REMBRANDT’S MISSING PIECE: AI ART AND THE FALLACIES OF COPYRIGHT LAW

This article discusses contemporary problems related to Artificial Intelligence (AI), law and the visual arts. It suggests that the fallacies of copyright law are already visible in legal conundrums raised by AI in the creative sector. These include, for instance, the lack of uniformity in relation to creations’ copyrightability, the massive scale of copyright infringement affecting visual artists and the creative industry, and the difficulties in implementing media regulation and cyber-regulation. The deeply cherished ‘human authorship’ criterion that was sustained recently by a US Federal Appeals Court in Thaler, in particular, is a short-term solution to the legal challenges raised in the field of intellectual property law, vis-à-vis the rapid developments in AI systems. Further, the article discusses the limited linkages between IP law and human rights law (including the views of universal and regional human rights bodies), as well as the limited effect of companies’ regulation in resolving the problem of copyright infringement. This article therefore submits that alternative solutions should urgently be sought to address these legal challenges in different spheres of law, and most importantly, human rights law. An example is the incorporation in the copyright discourse of positive state obligations accompanying the rights of authors to benefit from their intellectual and artistic creations (article 15 of the ICESCR), in conjunction with due diligence obligations in relation to AI companies as non-state actors. This article therefore suggests that international human rights bodies should have a greater voice in the role of science and AI technologies around the world, including in relation to authors’ rights. It concludes that a human-rights based approach to IP rights could also increase responsible conduct by creators who use AI tools in their art, since the freedom of expression – and artistic freedom – protected by human rights law carries with it ‘duties and responsibilities’

Caliphs, Jinns, and Sufi Shrines: The Protection of Cultural Heritage and Cultural Rights under Islamic Law

This Article examines the position of the Islamic legal tradition on arts and cultural heritage, including its pitfalls, and argues that a better understanding of Muslim state practice is needed to enhance the protection of cultural rights in the Muslim world. This can further facilitate collaboration between Muslim states and inter-governmental bodies working in the field of culture; implement better accountability mechanisms under international criminal law, as well as; to contribute to the fight against terrorism. In addition, the author submits that Islamic law is not necessarily an appropriate platform to enhance cultural rights and cultural heritage in the Muslim world. This is because of the nature of the Islamic legal tradition, which contains an extraordinary number of legal tools capable of setting aside obscure and anachronistic views in favor of modernization, yet is equally full of contradictions and ambiguities. The high complexity and diversity of possible solutions under Islamic law may inhibit the implementation of appropriate cultural policies on the protection of cultural heritage and the arts. The emphasis therefore should be on Muslim state practice, including in particular the practice of the rightly guided Caliphs whose palaces are evidence of tolerance and broadmindedness; contemporary Muslim state practice of those Muslim states that strive to promote cultural rights; and best practices initiated by Arab-Muslim organizations and institutions

Cultural rights in the case-law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

One of the most remarkable developments of the new millennium has been the expansion of debates on culture at the highest levels of the international community’s decision-making processes. This development has necessarily had an impact on cultural rights empowerment, including enhancing their justiciability. Substantial progress has been made both at a regional and international level. Yet, not all thresholds have been reached. The International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) has never explicitly addressed cultural rights in its case-law. Despite its ‘multicultural’ composition, it is only with great difficulty that the Court examines questions related to culture. However, a thorough examination of the jurisprudence of the ICJ reveals that opportunities to take cultural rights seriously have arisen more than once. Recent judgments of the Court reveal the emergence of a certain trend calling for a ‘culturally sensitive’ understanding of legal issues brought to the Hague. The present paper submits that this trend is beneficial not only for the protection of cultural rights, but also for the maintenance of human and cultural diversity, as well as for the survival and livelihood of indigenous peoples. In light of the urgent worldwide need for peace, addressing culture as a legal issue before the ICJ, in accordance with articles 36 and 60 of its statute, may be a fruitful pathway for the Court to follow in order to resolve international disputes

