How cold will it be? Prospects for NHS funding: 2011- 2017

NHS spending in England may have more than doubled in real terms since 1999/2000, but the prospects for future funding now look bleak. Although there is consensus that the NHS faces a tough financial future, there is no agreement about just how cold the financial climate will be. Starting with a look at historical funding for the NHS, The King's Fund and the Institute for Fiscal Studies set out three plausible future funding scenarios and their consequences. The paper concludes with an assessment of each scenario and the options for funding up to 2017

Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: evidence from the introduction of stakeholder pensions in the UK

Faced with ageing populations, OECD governments are seeking policies to increase individual retirement saving. In April 2001, the UK government introduced Stakeholder Pensions – a low cost retirement saving vehicle. The reform also changed the structure of tax-relieved contribution ceilings, increasing their generosity for lower earning individuals. We examine the impact of these changes on private pension coverage and on contributions to personal pension accounts using individual level micro data. We use a difference-in-differences strategy, and where necessary our estimator is modified to allow for dichotomous outcomes. The results suggest that the change to the contribution ceilings affected both coverage rates and contributions to private pensions among lower earnings individuals, especially among women, and those in couples

The importance of incentives in influencing private retirement saving: known knowns and known unknowns

We summarise what economic theory predicts about how retirement savings decisions are affected by marginal withdrawal rates created by the tax, tax credit and benefit system, and by the information individuals are provided with. All these predictions vary across individuals with their circumstances. In documenting the incentives to save in a private pension provided by the tax, tax credit and benefit system we show that some individuals face a very strong incentive to place funds in a private pension at particular times during their working lives. Those who are basic rate taxpayers who expect to become higher rate taxpayers or move onto the taper of the Working Tax Credit have an incentive to delay making any private pension contributions until that time, while those expecting to move off that taper have an incentive to bring forward future pension contributions. When examining retirement saving it is important to consider both saving decisions and also the choice of retirement age. We cite previous evidence that both of these margins have been adjusted by individuals in the light of changed financial incentives. In particular there is evidence that spending by working age individuals was increased in the light of the introduction of the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme. In addition evidence from West Germany and the United States shows that individuals' retirement ages can be affected substantially by changing financial incentives. There is less evidence of reduced spending by working age individuals in the light of the decision to index the Basic State Pension in line with prices rather than the greater of prices or earnings. New evidence from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing shows that it is low and high wealth individuals who are most likely to be out of the labour market prior to the State Pension Age, though often for very different stated reasons. This suggests that if retirement incomes of those with low wealth are to be increased then increased labour market participation is perhaps a margin for them to adjust. Incentives to work and save are potentially affected by two recent UK reforms: the introduction of the two new tax credits (Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit) and the introduction of the Pension Credit. We present some preliminary evidence on whether the strong incentive to contribute to a private pension provided by the two new tax credits has boosted private pension participation, the results of which are somewhat inconclusive and are worthy of further research. Examining the distribution of current pensioner incomes with respect to the incentives induced by the Pension Credit reform we find that many single pensioners will see an unambiguous increase in the incentive to increase their private retirement income -- for example through increased saving or later retirement. There are still large numbers of single pensioners who see a reduction in the incentive to increase their retirement income, the majority of whom have private income which they might decide to reduce. Fewer individuals in pensioner couples are eligible for the Pension Credit. Despite this we find that a similar proportion faces a reduced incentive to acquire greater income as we did for single pensioners. If the expectations of individuals do not reflect the current rules of the system, then we cannot expect to observe responses fully in line with economic theory that is predicated on full information. Recent evidence from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing suggests that on average individuals underestimate their longevity and overestimate the private pension income that they can expect to receive. On the other hand, expectations of being in paid employment at older ages are, on average, similar to the current proportions of older individuals who are in paid work and individuals' expectations of remaining in the labour market at older ages appear to square up with the marginal financial incentives to remain in work that are created by different types of pension scheme

Britain's fiscal squeeze: the choices ahead

The economic and financial crisis that has unfolded over the last two years has caused a dramatic deterioration in the UK's public finances, with public sector borrowing set to peak this year at a level not seen since the Second World War and public sector indebtedness set to climb to levels not seen since the late 1960s. With the next general election less than a year away, the Government and the main opposition parties alike will be under pressure to offer more detailed proposals to repair the public finances. This note discusses some of the key questions all the parties will have to grapple with

Budget 2009: tightening the squeeze?

