Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Safeguards System Modeling

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for potential U.S. use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems used in enrichment facilities. This research focuses on analyzing the effectiveness of the safeguards in protecting against the range of safeguards concerns for enrichment plants, including diversion of attractive material and unauthorized modes of use. We developed an Extend simulation model for a generic medium-sized centrifuge enrichment plant. We modeled the material flow in normal operation, plant operational upset modes, and selected diversion scenarios, for selected safeguards systems. Simulation modeling is used to analyze both authorized and unauthorized use of a plant and the flow of safeguards information. Simulation tracks the movement of materials and isotopes, identifies the signatures of unauthorized use, tracks the flow and compilation of safeguards data, and evaluates the effectiveness of the safeguards system in detecting misuse signatures. The simulation model developed could be of use to the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA, enabling the IAEA to observe and draw conclusions that uranium enrichment facilities are being used only within authorized limits for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It will evaluate improved approaches to nonproliferation concerns, facilitating deployment of enhanced and cost-effective safeguards systems for an important part of the nuclear power fuel cycle

Modeling Efforts to Aid in the Determination of Process Enrichment Levels for Identifying Potential Material Diversion

Efforts have been under way at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to develop detailed analytical models that simulate enrichment and conversion facilities for the purpose of aiding in the detection of material diversion as part of an overall safeguards strategy. These models could be used to confirm proper accountability of the nuclear materials at facilities worldwide. Operation of an enrichment process for manufacturing commercial reactor fuel presents proliferation concerns including both diversion and the potential for further enrichment to make weapons grade material. While inspections of foreign reprocessing facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are meant to ensure that such diversion is not occurring, it must be verified that such diversion is not taking place through both examination of the facility and taking specific measurements such as the radiation fields outside of various process lines. Our current effort is developing algorithms that would be incorporated into the current process models that would provide both neutron and gamma radiation fields outside any process line for the purpose of to determining the most effective locations for placing in-plant monitoring equipment. These algorithms, while providing dose and spectral information, could also be designed to provide detector responses that could be physically measured at various points on the process line. Such information could be used to optimize detector locations in support of real-time on-site monitoring to determine the enrichment levels within a process stream. The results of parametric analyses to establish expected variations for several different process streams and configurations are presented. Based upon these results, the capability of a sodium iodide (NaI(Tl)), high-purity germanium (HPGe), or neutron detection system is being investigated from the standpoint of their viability in quantitatively measuring and discerning the enrichment and potential throughput variations thereof. The benefits and issues associated with both passive and active interrogation measurement techniques are also discussed

Modeling Efforts to Aid in the Prediction of Process Enrichment Levels with the Intent of Identifying Potential Material Diversion

As part of an ongoing effort at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to enhance analytical models that simulate enrichment and conversion facilities, efforts are underway to develop routines to estimate the total gamma-ray flux and that of specific lines around process piping containing UF{sub 6}. The intent of the simulation modeling effort is to aid in the identification of possible areas where material diversion could occur, as input to an overall safeguards strategy. The operation of an enrichment facility for the production of low enriched uranium (LEU) presents certain proliferation concerns, including both the possibility of diversion of LEU and the potential for producing material enriched to higher-than-declared, weapons-usable levels. Safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are designed to provide assurance against diversion or misuse. Among the measures being considered for use is the measurement of radiation fields at various locations in the cascade hall. Our prior efforts in this area have focused on developing a model to predict neutron fields and how they would change during diversion of misuse. The neutron models indicated that while neutron detection useful in monitoring feed and product containers, it was not useful for monitoring process lines. Our current effort is aimed at developing algorithms that provide estimates of the gamma radiation field outside any process line for the purpose of determining the most effective locations for placing in-plant gamma-monitoring equipment. These algorithms could also be modified to provide both dose and spectral information and, ultimately, detector responses that could be physically measured at various points on the process line. Such information could be used to optimize detector locations in support of real-time on-site monitoring to determine the enrichment levels within a process stream. The results of parametric analyses to establish expected variations for several different process streams and configurations are presented. The benefits and issues associated with both passive and active interrogation measurement techniques are also being explored