COVID-19 Vaccines and their Pitfalls in Informed Consent

The World Health Organization declared the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic as a global health crisis. The search for a coronavirus vaccine escalated to a global competition. Drugs for other diseases as well as new formulations are proposed as potential candidates for the treatment or intervention of coronavirus. Almost all pharmaceutically able countries are pursuing potential vaccines. At the time of writing this article, two vaccines are already marketed and tested with promising interim results. Both vaccines use messenger RNA (mRNA) encapsulated in a lipid nanocarrier. Under ordinary circumstances, clinical trial authorizations oblige sponsors to disclose all risks to volunteers in order to formulate an informed knowledgeable decision. This however has been subject to exceptions during the pandemic. The mRNA-based vaccine has been rushed in unprecedented record speed to human clinical efficacy evaluation. This raises a number of questions related to the validity of volunteers’ free and informed consent. The present article argues that informed consent of all risks as well as the protection of volunteers’ personal data constitute concrete obligations under human rights law that cannot be derogated from in times of emergency – such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, it suggests a risk governance framework through blockchain for international vaccine testing clinical trials

I. African court on human and peoples’ rights, African commission on human and peoples’ rights v. Great socialist people’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, order for provisional measures, 25 March 2011

Africa has been struggling for years to establish a mechanism of human rights protection comparable to other international and regional mechanisms. Illiteracy and the low standards of economic development and social welfare, especially in rural areas, as well as the absence of financial resources were certainly not the best grounds to build on. Moreover, as Nmehielle notes, the creation of a human rights mechanism in Africa was equally hinged on other questions, more controversial ones, such as the existence of the concept of ‘law’ and ‘rights’ in pre-colonial Africa. In this respect, a Western-style mechanism of human rights protection would be naturally perceived with suspicion, as a form of foreign intervention

Caliphs, Jinns, and Sufi Shrines: The Protection of Cultural Heritage and Cultural Rights under Islamic Law

This Article examines the position of the Islamic legal tradition on arts and cultural heritage, including its pitfalls, and argues that a better understanding of Muslim state practice is needed to enhance the protection of cultural rights in the Muslim world. This can further facilitate collaboration between Muslim states and inter-governmental bodies working in the field of culture; implement better accountability mechanisms under international criminal law, as well as; to contribute to the fight against terrorism. In addition, the author submits that Islamic law is not necessarily an appropriate platform to enhance cultural rights and cultural heritage in the Muslim world. This is because of the nature of the Islamic legal tradition, which contains an extraordinary number of legal tools capable of setting aside obscure and anachronistic views in favor of modernization, yet is equally full of contradictions and ambiguities. The high complexity and diversity of possible solutions under Islamic law may inhibit the implementation of appropriate cultural policies on the protection of cultural heritage and the arts. The emphasis therefore should be on Muslim state practice, including in particular the practice of the rightly guided Caliphs whose palaces are evidence of tolerance and broadmindedness; contemporary Muslim state practice of those Muslim states that strive to promote cultural rights; and best practices initiated by Arab-Muslim organizations and institutions

La liberté de l'art face à la protection des croyances religieuses : étude d'un conflit de valeurs sous le prisme du droit international.

Our thesis project suggests suggests a legal, political and social reading of a conflict between two fundamental cultural rights. Several controversies exist today in the west world claiming the eventual legitimacy of the restrictions on artistic freedom, in the name of the protection of religious beliefs. We could even observe a certain ‘paroxysm' on this matter, which ends up at a legal, and virtually a real, conflict. From an international law point of view, the first indications of this kind of conflict appeared more or less during the notorious controversy around Salman Rushdie's ‘Satanic Verses”. Fifteen years later, in 2004, another ‘global crisis' appears: that of the Danish cartoons, followed by several resolutions on the subject of defamation of religions, issued by the UN Human Rights Council and the General Assembly. Associating this supposed “conflict of values” with the impact of 9/11 and the war against terrorism, as well as the discrimination politics against immigrants and asylum seekers in Europe, or even Huntington's theory concerning a pretended ‘conflict of civilisations', we realize that this ‘conflict' is not a matter concerning exclusively freedom of expression(FoE), and certainly not the freedom of the arts. Our aim is to propose alternative methods of conflict resolution techniques, based on the analysis of the values at stake and focusing on the prevention of such « cultural conflicts », rather then on their resolution, in favour of one right or the other.Notre projet de thèse suggère une lecture juridique, politique et sociale d'un conflit entre deux droits fondamentaux culturels. Plusieurs controverses existent aujourd'hui dans le monde occidental, dont l'objectif serait la légitimation éventuelle des restrictions de la liberté d'expression, et la liberté de l'art en particulier, au nom de la protection des croyances religieuses. Nous pourrions constater en effet un certain « paroxysme », qui aboutit, en dernier essor, à un conflit juridique, voire, un conflit réel. Au plan international, les premières indications de ce conflit apparussent peu ou prou au même époque que la controverse autour les « Versets sataniques » de Salman Rushdie. Quinze ans après, déclencha une autre « crise mondiale »: l'affaire des caricatures danoises, suivie, jusqu'aujourd'hui, par des dizaines de résolution du Conseil des droits de l'Homme et de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies sur la diffamation des religions. Si l'on associe ce prétendu ‘conflit de valeurs' aux répercussions des attaques du 11 septembre et de la guerre contre le terrorisme, ainsi qu'aux politiques de discrimination constante à l'encontre des immigrés et les requérants d'asile en Europe, ou encore à la théorie de Huntington qui prône un supposé « conflit de civilisations », nous comprenons bien que la discussion est loin de concerner uniquement la liberté d'expression, ni, a fortiori, la liberté de l'art. Notre but est de proposer des approches « alternatives » aux conflits de droits, basées sur l'analyse des valeurs qui sont en jeu, et ciblant plutôt à la prévention de tels « conflits culturels », qu'à leur résolution formelle en faveur d'un droit ou d'un autre

La liberté de l'art face à la protection des croyances religieuses : étude d'un conflit de valeurs sous le prisme du droit international.

Our thesis project suggests suggests a legal, political and social reading of a conflict between two fundamental cultural rights. Several controversies exist today in the west world claiming the eventual legitimacy of the restrictions on artistic freedom, in the name of the protection of religious beliefs. We could even observe a certain ‘paroxysm' on this matter, which ends up at a legal, and virtually a real, conflict. From an international law point of view, the first indications of this kind of conflict appeared more or less during the notorious controversy around Salman Rushdie's ‘Satanic Verses”. Fifteen years later, in 2004, another ‘global crisis' appears: that of the Danish cartoons, followed by several resolutions on the subject of defamation of religions, issued by the UN Human Rights Council and the General Assembly. Associating this supposed “conflict of values” with the impact of 9/11 and the war against terrorism, as well as the discrimination politics against immigrants and asylum seekers in Europe, or even Huntington's theory concerning a pretended ‘conflict of civilisations', we realize that this ‘conflict' is not a matter concerning exclusively freedom of expression(FoE), and certainly not the freedom of the arts. Our aim is to propose alternative methods of conflict resolution techniques, based on the analysis of the values at stake and focusing on the prevention of such « cultural conflicts », rather then on their resolution, in favour of one right or the other.Notre projet de thèse suggère une lecture juridique, politique et sociale d'un conflit entre deux droits fondamentaux culturels. Plusieurs controverses existent aujourd'hui dans le monde occidental, dont l'objectif serait la légitimation éventuelle des restrictions de la liberté d'expression, et la liberté de l'art en particulier, au nom de la protection des croyances religieuses. Nous pourrions constater en effet un certain « paroxysme », qui aboutit, en dernier essor, à un conflit juridique, voire, un conflit réel. Au plan international, les premières indications de ce conflit apparussent peu ou prou au même époque que la controverse autour les « Versets sataniques » de Salman Rushdie. Quinze ans après, déclencha une autre « crise mondiale »: l'affaire des caricatures danoises, suivie, jusqu'aujourd'hui, par des dizaines de résolution du Conseil des droits de l'Homme et de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies sur la diffamation des religions. Si l'on associe ce prétendu ‘conflit de valeurs' aux répercussions des attaques du 11 septembre et de la guerre contre le terrorisme, ainsi qu'aux politiques de discrimination constante à l'encontre des immigrés et les requérants d'asile en Europe, ou encore à la théorie de Huntington qui prône un supposé « conflit de civilisations », nous comprenons bien que la discussion est loin de concerner uniquement la liberté d'expression, ni, a fortiori, la liberté de l'art. Notre but est de proposer des approches « alternatives » aux conflits de droits, basées sur l'analyse des valeurs qui sont en jeu, et ciblant plutôt à la prévention de tels « conflits culturels », qu'à leur résolution formelle en faveur d'un droit ou d'un autre