Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions (new title: Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result)

The present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auction with arbitrarily many bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient allocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small. In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficient allocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding.Simultaneous Ascending Auction, weak dominance, multi-unit auctions, game theory

Implementing Efficient Market Structure

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke--Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms generally avoid budget deficits and prevent excessive entry.

Implementing Efficient Market Structure

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clark-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms generally avoid budget deficits and prevent excessive entry.Mechanism design, natural oligopoly, auctions, entry

Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany

The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction.The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions.In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game.Multi-unit auctions, spectrum auctions, telecomm-unications, industrial organization, game theory

The Third Generation (UMTS) Spectrum Auction in Germany

The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents a game theoretic explanation of observed events during the crucial phase of that auction, which have puzzled several observers. In addition, the paper evaluates the merit of the German UMTS auction design, relative to the English design, that was predominantly employed in Europe.auctions, telecommunications, industrial organization, game theory.

Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending bid auctions

The present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auction with arbitrarily many bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient allocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small. In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficient allocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding

Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germany

The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions. In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game

Students´ reading ability moderates the effects of teachers´ beliefs on students´ reading progress

Teachers’ beliefs about teaching have been found to affect students’ learning growth. The aim of this study was to investigate effects of teachers’ constructivist and direct-transmissive beliefs on learners’ reading progress and whether these effects are influenced by prior student achievement. We measured constructivist and direct-transmissive beliefs of 29 teachers and the progress in reading fluency and reading comprehension of their students (N = 568) at eight points of measurement over one school year. Results of three-level latent growth curve modeling revealed that teachers’ constructivist beliefs were positively related to learners’ progress in reading fluency but had no general effect on growth in reading comprehension. Nevertheless, the relation between constructivist beliefs and individual learners’ progress in reading comprehension was affected by students’ level of ability. Teachers with stronger constructivist beliefs effected higher learning growth for high ability compared to low ability learners. No effects were found for direct-transmissive beliefs. Using longitudinal modelling of student learning, this study adds a more differentiated view to findings concerning the effects of teacher beliefs. Results show that effects vary depending on subject of learning (fluency vs. comprehension), and that effects of teacher beliefs may depend on students’ level of ability

Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany

The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction.The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions.In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game

Cooperative home light: assessment of a security function for the automotive field

Crime and feeling of security are omnipresent and can be influenced by lighting conditions. However, lighting improvements are generally concentrated on street lighting. Meanwhile, a vast variety of new technologies, including innovative lighting systems and connected mobility, are entering into the automotive field. Hence, opportunities are not limited only to provide traffic improvements, entertainment features or driver assistance functions but also measures to tackle (vehicle-related) crime and to increase feeling of security. In this paper, we suggest a security function, namely the cooperative home light (CHL), which makes use of new technologies and has the potential to tackle crime as well as to increase drivers’ feeling of security. We also provide an overview of an implementation. However, because of the underlying challenges, the main focus of this paper is to assess the CHL. Therefore, we introduce our three-steps approach consisting of a transfer of related work, a customer survey and results from our proprietary simulation environment in order to assess the CHL