Analytical methods for vasopressin: A review

Thesis (M.A.)—Boston Universit

Theoretical Perspectives on Protein Folding

Understanding how monomeric proteins fold under in vitro conditions is crucial to describing their functions in the cellular context. Significant advances both in theory and experiments have resulted in a conceptual framework for describing the folding mechanisms of globular proteins. The experimental data and theoretical methods have revealed the multifaceted character of proteins. Proteins exhibit universal features that can be determined using only the number of amino acid residues (N) and polymer concepts. The sizes of proteins in the denatured and folded states, cooperativity of the folding transition, dispersions in the melting temperatures at the residue level, and time scales of folding are to a large extent determined by N. The consequences of finite N especially on how individual residues order upon folding depends on the topology of the folded states. Such intricate details can be predicted using the Molecular Transfer Model that combines simulations with measured transfer free energies of protein building blocks from water to the desired concentration of the denaturant. By watching one molecule fold at a time, using single molecule methods, the validity of the theoretically anticipated heterogeneity in the folding routes, and the N-dependent time scales for the three stages in the approach to the native state have been established. Despite the successes of theory, of which only a few examples are documented here, we conclude that much remains to be done to solve the "protein folding problem" in the broadest sense.Comment: 48 pages, 9 figure

The Economics of Bankruptcy: An Introduction to the Literature

This essay surveys important contributions to the economics of bankruptcy. It is an introductory chapter for a forthcoming volume (from Edward Elgar Press) that compiles the work of legal scholars as well as economists working in the field of corporate finance. The essay begins with the foundational theories of Baird, Jackson, and Rea and then collects scholarly work extending, testing, or revising those theories. At various points I identify questions that merit further study, particularly empirical testing

Rules of Thumb for Intercreditor Agreements

Intercreditor agreements frequently restrict the extent to which subordinated creditors can participate in the bankruptcy process by, for example, contesting liens of senior lenders, objecting to a cash collateral motion, or even exercising the right to vote on a plan of reorganization. Because intercreditor agreements can reorder the bargaining environment in bankruptcy, some judges have been unsure about their enforceability. Other judges have not hesitated to enforce the agreements, at least when they do not restrict the voting rights of subordinated creditors. This essay argues that intercreditor agreements are controversial because they pose a trade-off: they reduce bargaining costs (by limiting the participatory rights of subordinated creditors), but can give senior lenders outsized influence over the bankruptcy process, to the detriment of investors who were not party to the intercreditor agreement. The essay proposes several rules of thumb that might help judges navigate this trade-off

Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis

The discount rate is a critical element of cost-benefit analysis. The value of cost-benefit analysis in improving regulatory decisions depends, in large part, on the reasonableness of the discount rate. Small variations in the discount rate can significantly bias the analysis. Despite the importance of the discount rate, courts have failed to develop a standard of review for agency discount rate choices. this is particularly troubling in light of evidence that agency practice exhibits wide-ranging, and generally unexplained, variation in discount rates. Not only do different agencies employ different rates, but the same agency will sometimes apply different rates to different regulations without explanation. This comment seeks to strengthen cost-benefit analysis by providing a framework for judicial review of agency discount rates. As a threshold matter, courts should find, as a matter of law, that an agency acts unreasonably if it fails to discount future costs and benefits, even if they accrue to future generations. Additionally, courts should take a "hard look" at agency discount rates and ask three basic questions: Is there a record for the agency's choice? Did the agency explain its choice between the alternative approaches to discounting, the SRTP and OCC? Did the agency consider the relevant factors in applying the chosen method? While these questions are standard fare in hard look review, they would represent a significant advance in judicial review of discount rates. More importantly, hard look review would provide strong incentives for agencies to adopt morally and economically sensible discount rates

Coasean Bargaining in Consumer Bankruptcy

During my first weeks as a graduate student in economics, a professor described the Coase Theorem as “nearly a tautology:” Assume a world in which bargaining is costless. If there are gains from trade, the Theorem tells us, the parties will trade. The initial assignment of property rights will not affect the final allocation because the parties will bargain (costlessly) to an efficient outcome. “How can that be a theorem?,” I remember thinking at the time