subjects repeatedly set the short-term interest rate for a computer economy with inflation as their target. A large majority of subjects learn to successfully control inflation. We find that Taylor-type rules fit the choice data well, and are instrumental in characterizing heterogeneity in decision making. Our experiment is the first to begin to organize data experimentally with an eye on monetary policy rules for this, one of the most widely watched and analyzed decisions in economics.

An Experimental Test Of Taylor-Type Rules With Inexperienced Central Bankers

We experimentally test whether a class of monetary policy decision rules describes decision making in a population of inexperienced central bankers. In our experiments, subjects repeatedly set the short-term interest rate for a computer economy with inflation as their target. A large majority of subjects learn to successfully control inflation. We find that Taylor-type rules fit the choice data well, and are instrumental in characterizing heterogeneity in decision making. Our experiment is the first to begin to organize data experimentally with an eye on monetary policy rules for this, one of the most widely watched and analyzed decisions in economics.monetary policy, Taylor rule, experimental economics, repeated games

Experimental Economics: A Revolution in Understanding Behaviour

What is the best compensation package to offer employees? How should choice among investments in pension plans be structured? Should a government use auctions to sell natural resources? Is it possible to design a market to reduce non-point source pollution in Quebec’s watersheds? What holds people back from trying technologies that are completely new to them? Over the last two decades a revolution has occurred in the advancement of our ability to answer questions such as these. This revolution is called experimental economics. Experimental economics is the use of a controlled laboratory environment to understand decisions people make. In an economics experiment, people make decisions in a laboratory. They are paid according to the outcome of their decisions, and their decisions are analyzed to determine the effect of an institutional or environmental change that is being tested. Through the analysis of behaviour in controlled economics experiments, much has been learned about behaviour when outcomes are uncertain: for example, new notions about preferences toward risk and consumption over time have been developed. Much has also been learned about how people behave in strategic environments: for example, bidding behaviour in auctions is better understood, and the strategies people use as they learn how to trust each other have been observed. The purpose of this report is to describe the methodology of experimental economics and to detail its major uses. We will focus on the ability to measure behaviours in a wide variety of situations important to organizations. We will show, with examples from our own work, how feedback between the laboratory and the field can result in new understanding of decisions in an effort to affect the cycle of poverty in a developing country in fundamentally new ways. What is the best compensation package to offer employees? How should choice among investments in pension plans be structured? Should a government use auctions to sell natural resources? Is it possible to design a market to reduce non-point source pollution in Quebec’s watersheds? What holds people back from trying technologies that are completely new to them? Over the last two decades a revolution has occurred in the advancement of our ability to answer questions such as these. This revolution is called experimental economics. Experimental economics is the use of a controlled laboratory environment to understand decisions people make. In an economics experiment, people make decisions in a laboratory. They are paid according to the outcome of their decisions, and their decisions are analyzed to determine the effect of an institutional or environmental change that is being tested. Through the analysis of behaviour in controlled economics experiments, much has been learned about behaviour when outcomes are uncertain: for example, new notions about preferences toward risk and consumption over time have been developed. Much has also been learned about how people behave in strategic environments: for example, bidding behaviour in auctions is better understood, and the strategies people use as they learn how to trust each other have been observed. The purpose of this report is to describe the methodology of experimental economics and to detail its major uses. We will focus on the ability to measure behaviours in a wide variety of situations important to organizations. We will show, with examples from our own work, how feedback between the laboratory and the field can result in new understanding of decisions in an effort to affect the cycle of poverty in a developing country in fundamentally new ways.

Who Gets the Last Word? An Experimental Study of the Effect of a Peer Review Process on the Expression of Social Norms

We alter who gets the last word on the outcome in three different types of trust games: the first mover, the second mover, or, a committee comprised of first and second movers. The committee functions in a manner similar to a peer review process, in which experienced subjects pass judgment on the outcome reached by a different pair of subjects. Surprisingly, giving the first mover the last word benefits the second mover. Letting the committee decide increases the first mover’s trust. And first and second movers pass different types of judgments when they act as a committee. Au cours de trois jeux de confiance différents, nous alternons la personne qui aura le dernier mot sur le résultat : le premier joueur, le deuxième joueur, ou un comité (à qui revient la décision) composé du premier et du second joueur. Ce comité fonctionne de manière similaire à la révision conventionnelle par les pairs, où des joueurs expérimentés passent un jugement sur les résultats préalablement réalisés par deux joueurs différents. Étonnamment, donner le dernier mot au premier joueur donne l’avantage au deuxième joueur. D’autre part, laisser le comité prendre la décision augmente la confiance du premier joueur. Finalement, les premiers et seconds joueurs passent différents types de jugements lorsqu’ils font partie d’un comité.experimental economics, peer review, social norm, social preferences, third-party punishment, trust, confiance, économie expérimentale, normes sociales, préférences sociales, révision par les pairs, sanctions par une tierce personne

BUYER CONCENTRATION AS A SOURCE OF COUNTERVAILING POWER: EVIDENCE FROM EXPERIMENTAL POSTED-OFFER MARKETS

We experimentally examine the impact of buyer concentration on the pricing of a monopolist. In our experimental markets, a monopolist faces either two or four buyers. Markets with two buyers achieve significantly lower prices, sometimes below competitive levels, than those with four buyers. We design an additional pair of treatments to pinpoint the source of this difference. We attribute the lower pries in the two-buyer treatment to the monopolist pricing more cautiously when there are fewer buyers in order to avoid costly losses in sales. Buyer concentration may thus be an elective source of countervailing power.