Suppression of environmental health scientists: real-world examples as a basis for action

Pressures on epidemiologists, toxicologists, and on public health scientists to suppress their work are known to occur worldwide. In this article, we share six stories from environmental health scientists about the pressures they faced in their jobs after bringing public health problems to light. The method used to document each of the stories was to invite scientists who attended meetings of the International Society for Environmental Epidemiology to tell their own stories of having experienced research suppression. We then extracted the salient features of each experience into a coherent story, providing references as corroboration where possible. The specific purpose in going public with the six stories presented in this article is to open a conversation to better equip colleagues to stand up to pressures to suppress their work. By publicly sharing the pressures experienced by these scientists in attempts to suppress their scientific work, including intimidation, harassment, threats and/or bullying, other scientists may be better able to withstand such pressures. In the absence of a larger collection of stories, we are unable to identify common approaches taken against suppression. It appears that a focus on scientific excellence and tenacity are two major factors likely to have contributed to the ability to withstand pressure. We encourage others to tell their stories. Bringing examples of these instances to attention will make them familiar enough to be less intimidating should others experience anything similar. Additional documented experiences will expand the base of stories and thus help colleagues to withstand the pressures wielded by special interests. Shining a light on these pressures will remove barriers, not only to advancing the science, but also to protecting the public interest

Childhood Lead Exposure in the Palestinian Authority, Israel, and Jordan: Results from the Middle Eastern Regional Cooperation Project, 1996–2000

In the Middle East, the major sources of lead exposure have been leaded gasoline, lead-contaminated flour from traditional stone mills, focal exposures from small battery plants and smelters, and kohl (blue color) in cosmetics. In 1998–2000, we measured blood lead (PbB) levels in children 2–6 years of age in Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority (n = 1478), using a fingerstick method. Mean (peak; percentage > 10 μg/dL) PbB levels in Israel (n = 317), the West Bank (n = 344), Jordan (n = 382), and Gaza (n = 435) were 3.2 μg/dL (18.2; 2.2%), 4.2 μg/dL (25.7; 5.2%), 3.2 μg/dL (39.3; < 1%), and 8.6 μg/dL (> 80.0; 17.2%), respectively. High levels in Gaza were all among children living near a battery factory. The findings, taken together with data on time trends in lead emissions and in PbB in children in previous years, indicate the benefits from phasing out of leaded gasoline but state the case for further reductions and investigation of hot spots. The project demonstrated the benefits of regional cooperation in planning and carrying out a jointly designed project

Mesothelioma and asbestosis in a young woman following occupational asbestos exposure: Short latency and long survival: Case Report

A 27-year-old female white-collar worker was diagnosed in 1998 with mesothelioma eight and one-half years following first exposure as a bystander to debris in a site in which asbestos-containing building materials were being dismantled and rebuilding work took place. Prodromal back pain had been present for a year and a half. She underwent extrapleural pneumectomy and received an intrapleural infusion of cisplatin post-operatively. Exposure to asbestos was verified by contemporary reports and lung biopsy, which demonstrated asbestos bodies and microscopic interstitial fibrosis -conforming evidence for asbestosis. The patient is alive and well 12 years after diagnosis and 14 years after onset of symptoms. The combination of an extremely short latency period and long survival following occupational exposure to asbestos dust is unique

Evaluating the Effects of SARS-CoV-2 Spike Mutation D614G on Transmissibility and Pathogenicity.

Global dispersal and increasing frequency of the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein variant D614G are suggestive of a selective advantage but may also be due to a random founder effect. We investigate the hypothesis for positive selection of spike D614G in the United Kingdom using more than 25,000 whole genome SARS-CoV-2 sequences. Despite the availability of a large dataset, well represented by both spike 614 variants, not all approaches showed a conclusive signal of positive selection. Population genetic analysis indicates that 614G increases in frequency relative to 614D in a manner consistent with a selective advantage. We do not find any indication that patients infected with the spike 614G variant have higher COVID-19 mortality or clinical severity, but 614G is associated with higher viral load and younger age of patients. Significant differences in growth and size of 614G phylogenetic clusters indicate a need for continued study of this variant

Evaluating the Effects of SARS-CoV-2 Spike Mutation D614G on Transmissibility and Pathogenicity

Global dispersal and increasing frequency of the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein variant D614G are suggestive of a selective advantage but may also be due to a random founder effect. We investigate the hypothesis for positive selection of spike D614G in the United Kingdom using more than 25,000 whole genome SARS-CoV-2 sequences. Despite the availability of a large dataset, well represented by both spike 614 variants, not all approaches showed a conclusive signal of positive selection. Population genetic analysis indicates that 614G increases in frequency relative to 614D in a manner consistent with a selective advantage. We do not find any indication that patients infected with the spike 614G variant have higher COVID-19 mortality or clinical severity, but 614G is associated with higher viral load and younger age of patients. Significant differences in growth and size of 614G phylogenetic clusters indicate a need for continued study of this variant

