10 research outputs found
Quantile stable mechanisms
We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants
Quantile stable mechanisms
We construct quantile stable mechanisms, show that they are distinct in sufficiently large markets, and analyze how they can be manipulated by market participants. As a step to showing that quantile stable mechanisms are well defined, we show that median and quantile stable matchings exist when contracts are strong substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand. This last result is of independent interest as experiments show that agents who match in a decentralized way tend to coordinate on the median stable matching when it exists
Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
We show that generalized median stable matchings exist in many-to-many matching markets when contracts are strong substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand