7 research outputs found
Re-enchanting realism in debate with Kyle Stanford
In this article, against the background of a notion of âassembledâ truth, the
evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation
for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as ânaturalised
realismâ is outlined. Naturalised realism is âfallibilistâ in the unique sense that it captures
and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued
that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanfordâs anti-realist ânew inductionâ threats by
showing that âexplanationismâ and his âepistemic instrumentalismâ are just two positions
among many on a constantly evolving continuum of options between instrumentalism and
full-blown realism. In particular it is demonstrated that not only can naturalised realism
redefine the terms of realist debate in such a way that no talk of miracles need enter the
debate, but it also promises interesting defenses against inductive- and under-determination-
based anti-realist arguments.http://link.springer.com/journal/10838hb2013cp201
Re-enchanting Realism in Debate with Kyle Stanford
In this article, against the background of a notion of âassembledâ truth, the
evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation
for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as ânaturalised
realismâ is outlined. Naturalised realism is âfallibilistâ in the unique sense that it captures
and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued
that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanfordâs anti-realist ânew inductionâ threats by
showing that âexplanationismâ and his âepistemic instrumentalismâ are just two positions
among many on a constantly evolving continuum of options between instrumentalism and
full-blown realism. In particular it is demonstrated that not only can naturalised realism
redefine the terms of realist debate in such a way that no talk of miracles need enter the
debate, but it also promises interesting defenses against inductive- and under-determination-
based anti-realist arguments.http://link.springer.com/journal/10838hb2013cp201
Repositioning Realism
On prĂ©sente le « rĂ©alisme naturalisé» comme une version du rĂ©alisme qui soit plus compatible avec lâhistoire des sciences quâavec les formes explicationnistes ou convergentes de rĂ©alisme. On expose son contenu en se rĂ©fĂ©rant Ă quatre thĂšses : 1) La question de savoir si le rĂ©alisme est garanti par rapport Ă une thĂ©orie particuliĂšre dĂ©pend du type et de la qualitĂ© de preuves disponibles pour cette thĂ©orie ; 2) La rĂ©fĂ©rence est une affaire dâinteraction causale avec le monde ; 3) La plus grande partie de la science se situe quelque part entre instrumentalisme et rĂ©alisme scientifique, dans un continuum de positions concernant le statut des thĂ©ories ; 4) Le degrĂ© auquel le rĂ©alisme est garanti a quelque chose Ă voir avec le degrĂ© auquel les thĂ©ories rĂ©fĂšrent avec succĂšs, plus quâavec la vĂ©ritĂ© des thĂ©ories.âNaturalised realismâ is presented as a version of realism which is more compatible with the history of science than convergent or explanationist forms of realism. The account is unpacked according to four theses: 1) Whether realism is warranted with regards to a particular theory depends on the kind and quality of evidence available for that theory; 2) Reference is about causal interaction with the world; 3) Most of science happens somewhere in between instrumentalism and scientific realism on a continuum of stances towards the status of theories; 4) The degree to which realism is warranted has something to do with the degree to which theories successfully refer, rather than with the truth of theories
A Non-classical Logical Foundation for Naturalised Realism
In this paper, by suggesting a formal representation of science based on recent advances in logic-based Artificial Intelligence, we show how three serious concerns around the realisation of traditional scientific realism (the theory/observation distinction, over-determination of theories by data, and theory revision) can be overcome such that traditional realism is given a new guise as ânaturalisedâ. We contend that such issues can be dealt with (in the context of scientific realism) by developing a formal representation of sci- ence based on the application of the following tools Knowledge Representa- tion: the family of knowledge representation languages known as Description Logics, an enrichment of classical logics via defeasible statements, and an ap- plication of the preferential interpretation of the approach to Belief Revision
A non-classical logical foundation for naturalised realism
In this paper, by suggesting a formal representation of science based on recent advances in logic-based Artificial Intelligence, we show how three serious concerns around the realisation of traditional scientific realism (the theory/observation distinction, over-determination of theories by data, and theory revision) can be overcome such that traditional realism is given a new guise as \u2018naturalised\u2019. We contend that such issues can be dealt with (in the context of scientific realism) by developing a formal representation of sci- ence based on the application of the following tools Knowledge Representa- tion: the family of knowledge representation languages known as Description Logics, an enrichment of classical logics via defeasible statements, and an ap- plication of the preferential interpretation of the approach to Belief Revision
Logic and Philosophy of Science in Nancy (II)
This issue collects a selection of contributed papers presented at the 14th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Nancy, July 2011. These papers were originally presented within two of the main sections of the Congress. They deal with general philosophy of science (including ethical and historical aspects of philosophy of science), and philosophy of biology, physics, chemistry and economics. A first volume of contributed papers, dedicated to logic, philosophy of mathematics and cognitive science, and philosophy of technology, appeared in the last issue of Philosophia ScientiĂŠ (18-3), 2014