Conceptualizing Shari\u27a in the Modern State

THIS Article addresses the animated and evolving role that Shari\u27a, i.e., the system of Islamic jurisprudence collectively or generally, and Shari\u27a conceptions play in the contemporary world. There are various manifestations of this evolving role in the often dynamic, subtle, highly negotiated, and far from formalistic ways that Shari\u27a is animated in today\u27s world. There are three main points that I will address in this Article. First is to provide some insight into the various ways that Shari\u27a has been manifesting in the recent revolutions sweeping through the Arabic-speaking world, while at the same time contrasting the rather curious case of the various anti-Shari\u27a legislations proposed in parts of the United States, as well as some of the anti-Shari\u27a European discourses taking place. Second, I will address two basic conceptualizations of Shari\u27a that we find historically not just persistent, but historically competing and often wrestling for space. Although these conceptualizations have clear points of demarcation and delineation, they are quite broad and disagree in some fundamental and basic assumptions, particularly in epistemological, as well as ontological and deontological, assumptions;Finally, I will address the way that the assumptions of each of these conceptualized perspectives or schools of thought in Shari\u27a have expressed themselves in various ages and historical contexts. Indeed, we find that there are very particular attributes or particular characteristics to the way that each conceptualized view of Shari\u27a expresses itself in various historical contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Villanova Law Review is the property of Villanova University School of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder\u27s express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.

Islamic Law and Ambivalent Scholarship

This book reminds me of the image of the arrogantly condescending and blustering tourist in Cairo who drifts into a store that has taken the trouble of prominently displaying the price of their commodities in nicely typed tags. Nevertheless, the tourist walks in, reads the price tag, and then proclaims, Okay, what is the real price? The poor store employee stares at him with incredulity, and simply repeats the price on the tag, and, in response, the tourist emits this knowing and smug smile as if saying, I know you guys, you never mean what you say; everything in Arab culture is negotiable, everything is subject to bargaining, and I will not be fooled. Of course, the tourist misses the point. The price on the tag is the real price, and there is no expectation of haggling, bargaining, or any other reconstruction of reality. Before arriving in Cairo, however, the tourist has already received a steady dosage of advice about the Arab bazaar. Everything, the tourist is told, in the Arab market is negotiable; so never take any of the advertised prices at face value, and argue and haggle to your heart\u27s content. Lawrence Rosen\u27s book is not intended to give advice to tourists about how to get the most for their money; it is nothing short of an attempt to explain the Islamic and Arab conception of justice. The author explicitly adopts the bazaar as the relevant model for understanding Islamic conceptions of justice, whether old or new, rural or urban, social or legal, or Muslim or Arab. But like our haggling tourist, whether intentionally or not, he ends up essentializing and deprecating his subject into a caricature that, although based on some truth, is largely a fictional invention

Conceptualizing Shari\u27a in the Modern State

THIS Article addresses the animated and evolving role that Shari\u27a, i.e., the system of Islamic jurisprudence collectively or generally, and Shari\u27a conceptions play in the contemporary world. There are various manifestations of this evolving role in the often dynamic, subtle, highly negotiated, and far from formalistic ways that Shari\u27a is animated in today\u27s world. There are three main points that I will address in this Article. First is to provide some insight into the various ways that Shari\u27a has been manifesting in the recent revolutions sweeping through the Arabic-speaking world, while at the same time contrasting the rather curious case of the various anti-Shari\u27a legislations proposed in parts of the United States, as well as some of the anti-Shari\u27a European discourses taking place. Second, I will address two basic conceptualizations of Shari\u27a that we find historically not just persistent, but historically competing and often wrestling for space. Although these conceptualizations have clear points of demarcation and delineation, they are quite broad and disagree in some fundamental and basic assumptions, particularly in epistemological, as well as ontological and deontological, assumptions;Finally, I will address the way that the assumptions of each of these conceptualized perspectives or schools of thought in Shari\u27a have expressed themselves in various ages and historical contexts. Indeed, we find that there are very particular attributes or particular characteristics to the way that each conceptualized view of Shari\u27a expresses itself in various historical contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Villanova Law Review is the property of Villanova University School of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder\u27s express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.

Soul Searching and the Spirit of Shari\u27a: A Review of Bernard Weiss\u27s The Spirit of Islamic Law

In this book review, Khaled Abou El Fadl offers a review of Bernard G. Weiss\u27, The Spirit of Islamic Law

The Unique and International and the Imperative of Discourse

When we consider the dynamics between international law and the paradigms of cultural and moral uniqueness or particularity, we ought to think about two distinct aspects of this relationship or dynamic. On the one hand, there is the issue of whether international law ought to care about unique and particular manifestations of culture and morality. This is especially so when talking about the relationship of international law to religion. International law- in particular the human rights tradition within international law-represents a set of normative claims about the way that human beings ought to act, behave, and even, at times, think. As such, international law makes intrusive demands upon the moral space in which human beings function. But this is the same moral space for which claims of moral particularity or religion compete, and the pertinent question is: should the proponents of international law defer, in any fashion, to the competing claims for moral space that are made by the proponents of moral particularity or religion? On the flip side of this equation is the equally compelling consideration: whether particular or unique religious systems or cultural paradigms ought to care about or defer to the competing claims of international law? In essence, the question can be posed with equal force to both paradigms: the paradigm of internationalism and the paradigm of moral uniqueness. I will be arguing that in fact both paradigms have no alternative but to be concerned with what the other has to offer, and I will do so on the basis of a theoretical exposition. Coherent theoretical stands are often the only safeguard against result-oriented activism. When human rights activists and religious activists act without the restraint of reflective and self-critical pauses, they often end up violating the moral space in which human beings function. Instead of presenting claims that could be evaluated and negotiated, their behavior starts to resemble an arrogant and self-absorbed invasion of the moral space of the other. But, as we encounter in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, intrusive invasions of the moral space of others is at times well justified and clearly warranted, but it ought not to be done lightly. At a minimum, any act of moral interventionism, in which internationalists challenge and attempt to deny more particular visions of the right or good life, must be justified in coherent and accountable terms-otherwise, moral interventionism starts appearing whimsical and despotic. I should note that my own expertise comes primarily in the Islamic context and so much of what I am going to say will relate to the context of Islamic law and Islamic tradition, and their interaction with the international context

Fox Hunting, Pheasant Shooting and Comparative Law

The Roman jurists, ancient rabbis and Muslim jurists were very different people. Above all, the rabbis and Muslim jurists were engaged on a search for law as truth. And the Roman jurists were much more obviously upper-class gentlemen.91 But the similarities are great. All three had a passion for legal interpretation. They delighted in discussing hypothetical cases. They chased after solutions by ways of reasoning devised by themselves. Practical utility, while present, was in the background. At times, to outsiders, their opinions seem outr6, even callous, remote from reality. They have little interest in what actually happens in court: their texts do not smell of the courtroom even when they invent new devices. They do not seek to devise a system of law. Nor do they propose radical reform. They write for those interested in the same issues as themselves. This article is a comparison of Roman and Islamic Law