Explaining Variation in Public Debt: A Quantitative Analysis of the Effects of Governance

This paper examines the main political influence factors accounting for the variation in public debt accumulation on a global scale. This allows for a reassessment of the recent focus on a regime type theory of public debt and for a test of an alternative governance theory. I argue that political stability, the rule of law, the control of corruption, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality promote lower public debt accumulation by reducing the incentives for governments to “borrow from the future,” by increasing state capacity to collect taxes and effectively use public funds, and by providing more security and equity to private investment, inducing higher economic growth and tax revenues. Both theories are tested against a number of controls stemming from theories of public choice, theories of governmental distributional conflict, as well as from politico-institutional and macroeconomic explanations of public debt accumulation. Applying different specifications of quantitative models, the two governance indicators political stability and regulatory quality show consistent effects on public debt accumulation, partly confirming the proposed governance theory. Furthermore, the paper can reproduce a public debt-reducing effect of more democratic regime types across a number of model specifications – though without a high degree of robustness.[Expliquer la variation de la dette publique par la gouvernance ? Une analyse quantitative] Cet article examine les principaux facteurs politiques d’influence expliquant la variation de l’accumulation de dette publique selon les pays. Ceci permet de reconsidérer les explications en termes de théorie des régimes, actuellement privilégiées, et de mettre plutôt à l’essai une théorie de type gouvernance. L’idée est que la stabilité politique, l’État de droit, le contrôle de la corruption, l’efficacité administrative et la qualité de la réglementation favorisent une moindre accumulation de dette publique en réduisant la tentation des pouvoirs publics d’« emprunter aux générations futures », en accroissant la capacité de l’État à collecter l’impôt et à utiliser efficacement les fonds publics, et en offrant à l’investissement privé davantage de sécurité et d’équité, ce qui induit une croissance économique et des recettes fiscales plus élevées. Les deux théories sont mises à l’épreuve au moyen d’une série de contrôles tirés de la théorie du choix rationnel, de la théorie du conflit de répartition des ressources publiques, ainsi que des explications politico-institutionnelles et macro-économiques de l’accumulation de dette publique. L’application de différentes spécifications de modèles quantitatifs fait apparaître des effets constants de deux indicateurs de gouvernance, « stabilité politique » et « qualité de la réglementation », sur l’accumulation de dette publique, ce qui confirme partiellement la théorie de la gouvernance proposée. On a pu en outre reproduire un effet de réduction de la dette publique des types de régime plus démocratiques pour plusieurs spécifications de modèle, mais avec un degré de robustesse peu élevé.1 Introduction 2 Explaining variation in public debt 3 A governance theory of public debt 4 Data and methodology 5 Findings 6 Conclusions Reference

Pupil-centred spiritual leadership: an empirical study of thirteen church primary school headteachers in England

The place of Church school headteachers as spiritual leaders of the school community is rarely highlighted. This article investigates how 13 Church primary school headteachers (Catholic Church of England, and Methodist) interpret this role. It draws on the Faith in the Nexus research which investigated how church primary schools nurtured pupils’ spiritual development and facilitated faith activity in the home. The head teacher interviews revealed several recurring themes, such as empowering children, collective worship, relationships with church and parents, and the visibility of faith in school. This research brings together a comparison of leadership approaches from Catholic and Anglican headteachers. Evidence of differences emerged; Catholic headteachers tended to use ‘overtly religious’ language while many Anglican headteachers employed a more ‘secular’ language to express their vision of spiritual leadership. A comparison with Shaw’s (Citation 2015, 2017) model of ‘ethotic leadership’, highlighted much in common. The headteachers’ ethos was pupil-centric and shaped by a focus on the spiritual development of the child. An adaptation of Shaw’s model is offered which places the child at the centre

Pupil-centred spiritual leadership: an empirical study of thirteen church primary school headteachers in England

The place of Church school headteachers as spiritual leaders of the school community is rarely highlighted. This article investigates how 13 Church primary school headteachers (Catholic Church of England, and Methodist) interpret this role. It draws on the Faith in the Nexus research which investigated how church primary schools nurtured pupils’ spiritual development and facilitated faith activity in the home. The head teacher interviews revealed several recurring themes, such as empowering children, collective worship, relationships with church and parents, and the visibility of faith in school. This research brings together a comparison of leadership approaches from Catholic and Anglican headteachers. Evidence of differences emerged; Catholic headteachers tended to use ‘overtly religious’ language while many Anglican headteachers employed a more ‘secular’ language to express their vision of spiritual leadership. A comparison with Shaw’s (Citation2015, 2017) model of ‘ethotic leadership’, highlighted much in common. The headteachers’ ethos was pupil-centric and shaped by a focus on the spiritual development of the child. An adaptation of Shaw’s model is offered which places the child at the centre

[Book Review] Who Is Watching the Shadow Banks? Thiemann, Matthias: The Growth of Shadow Banking: A Comparative Institutional Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018)

Shadow banking refers to bank-like financial activities that do not fall under traditional regulations; they have been one of the root causes of the recent financial crisis. M. Thiemann identifies the structural causes for their rapid growth, and shows which institutional reforms could prevent the circumvention of regulations

[Book Review] Lecture croisée: Leaving Our "Comfort Zones" to Measure and Evaluate Austerity?

