Re-enchanting realism in debate with Kyle Stanford

In this article, against the background of a notion of ‘assembled’ truth, the evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as ‘naturalised realism’ is outlined. Naturalised realism is ‘fallibilist’ in the unique sense that it captures and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanford’s anti-realist ‘new induction’ threats by showing that ‘explanationism’ and his ‘epistemic instrumentalism’ are just two positions among many on a constantly evolving continuum of options between instrumentalism and full-blown realism. In particular it is demonstrated that not only can naturalised realism redefine the terms of realist debate in such a way that no talk of miracles need enter the debate, but it also promises interesting defenses against inductive- and under-determination- based anti-realist arguments.http://link.springer.com/journal/10838hb2013cp201

Re-enchanting Realism in Debate with Kyle Stanford

In this article, against the background of a notion of ‘assembled’ truth, the evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as ‘naturalised realism’ is outlined. Naturalised realism is ‘fallibilist’ in the unique sense that it captures and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanford’s anti-realist ‘new induction’ threats by showing that ‘explanationism’ and his ‘epistemic instrumentalism’ are just two positions among many on a constantly evolving continuum of options between instrumentalism and full-blown realism. In particular it is demonstrated that not only can naturalised realism redefine the terms of realist debate in such a way that no talk of miracles need enter the debate, but it also promises interesting defenses against inductive- and under-determination- based anti-realist arguments.http://link.springer.com/journal/10838hb2013cp201

Repositioning Realism

On présente le « réalisme naturalisé» comme une version du réalisme qui soit plus compatible avec l’histoire des sciences qu’avec les formes explicationnistes ou convergentes de réalisme. On expose son contenu en se référant à quatre thèses : 1) La question de savoir si le réalisme est garanti par rapport à une théorie particulière dépend du type et de la qualité de preuves disponibles pour cette théorie ; 2) La référence est une affaire d’interaction causale avec le monde ; 3) La plus grande partie de la science se situe quelque part entre instrumentalisme et réalisme scientifique, dans un continuum de positions concernant le statut des théories ; 4) Le degré auquel le réalisme est garanti a quelque chose à voir avec le degré auquel les théories réfèrent avec succès, plus qu’avec la vérité des théories.“Naturalised realism” is presented as a version of realism which is more compatible with the history of science than convergent or explanationist forms of realism. The account is unpacked according to four theses: 1) Whether realism is warranted with regards to a particular theory depends on the kind and quality of evidence available for that theory; 2) Reference is about causal interaction with the world; 3) Most of science happens somewhere in between instrumentalism and scientific realism on a continuum of stances towards the status of theories; 4) The degree to which realism is warranted has something to do with the degree to which theories successfully refer, rather than with the truth of theories

A Non-classical Logical Foundation for Naturalised Realism

In this paper, by suggesting a formal representation of science based on recent advances in logic-based Artificial Intelligence, we show how three serious concerns around the realisation of traditional scientific realism (the theory/observation distinction, over-determination of theories by data, and theory revision) can be overcome such that traditional realism is given a new guise as ‘naturalised’. We contend that such issues can be dealt with (in the context of scientific realism) by developing a formal representation of sci- ence based on the application of the following tools Knowledge Representa- tion: the family of knowledge representation languages known as Description Logics, an enrichment of classical logics via defeasible statements, and an ap- plication of the preferential interpretation of the approach to Belief Revision

A non-classical logical foundation for naturalised realism

In this paper, by suggesting a formal representation of science based on recent advances in logic-based Artificial Intelligence, we show how three serious concerns around the realisation of traditional scientific realism (the theory/observation distinction, over-determination of theories by data, and theory revision) can be overcome such that traditional realism is given a new guise as \u2018naturalised\u2019. We contend that such issues can be dealt with (in the context of scientific realism) by developing a formal representation of sci- ence based on the application of the following tools Knowledge Representa- tion: the family of knowledge representation languages known as Description Logics, an enrichment of classical logics via defeasible statements, and an ap- plication of the preferential interpretation of the approach to Belief Revision

Logic and Philosophy of Science in Nancy (II)

This issue collects a selection of contributed papers presented at the 14th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Nancy, July 2011. These papers were originally presented within two of the main sections of the Congress. They deal with general philosophy of science (including ethical and historical aspects of philosophy of science), and philosophy of biology, physics, chemistry and economics. A first volume of contributed papers, dedicated to logic, philosophy of mathematics and cognitive science, and philosophy of technology, appeared in the last issue of Philosophia Scientiæ (18-3), 2014