The outlook for the public finances appears significantly weaker than the Treasury predicted in the November 2008 Pre-Budget Report (PBR). This will have an important bearing on the two key tax and spending decisions that Chancellor Alistair Darling will have to take in his Budget statement on 22 April: whether to announce an additional short-term stimulus to help support the economy and whether to announce an additional long- term tightening to help repair the public finances. This Briefing Note sets out illustrative projections for the outlook for government borrowing and debt over the next few years. It then assesses by how much this or a future government might need to cut existing public spending plans and/or increase taxes to ensure that the outlook for public sector borrowing was no worse than that laid out in the PBR. The analysis in this Briefing Note builds on the detailed forecasts in the January 2009 IFS Green Budget. It does not re-estimate the Green Budget forecasts, but instead makes some broad-brush adjustments to them to reflect new information and analysis available since the PBR

The value of teachers' pensions

As private sector employers have moved away from providing final salary defined benefit (DB) pensions to their employees, attention has increasingly focused on the public sector's continued provision of such pensions and the value of these pension promises to public sector employees. The estimated underlying liabilities of such plans have increased sharply in recent years, at least in part due to unanticipated increases in longevity. This has led to reforms of all the major public sector pension schemes, the net result of which has been to reduce the level of benefits offered by the schemes (predominantly to new, rather than existing members). This paper examines, in the context of the Teachers' Pension Scheme (TPS), how much the pension promises are worth and what effect the change in scheme rules has had on them. This paper also addresses a number of other issues that are important when valuing DB pension rights and their relation to overall remuneration. First, how increases in current pay feed through into pension values. Second, how the age profile of earnings affects the profile of pension accrual. Finally, how the value of pension rights in DB schemes compares to that in a stylised defined contribution (DC) scheme. The figures presented in this paper relate specifically to the composition of members and the specific scheme rules of the TPS. However, the issues raised apply equally to other DB schemes, both public and private sector

Ill-health and retirement in Britain: a panel data-based analysis

We examine the role of ill-health in retirement decisions in Britain, using the first eight waves of the British Household Panel Survey (1991-98). As self-reported health status is likely to be endogenous to the retirement decision, we instrument self-reported health by a constructed ‘health stock’ measure using a set of health indicator variables and personal characteristics, as suggested by Bound et al (1999). Using both linear and non-linear fixed effects estimators, we show that adverse individual health shocks are an important predictor of individual retirement behaviour. We compare the impact of our constructed health measure on economic activity with that arising from the use of other health variables in the data set. We also examine the impact of the 1995 reform of disability benefits on the retirement decision

What is a public sector pension worth?

We measure accruals in defined benefit (DB) pension plans for public and private sector workers in Britain, using typical differences in scheme rules and sector-specific lifetime age-earnings profiles by sex and educational group. We show not just that coverage by DB pension plans is greater in the public sector, but that median pension accruals as a % of salary are almost 5% higher among DB-covered public sector workers than covered private sector workers. This is largely driven by earlier normal pension (retirement) ages. For workers of different ages in the two sectors, marginal accruals also vary as a result of differences in earnings profiles across the sectors. The differences in earnings profiles across sectors should induce caution in using calculated coefficients on wages from cross sections of data in order to estimate sectoral wage effects

The UK public finances: ready for recession?

Summary Neither the current Labour government nor the previous Conservative one can look back over their respective terms of office as periods of great success in fiscal management. Both started by strengthening their underlying budget balances for three years after taking office, but both then allowed them to drift steadily back into the red. This meant that they were already borrowing significant amounts when the onset of recession required them to borrow more. Labour is entering this recession with a similar structural budget deficit to the one that it inherited from the Conservatives, but with a smaller underlying debt. It remains to be seen whether the structural budget deficit will deteriorate as far under Labour as it did under the Conservatives, but debt is very likely to rise above the peak it recorded under the Conservatives (even without the impact of recent bank nationalisations and recapitalisations). Labour recorded a similar structural budget deficit in the year before this recession to that which the Conservatives recorded in the year before the last. However, the structural deficit appears to have deteriorated more sharply in the early phase of the downturn than it did under the Conservatives and as a result is set to be higher in the first year of recession than it was under the Conservatives. This largely reflects the particular impact of the credit crunch and falls in the stock market and housing market, rather than budget decisions. Labour is also going into the recession with a significantly higher level of debt than the Conservatives did. Turning to the international context, we are entering the current recession with one of the largest structural budget deficits in the industrial world and a debt level that may be among the smallest in the G7 but which is larger than that of most industrial countries. We have done less to reduce our structural budget deficit and less to reduce our debt than most other industrial countries since Labour came to office