Equity Rights Issues in Spain: Flotation Costs and Wealth Effects

This paper analyses the flotation costs and the share price reaction of equity offerings in Spain. The results report a positive relationship between relative flotation costs and the underwriting of an issue, and a negative relationship between such costs and ownership concentration. Fixed flotation costs and a negative relationship with the gross offer proceeds are also observed. On average, there is a negative share price reaction on the date of the 'previous communication' to the "Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores". The different sub-samples analysed according to the underwriting of the issue and the discount offered reveal no statistical differences. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2003.

Security Choice, Information Effects and Firm Characteristics: A Factor Analytic Approach

Abstract:  We examine the marginal choice between debt and equity securities using a factor analytic approach. This data reduction property eliminates the need to select the one best variable to proxy for a particular theoretical construct. Our results reinforce numerous existing findings using traditional methods and suggest both static tradeoff and asymmetric information based considerations are relevant in determining security choice. Two new results are presented related to the accounting liquidity of the firm. First, the preference for equity is increasing with liquidity as suggested by the window of opportunity hypothesis. Secondly, the market response to equity issuance announcements is inversely related to the liquidity of the firm. Profitability and growth measures support Jensen's (1986) agency cost of free cash flow as a potential explanation for the second finding. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2004.

Measuring the Extent of Structural Remedy in Section 7 Settlements: Was the US DOJ Successful in the 1990s?

This paper suggests an innovative measure of structural relief obtained in a typical Section 7 settlement. The fraction of competitive overlap subject to divestiture as a condition of the settlement is modeled as a function of merger-specific efficiencies, the proportion of the deal held “hostage” to antitrust review, the merger’s anticompetitive potential, and other factors. The model is applied to data on 86 recent Justice Department cases covering the period 1990–2003 and to the subsample of 1990s cases. All data are collected from publicly available documents only. The government is found to secure larger divestitures when the cost to the acquirer of delaying the settlement is high. The resulting estimates are used to predict several out-of-sample observations. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007merger policy, U.S. Department of Justice, structural remedies, L44, C24,