Secret-Sharing Matroids need not be Algebraic

We combine some known results and techniques with new ones to show that there exists a non-algebraic, multi-linear matroid. This answers an open question by Matus (Discrete Mathematics 1999), and an open question by Pendavingh and van Zwam (Advances in Applied Mathematics 2013). The proof is constructive and the matroid is explicitly given

Vying for Foreign Direct Investment: A EU-type Model of Tax Competition

This paper brings out the special mechanism through which taxes influence bilateral FDI, when investment decisions are two-fold in the presence of fixed setup flows costs. For each pair of source-host countries, there is a set of factors determining whether aggregate FDI flows will occur at all, and a different set of factors determining the volume of FDI flows (provided they occur). We develop a two-country tax competition model which yield an asymmetric Nash-equilibrium with high corporate tax rate and high level of public good provision in the rich source country for FDI outflows and with low corporate tax rate and low level of public good provision in the poor host country for FDI outflows. This is akin to the asymmetry among the EU 15 and EU 10 in the enlarged European Union, as of 2004. We also demonstrate that the notion that the mere international tax differentials are a key factor behind the direction and magnitude of FDI flows, the traditional race to the bottom argument in tax competition are too simple.

Gains from FDI Inflows with Incomplete Information

The paper develops an international macroeconomic model of FDI flows with a unique feature: a hands-on management ability to react in real time to changing economic environments. Anticipating this advantage, foreign direct investors can outbid other investors in a certain industry in which they specialize in the source country. The model can explain both two-way FDI flows among developed countries and one-way FDI flows from developed to developing country. The unique gains from FDI to the host country stem from the increased eciency of domestic investment.

International Tax Competition and Gains from Tax Harmonization

In a world economy there are two types of distortions which can be caused by capital income taxation in addition to the standard closed-economy wedge between the consumer-saver marginal intertemporal rate of substitution and the producer-investor marginal productivity of capital: (i)international differences in intertemporal marginal rates of substitution, implying an inefficient allocation of world savings across countries; and (ii) international differences in the marginal productivity of capital, implying an inefficient allocation of world investment across countries. The paper focuses on the structure of taxation for countries which are engaged in tax competition and on potential gains from s tax harmonization. We show that if the competing countries are sufficiently coordinated with the rest of the world then tax competition leads each country to apply the residence principle of taxation and there are no gains from tax harmonization. If, however there is not sufficient coordination,tax competition leads to low capital income taxes and the tax burden falls on the internationally immobile factors. The outcome is nevertheless still efficient relative to the available constrained set of tax instruments.

Optimal Incentives to Domestic Investment in the Presence of Capital Flight

This paper develops a model of an open economy which employs distortionary taxes to finance public consumption, and with an access to the world capital market. The paper examines the efficiency of quantity restrictions on capital exports and the accompanying set of taxes. A distinction is made between a benchmark case where the government can fully tax foreign-source income and a more realistic case where the government cannot effectively tax foreign-source income.

On the Desirability of Taxing Charitable Contributions

We develop a model that allows for public goods and status signaling through charitable contributions. This model provides a unified framework in which contributions are driven both by altruism and status signaling. We use this setup to re-examine the conventional practice of rendering a favorable tax treatment to charitable contributions.optimal taxation, re-distribution, charitable contributions, inequality

Welfare Migration: Is the Net Fiscal Burden a Good Measure of its Economics Impact on the Welfare of the Native-Born Population?

Migration of young workers (as distinct from retirees), even when driven in by the generosity of the welfare state, slows down the trend of increasing dependency ratio. But, even though low-skill migration improves the dependency ratio, it nevertheless burdens the welfare state. Recent studies by Smith and Edmonston (1977), and Sinn et al (2003) comprehensively estimate the fiscal burden that low-skill migration imposes on the fiscal system. However, an important message of this paper is that in an infinite-horizon set-up, one cannot fully grasp the implications of migration for the welfare state just by looking at the net fiscal burden that migrants impose on the fiscal system. In an infinite-horizon, overlapping generations economy, this net burden could change to net gain to the native-born population.migration, welfare state, fiscal burden

A Brazilian-Type Debt Crisis: Simple Analytics

We develop a model that captures important features of debt crises of the Brazilian type. Its applicability to Brazil lies in the fact that (1) macro fundamentals were sound in the wake of the crisis (e .g., a non-negligible primary surplus, a relatively low debt/GDP ratio, low inflation, etc.); and (2) the trigger for the crisis appears to be the forthcoming elections, with an expected regime change.