Patterned Inequality, Compounding Injustice, and Algorithmic Prediction

If whatever counts as merit for some purpose is unevenly distributed, a decision procedure that accurately sorts people on that basis will “pick up” and reproduce the pre-existing pattern in ways that more random, less merit-tracking procedures would not. This dynamic is an important cause for concern about the use of predictive models to allocate goods and opportunities. In this article, I distinguish two different objections that give voice to that concern in different ways. First, decision procedures may contribute to future social injustice and other social ills by sustaining or aggravating patterns that undermine equality of status and opportunity. Second, the same decision procedures may wrong particular individuals by compounding prior injustices that explain those persons’ predicted or actual characteristics. I argue for the importance of the first idea and raise doubts about the second. In normative assessments and legal regulation of algorithmic decisionmaking, as in our thinking about anti-discrimination norms more broadly, a central concern ought to be the prospect of entrenching harmful and unjust patterns—quite apart from any personal wrong done to the individuals about whom predictions are made

Modeling Factions for ‘Effects Based Operations’: Part II – Behavioral Game Theory

Military, diplomatic, and intelligence analysts are increasingly interested in having a valid system of models that span the social sciences and interoperate so that one can determine the effects that may arise from alternative operations (courses of action) in different lands. Part I of this article concentrated on internal validity of the components of such a synthetic framework – a world diplomacy game as well as the agent architecture for modeling leaders and followers in different conflicts. But how valid are such model collections once they are integrated together and used out-of-sample (see Section 1)? Section 2 compares these realistic, descriptive agents to normative rational actor theory and offers equilibria insights for conflict games. Sections 3 and 4 offer two real world cases (Iraq and SE Asia) where the agent models are subjected to validity tests and an EBO experiment is then run for each case. We conclude by arguing that substantial effort on game realism, best-of-breed social science models, and agent validation efforts is essential if analytic experiments are to effectively explore conflicts and alternative ways to influence outcomes. Such efforts are likely to improve behavioral game theory as well

Modeling Factions for \u27Effects Based Operations\u27: Part I Leader and Follower Behaviors

This paper presents a synthetic approach for generating role playing simulation games intended to support analysts (and trainees) interested in testing alternative competing courses of action (operations) and discovering what effects they are likely to precipitate in potential ethno-political conflict situations. Simulated leaders and followers capable of playing these games are implemented in a cognitive modeling framework, called PMFserv, which covers value systems, personality and cultural factors, emotions, relationships, perception, stress/coping style and decision making. Of direct interest, as Sect. 1.1 explains, is mathematical representation and synthesis of best-of-breed behavioral science models within this framework to reduce dimensionality and to improve the realism and internal validity of the agent implementations. Sections 2 and 3 present this for leader profiling instruments and group membership decision-making, respectively. Section 4 serves as an existence proof that the framework has generated several training and analysis tools, and Sect. 5 concludes with lessons learned. Part II turns to the question of assessment of the synthesis and its usage in course of action studies

Socio-Cultural Games for Training and Analysis

This paper presents a theory for role playing simulation games intended to support analysts (and trainees) with generating and testing alternative competing hypotheses on how to influence world conflict situations. Simulated leaders and followers capable of playing these games are implemented in a cognitive modeling framework, called PMFserv, which covers value systems, personality and cultural factors, emotions, relationships, perception, stress/coping style and decision making. Of direct interest, as Section 1.1 explains, is codification and synthesis of best-of-breed social science models within PMFserv to improve the internal validity of the agent implementations. Sections 2 and 3 present this for leader profiling instruments and group membership decision-making, respectively. Section 4 then offers two real world case studies (The Third Crusade and SE Asia today) where the agent models are subjected to Turing and correspondence tests under each case study. In sum, substantial effort on game realism, best-of-breed social science models, and agent validation efforts is essential if analysis and training tools are to help explore cultural issues and alternative ways to influence outcomes. Such exercises, in turn, are likely to improve the state of the science as well

What is discrimination and when is it wrong?

I Nearly everyone agrees that discrimination is sometimes morally wrong. But despite the breadth of consensus on this point, there is remarkably little agreement about what makes something an instance of discrimination, or about what makes an instance of discrimination wrong when it is. I propose that discrimination is differential treatment that has a particular kind of explanatory connection to the agent's differential ascription of some property to the discriminatees, and I identify two things that are sometimes wrong with it. First, in paradigm cases of wrongful discrimination, the act manifests disrespect for the standing as persons of those who are discriminated against. It does this because it stems from a failure to recognize either their equal value, and the presumptive claim to equal consideration this entails, or their standing as autonomous individuals, that is, as part authors of their own lives. In such cases, discrimination is wrong irrespective of both its effects and its social meaning. Second, much discrimination is morally objectionable simply on account of its contingent consequences. It is bad, that is, because it does unjustified harm, or brings about distributions that are unfair. I offer an account of the moral case against racial profiling in law enforcement as an example of how we should think about this second sort of wrongful discrimination.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo