The Gold Standard and the Great Depression

This paper, written primarily for historians, attempts to explain why political leaders and central bankers continued to adhere to the gold standard as the Great Depression intensified. We do not focus on the effects of the gold standard on the Depression, which we and others have documented elsewhere, but on the reasons why policy makers chose the policies they did. We argue that the mentality of the gold standard was pervasive and compelling to the leaders of the interwar economy. It was expressed and reinforced by the discourse among these leaders. It was opposed and finally defeated by mass politics, but only after the interaction of national policies had drawn the world into the Great Depression.

Inconvenient glow: Cliometrics and the "golden age" of capitalism

This paper aims to criticize the recent cliometrics literature on the so-called "golden age" of capitalism. The works of Nicholas Crafts, Gianni Toniolo, and Barry Eichengreen are reconstructed in order to reveal the main characteristics of this research program. Its narrow quantitative focus, its reliance on theoretical propositions borrowed from neoclassical economics, and its auspicious interpretation of the postwar reconstruction are the main focus of the criticism presented. Finally, the cliometricians' attempt to historicize the "golden age" and de-historicize the following decades is related to the ideological understanding of the recent decades as a period of "great moderation."

Lessons from the New Deal: Did the New Deal Prolong Or Worsen the Great Depression?

Since the current recession began in December 2007, New Deal legislation and its effectiveness have been at the center of a lively debate in Washington. This paper emphasizes some key facts about two kinds of policy that were important during the Great Depression and have since become the focus of criticism by new New Deal critics: (1) regulatory and labor relations legislation, and (2) government spending and taxation. We argue that initiatives in these policy areas probably did not slow economic growth or worsen the unemployment problem from 1933 to 1939, as claimed by a number of economists in academic papers, in the popular press, and elsewhere. To substantiate our case, we cite some important economic benefits of New Deal-era laws in the two controversial policy areas noted above. In fact, we suggest that the New Deal provided effective medicine for the Depression, though fiscal policy was not sufficiently countercyclical to conquer mass unemployment and prevent the recession of 1937-38; 1933's National Industrial Recovery Act was badly flawed and poorly administered, and the help provided by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 came too late to have a big effect on the recovery

Immigration and Structural Change – Evidence from Post-War Germany

Does immigration accelerate sectoral change towards high-productivity sectors? This paper uses the mass displacement of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe to West Germany after World War II as a natural experiment to study this question. A simple two-sector model of the economy, in which moving costs prevent the marginal product of labor to be equalized across sectors, predicts that immigration boosts output per worker by expanding the high-productivity sector, but decreases output per worker within a sector. Using German district-level data from before and after the war, we find strong empirical support for these predictions.Beschleunigt Zuwanderung den sektoralen Wandel hin zu hoch-produktiven Sektoren? Diese Arbeit nutzt die Vertreibung von Deutschen aus Osteuropa nach Westdeutschland nach dem Zeiten Weltkrieg als ein natürliches Experiment, um diese Frage zu untersuchen. Ein einfaches Zwei-Sektoren-Modell, in welchem Mobilitätskosten verhindern, dass sich das Grenzprodukt der Arbeit zwischen den Sektoren angleicht, sagt voraus, dass Immigration den Output pro Kopf erhöht indem sie den hoch-produktiven Sektor expandieren lässt, gleichzeitig aber den Output pro Kopf innerhalb eines Sektors reduziert. Eine empirische Analyse, basierend auf Regierungsbezirksdaten der Vor- und Nachkriegszeit, findet starke Evidenz für diese Vorhersagen

On the causes of economic growth in Europe: why did agricultural labour productivity not converge between 1950 and 2005?

The objective of this study is to make a further contribution to the debate on the causes of economic growth in the European Continent. It explains why agricultural labour productivity differences did not converge between 1950 and 2005 in Europe. We propose an econometric model, one combining both proximate and fundamental causes of economic growth. The results show that the continuous exit of labour power from the sector, coupled with the increased use of productive factors originating in other sectors of the economy, caused the efficiency of agricultural workers to rise. However, we offer a complete explanation of the role played by institutions and geographical factors. Thus, we detect a direct and inverse relation between membership of the EU and the Communist bloc and the productivity of agricultural labour. In addition, strong support for agriculture affected productivity negatively