LISSAT Analysis of a Generic Centrifuge Enrichment Plant

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems for current and future plants in the nuclear power fuel cycle. The DOE is engaging several DOE National Laboratories in efforts applied to safeguards for chemical conversion plants and gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants. As part of the development, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has developed an integrated safeguards system analysis tool (LISSAT). This tool provides modeling and analysis of facility and safeguards operations, generation of diversion paths, and evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. The constituent elements of diversion scenarios, including material extraction and concealment measures, are structured using directed graphs (digraphs) and fault trees. Statistical analysis evaluates the effectiveness of measurement verification plans and randomly timed inspections. Time domain simulations analyze significant scenarios, especially those involving alternate time ordering of events or issues of timeliness. Such simulations can provide additional information to the fault tree analysis and can help identify the range of normal operations and, by extension, identify additional plant operational signatures of diversions. LISSAT analyses can be used to compare the diversion-detection probabilities for individual safeguards technologies and to inform overall strategy implementations for present and future plants. Additionally, LISSAT can be the basis for a rigorous cost-effectiveness analysis of safeguards and design options. This paper will describe the results of a LISSAT analysis of a generic centrifuge enrichment plant. The paper will describe the diversion scenarios analyzed and the effectiveness of various safeguards systems alternatives

Use of Antineutrino Detectors for Nuclear Reactor Safeguards Effectiveness Assessment

As described in an earlier article [1], important information regarding reactor power and the amount and type of fissile material in reactor cores can be determined by measuring the antineutrino rate and energy spectrum, using a cubic meter scale antineutrino detector at tens of meters standoff from the core. Current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards techniques do not provide such real-time quantitative information regarding core power levels and isotopic composition. The possible benefits of this approach are several and have been discussed in the earlier article. One key advantage is that the method gives the inspecting agency completely independent access to real-time information on the operational status and fissile content of the core. Furthermore, the unattended and non-intrusive nature of the technology may reduce the monitoring burden on the plant operator, even though more information is being provided than is available within the current IAEA safeguards regime. Here we present a detailed analytical framework for measuring the impact that such a detector might have on IAEA safeguards, if implemented. To perform the analysis, we will use initial data from our operating detector and a standard analysis technique for safeguards regimes, developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Because characterization of the prototype detector is still underway, and because improvements in the prototype could have important impact on safeguards performance, the results presented here should be understood to be preliminary, and not reflective of the ultimate performance of the system. The structure of this paper is as follows. Reactor safeguards and the relevant properties of antineutrino detectors are briefly reviewed. A set of hypothetical diversion scenarios are then described, and one of these is analyzed using the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Integrated Safeguards System Analysis Tool (LISSAT) The probability of successful diversion is calculated for one specific scenario, for two cases: (1) Use of current IAEA safeguards methods; and (2) Use of current IAEA safeguards methods along with antineutrino detectors. The relative improvement in IAEA safeguards are assessed by taking the ratio of the two probabilities (with and without antineutrino detectors)

LISSAT Analysis of a Generic Centrifuge Enrichment Plant." Paper presented at

ABSTRACT The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems for current and future plants in the nuclear power fuel cycle. The DOE is engaging several DOE National Laboratories in efforts applied to safeguards for chemical conversion plants and gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants. As part of the development, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has developed an integrated safeguards system analysis tool (LISSAT). This tool provides modeling and analysis of facility and safeguards operations, generation of diversion paths, and evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. The constituent elements of diversion scenarios, including material extraction and concealment measures, are structured using directed graphs (digraphs) and fault trees. Statistical analysis evaluates the effectiveness of measurement verification plans and randomly timed inspections. Time domain simulations analyze significant scenarios, especially those involving alternate time ordering of events or issues of timeliness. Such simulations can provide additional information to the fault tree analysis and can help identify the range of normal operations and, by extension, identify additional plant operational signatures of diversions. LISSAT analyses can be used to compare the diversion-detection probabilities for individual safeguards technologies and to inform overall strategy implementations for present and future plants. Additionally, LISSAT can be the basis for a rigorous cost-effectiveness analysis of safeguards and design options. This paper will describe the results of a LISSAT analysis of a generic centifuge enrichment plant. The paper will describe the diversion scenarios analyzed and the effectiveness of various safeguards systems alternatives