Changes in symptomatology, reinfection, and transmissibility associated with the SARS-CoV-2 variant B.1.1.7: an ecological study

Background The SARS-CoV-2 variant B.1.1.7 was first identified in December, 2020, in England. We aimed to investigate whether increases in the proportion of infections with this variant are associated with differences in symptoms or disease course, reinfection rates, or transmissibility. Methods We did an ecological study to examine the association between the regional proportion of infections with the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.7 variant and reported symptoms, disease course, rates of reinfection, and transmissibility. Data on types and duration of symptoms were obtained from longitudinal reports from users of the COVID Symptom Study app who reported a positive test for COVID-19 between Sept 28 and Dec 27, 2020 (during which the prevalence of B.1.1.7 increased most notably in parts of the UK). From this dataset, we also estimated the frequency of possible reinfection, defined as the presence of two reported positive tests separated by more than 90 days with a period of reporting no symptoms for more than 7 days before the second positive test. The proportion of SARS-CoV-2 infections with the B.1.1.7 variant across the UK was estimated with use of genomic data from the COVID-19 Genomics UK Consortium and data from Public Health England on spike-gene target failure (a non-specific indicator of the B.1.1.7 variant) in community cases in England. We used linear regression to examine the association between reported symptoms and proportion of B.1.1.7. We assessed the Spearman correlation between the proportion of B.1.1.7 cases and number of reinfections over time, and between the number of positive tests and reinfections. We estimated incidence for B.1.1.7 and previous variants, and compared the effective reproduction number, Rt, for the two incidence estimates. Findings From Sept 28 to Dec 27, 2020, positive COVID-19 tests were reported by 36 920 COVID Symptom Study app users whose region was known and who reported as healthy on app sign-up. We found no changes in reported symptoms or disease duration associated with B.1.1.7. For the same period, possible reinfections were identified in 249 (0·7% [95% CI 0·6–0·8]) of 36 509 app users who reported a positive swab test before Oct 1, 2020, but there was no evidence that the frequency of reinfections was higher for the B.1.1.7 variant than for pre-existing variants. Reinfection occurrences were more positively correlated with the overall regional rise in cases (Spearman correlation 0·56–0·69 for South East, London, and East of England) than with the regional increase in the proportion of infections with the B.1.1.7 variant (Spearman correlation 0·38–0·56 in the same regions), suggesting B.1.1.7 does not substantially alter the risk of reinfection. We found a multiplicative increase in the Rt of B.1.1.7 by a factor of 1·35 (95% CI 1·02–1·69) relative to pre-existing variants. However, Rt fell below 1 during regional and national lockdowns, even in regions with high proportions of infections with the B.1.1.7 variant. Interpretation The lack of change in symptoms identified in this study indicates that existing testing and surveillance infrastructure do not need to change specifically for the B.1.1.7 variant. In addition, given that there was no apparent increase in the reinfection rate, vaccines are likely to remain effective against the B.1.1.7 variant. Funding Zoe Global, Department of Health (UK), Wellcome Trust, Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (UK), National Institute for Health Research (UK), Medical Research Council (UK), Alzheimer's Society

Genomic assessment of quarantine measures to prevent SARS-CoV-2 importation and transmission

Mitigation of SARS-CoV-2 transmission from international travel is a priority. We evaluated the effectiveness of travellers being required to quarantine for 14-days on return to England in Summer 2020. We identified 4,207 travel-related SARS-CoV-2 cases and their contacts, and identified 827 associated SARS-CoV-2 genomes. Overall, quarantine was associated with a lower rate of contacts, and the impact of quarantine was greatest in the 16–20 age-group. 186 SARS-CoV-2 genomes were sufficiently unique to identify travel-related clusters. Fewer genomically-linked cases were observed for index cases who returned from countries with quarantine requirement compared to countries with no quarantine requirement. This difference was explained by fewer importation events per identified genome for these cases, as opposed to fewer onward contacts per case. Overall, our study demonstrates that a 14-day quarantine period reduces, but does not completely eliminate, the onward transmission of imported cases, mainly by dissuading travel to countries with a quarantine requirement

Genomic epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2 in a UK university identifies dynamics of transmission

AbstractUnderstanding SARS-CoV-2 transmission in higher education settings is important to limit spread between students, and into at-risk populations. In this study, we sequenced 482 SARS-CoV-2 isolates from the University of Cambridge from 5 October to 6 December 2020. We perform a detailed phylogenetic comparison with 972 isolates from the surrounding community, complemented with epidemiological and contact tracing data, to determine transmission dynamics. We observe limited viral introductions into the university; the majority of student cases were linked to a single genetic cluster, likely following social gatherings at a venue outside the university. We identify considerable onward transmission associated with student accommodation and courses; this was effectively contained using local infection control measures and following a national lockdown. Transmission clusters were largely segregated within the university or the community. Our study highlights key determinants of SARS-CoV-2 transmission and effective interventions in a higher education setting that will inform public health policy during pandemics.</jats:p