Books reviewed: Christopher Hood, Ruth Dixon (2015) A Government that Worked Better and Cost Less? Evaluating Three Decades of Reform and Change in UK Central Government Oxford, Oxford University Press Christopher Hood, Rozana Himaz (2017) A Century of Fiscal Squeeze Politics: 100 Years of Austerity, Politics, and Bureaucracy in Britain Oxford, Oxford University Pres

The Ambiguous Consensus on Fiscal Rules: How Ideational Ambiguity Has Facilitated Social Democratic Parties’ Support of Structural Deficit Rules in the Eurozone

In recent years, all eurozone member states have introduced national fiscal rules, which put limits on public deficits and debt. Fiscal rules reduce the fiscal policy discretion of politicians and affect their capacity to use public budgets for macroeconomic steering and redistribution. While such institutional discretion constraints run against the traditional policy preferences of social democratic parties, it is puzzling why they supported national fiscal rule reforms during the European debt crisis. This paper argues that the concept of structural deficit rules, central to reform efforts across the eurozone, allowed for the formation of an ambiguous consensus between center-right and center-left parties. While conservative and liberal parties are generally supportive of institutional discretion constraints, structural deficit rules – in contrast to nominal deficit rules – allowed social democratic and other left-wing parties to link such rules with their broader policy preferences of Keynesian countercyclical policymaking and the protection of tax revenues across the economic cycle to ensure the state’s capacity for redistribution. Drawing on three country case studies (Germany, Austria, France), this paper shows how the concept of structural deficit rules facilitated – at least discursively – the support for discretion-constraining institutions among social democratic and other left-wing parties. In theoretical terms, this study also advances research on the role of ambiguity in political decision-making, (re-)conceptualizing three forms of ambiguity underlying ambiguous consensus: textual ambiguity, institutional ambiguity, and ideational ambiguity.Au cours des dernières années, tous les pays membres de la zone euro ont introduit des règles budgétaires nationales qui fixent des limites à la dette et aux déficits publics. Les règles budgétaires réduisent le pouvoir discrétionnaire des responsables politiques en matière budgétaire et affectent leur capacité à utiliser les budgets publics pour le pilotage macroéconomique et pour la redistribution. Alors que ces contraintes institutionnelles vont à l’encontre des préférences traditionnelles des partis sociaux-démocrates, on peut s’étonner de constater que ces derniers ont soutenu les réformes des règles budgétaires pendant la crise de la dette en Europe. Cette étude défend l’idée selon laquelle les règles sur le déficit structurel, un concept central des initiatives de réforme au sein de la zone euro, ont abouti à un consensus ambigu entre les partis du centre-droit et ceux du centregauche. Tandis que les partis conservateurs et libéraux soutiennent généralement les contraintes sur le pouvoir discrétionnaire des institutions, les règles sur le déficit structurel – contrairement aux règles sur le déficit nominal – ont permis aux partis sociaux-démocrates et à d’autres partis de gauche de les relier à leurs préférences pour des politiques keynésiennes contra-cycliques plus larges et au maintien des impôts sur les revenus tout au long du cycle économique, afin d’assurer la capacité redistributive de l’État. Sur la base d’études de cas portant sur trois pays (Allemagne, Autriche et France), cet article montre comment le concept de règles sur le déficit structurel a facilité – du moins au niveau discursif – le soutien des contraintes institutionnelles par les partis sociaux-démocrates et par d’autres partis de gauche. Sur le plan théorique, la présente étude développe la recherche sur le rôle de l’ambiguïté dans la prise de décisions politiques, en (re)conceptualisant trois formes d’ambiguïté sous-jacentes au consensus ambigu : l’ambiguïté textuelle, l’ambiguïté institutionnelle et l’ambiguïté conceptuelle.1 Introduction 2 Three forms of ambiguity underlying ambiguous consensus Textual ambiguity Institutional ambiguity Ideational ambiguity 3 Origins and implementations of structural deficit rules From nominal to structural deficit rules in Europe The implementation of national structural deficit rules 4 The inherent ambiguities in structural deficit rules Ideational ambiguity in structural deficit rules Textual and institutional ambiguity in structural deficit rules 5 Social democratic support for structural deficit rules in three countries A problem definition of public deficits shared by social democratic parties Structural deficit rules and countercyclical policymaking Structural deficit rules and tax cuts 6 Conclusion Interviews Parliamentary and committee minutes Electoral manifestos and party platform programs Reference