Anyone but Him: The Complexity of Precluding an Alternative

Preference aggregation in a multiagent setting is a central issue in both human and computer contexts. In this paper, we study in terms of complexity the vulnerability of preference aggregation to destructive control. That is, we study the ability of an election's chair to, through such mechanisms as voter/candidate addition/suppression/partition, ensure that a particular candidate (equivalently, alternative) does not win. And we study the extent to which election systems can make it impossible, or computationally costly (NP-complete), for the chair to execute such control. Among the systems we study--plurality, Condorcet, and approval voting--we find cases where systems immune or computationally resistant to a chair choosing the winner nonetheless are vulnerable to the chair blocking a victory. Beyond that, we see that among our studied systems no one system offers the best protection against destructive control. Rather, the choice of a preference aggregation system will depend closely on which types of control one wishes to be protected against. We also find concrete cases where the complexity of or susceptibility to control varies dramatically based on the choice among natural tie-handling rules.Comment: Preliminary version appeared in AAAI '05. Also appears as URCS-TR-2005-87

Downward Collapse from a Weaker Hypothesis

Hemaspaandra et al. proved that, for $m > 0$ and $0 < i < k - 1$: if \Sigma_i^p \BoldfaceDelta DIFF_m(\Sigma_k^p) is closed under complementation, then $DIFF_m(\Sigma_k^p) = coDIFF_m(\Sigma_k^p)$. This sharply asymmetric result fails to apply to the case in which the hypothesis is weakened by allowing the $\Sigma_i^p$ to be replaced by any class in its difference hierarchy. We so extend the result by proving that, for $s,m > 0$ and $0 < i < k - 1$: if DIFF_s(\Sigma_i^p) \BoldfaceDelta DIFF_m(\Sigma_k^p) is closed under complementation, then $DIFF_m(\Sigma_k^p) = coDIFF_m(\Sigma_k^p)$

X THEN X: Manipulation of Same-System Runoff Elections

Do runoff elections, using the same voting rule as the initial election but just on the winning candidates, increase or decrease the complexity of manipulation? Does allowing revoting in the runoff increase or decrease the complexity relative to just having a runoff without revoting? For both weighted and unweighted voting, we show that even for election systems with simple winner problems the complexity of manipulation, manipulation with runoffs, and manipulation with revoting runoffs are independent, in the abstract. On the other hand, for some important, well-known election systems we determine what holds for each of these cases. For no such systems do we find runoffs lowering complexity, and for some we find that runoffs raise complexity. Ours is the first paper to show that for natural, unweighted election systems, runoffs can increase the manipulation complexity

The Complexity of Kings

A king in a directed graph is a node from which each node in the graph can be reached via paths of length at most two. There is a broad literature on tournaments (completely oriented digraphs), and it has been known for more than half a century that all tournaments have at least one king [Lan53]. Recently, kings have proven useful in theoretical computer science, in particular in the study of the complexity of the semifeasible sets [HNP98,HT05] and in the study of the complexity of reachability problems [Tan01,NT02]. In this paper, we study the complexity of recognizing kings. For each succinctly specified family of tournaments, the king problem is known to belong to $\Pi_2^p$ [HOZZ]. We prove that this bound is optimal: We construct a succinctly specified tournament family whose king problem is $\Pi_2^p$-complete. It follows easily from our proof approach that the problem of testing kingship in succinctly specified graphs (which need not be tournaments) is $\Pi_2^p$-complete. We also obtain $\Pi_2^p$-completeness results for k-kings in succinctly specified j-partite tournaments, $k,j \geq 2$, and we generalize our main construction to show that $\Pi_2^p$-completeness holds for testing k-kingship in succinctly specified families of tournaments for all $k \geq 2$