Economic-demographic interactions in long-run growth

Cliometrics confirms that Malthus’ model of the pre-industrial economy, in which increases in productivity raise population but higher population drives down wages, is a good description for much of demographic/economic history. A contributor to the Malthusian equilibrium was the Western European Marriage Pattern, the late age of female first marriage, which promised to retard the fall of living standards by restricting fertility. The demographic transition and the transition from Malthusian economies to modern economic growth attracted many Cliometric models surveyed here. A popular model component is that lower levels of mortality over many centuries increased the returns to, or preference for, human capital investment so that technical progress eventually accelerated. This initially boosted birth rates and population growth accelerated. Fertility decline was earliest and most striking in late eighteenth century France. By the 1830s the fall in French marital fertility is consistent with a response to the rising opportunity cost of children. The rest of Europe did not begin to follow until end of the nineteenth century. Interactions between the economy and migration have been modelled with Cliometric structures closely related to those of natural increase and the economy. Wages were driven up by emigration from Europe and reduced in the economies receiving immigrants

Economic-demographic interactions in the European long run growth

Cliometrics confirms that Malthus’s model of the preindustrial economy is a good description for much of demographic-economic history; increases in productivity raise population, but higher population drives down wages. A contributor to the Malthusian equilibrium was the Western European marriage pattern, the late age of female first marriage, which promised to retard the fall of living standards by restricting fertility. The demographic transition and the transition from Malthusian economies to modern economic growth attracted many cliometric models surveyed here. A popular model component is that lower levels of mortality over many centuries increased the returns to, or preference for, human capital investment so that technical progress eventually accelerated. This initially boosted birth rates and population growth accelerated. Fertility decline was earliest and most striking in late-eighteenth-century France. By the 1830s, the fall in French marital fertility is consistent with a response to the rising opportunity cost of children. The rest of Europe did not begin to follow until near the end of the nineteenth century. Interactions between the economy and migration, mainly focused on the long nineteenth century, have been modeled with cliometric structures closely related to those of natural increase and the economy. Wages were driven up by emigration from Europe and reduced in the economies receiving immigrants

Fallacious convergence? Williamson’s real wage comparisons under scrutiny

The idea of manifest real-wage convergence for unskilled workers in the latter half of the nineteenth century stems from an article from 1995 by Jeffrey G. Williamson. That article presented real wage comparisons of unskilled urban workers for seventeen countries. Sweden, along with the rest of Scandinavia, is found to be an influential case in accounting for much of the alleged factor price convergence taking place. This paper takes a closer look at all the three steps that have to be taken in order to establish real wage comparisons, focusing on Sweden in relation to the US and the UK. The most important findings are twofold. First, that the US–Sweden wage gap is considerably smaller for manufacturing than for building workers, and second, that the rate at which Sweden’s real wages approached the American and the British has been grossly overestimated. Swedish real wages did grow rapidly, but not as rapidly as Williamson’s comparison will have us to believe, because his real wage series does not constitute a representative account of the Swedish unskilled real wage experience. It is argued that, as we suffer from a serious paucity of data for narrow and comparable samples of late nineteenth century unskilled workers, resorting to more encompassing wage measures is a more viable option. That also implies a questioning of the American unskilled wage series, which makes considerably slower progress than the wage series for manufacturing workers.Convergence, Real wages, Wage benchmark, Purchasing power parity, Catching up, International comparisons